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The Tacis Programme is an initiative developed by the European Union to foster close and
harmonious economic and political links with the New Independent States and Mongolia. Its aim
is to support the partner countries’ initiatives to develop societies based on political freedom and
economic prosperity.
Tacis does this by providing grant finance, primarily for technical assistance and know-how to
support the process of transformation to market economies and democracy. Since its inception,
Tacis has committed ECU 3,300 million to launch more than 3,000 projects.
The Tacis Programme aims to forge closer links between the EU and the NIS, working alongside
each other to determine how funds should be spent. This ensures that Tacis funding is relevant to
each country’s own reform policies and priorities. As part of a broader international effort, Tacis
also works closely with other donors and international organisations.
Tacis provides know-how from a wide range of public and private organisations, which allows
experience of market economies and democracies to be combined with local knowledge and
skills. This know-how is delivered by providing policy advice, consultancy teams, studies and
training, by developing and reforming legal and regulatory frameworks, institutions and
organisations, and by setting up partnerships, networks, twinnings and pilot projects. Tacis is also
a catalyst, unlocking funds from major lenders by providing pre-investment and feasibility
studies.
The preparation of the Tacis regulation for the period 2000-6 has prompted a review of the
existing Tacis programme with regard to future reforms. New priorities for assistance will be
promoted through the following implementation changes: A move towards ‘dialogue-driven’
programming, an increased promotion of investment, an increase in the number of assistance
instruments available and improving the quality of the assistance through the creation of an
incentive scheme.
Tacis promotes understanding and appreciation of democracy and a market oriented social and
economic system by cultivating links and lasting relationships between organisations in the
partner countries and their counterparts in the European Union.
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Tacis, the European Union’s assistance programme to Russia and other newly independent states (NIS)
plus Mongolia, supported four streams of projects known as the (QWHUSULVH)DFLOLW\6XSSRUW*URXSas
part of the overall Facilities Programme.  Evaluation of these projects because of their similarity of
purpose and interaction took place simultaneously during the second half of 1998.  The total Tacis
commitment to these projects between 1993 and 1998 was about ECU 37 million.
These projects follow a structure termed the 
IDFLOLWLHVDSSURDFK
where the project design sets specific
objectives and criteria for the final commitment of funds and leaves considerable leeway in the choosing
of precise sub project or group to implement that sub project.  Facilities are intended to simplify and lend
support to the National Action Programmes.
This study evaluates one of these initiatives, the ongoing programme known as the (XURSHDQ 6HQLRU
6HUYLFH 1HWZRUN (ESSN) which had a budgeted allocation of ECU 10.4 million1 divided over ’five
projects’.  The objectives of the evaluation are to assess the impact of this project and how it contributed to
the development of the newly emerging privatised sector. Of parallel importance, particularly as
competition and constraints emerge for future funding, is to ascertain the value and impact of the
programme, so as to allow Tacis to review strategies and introduce necessary improvements to the
planning and delivery of future inputs.
The core objective of the ESSN programme, as with the other three, is to strengthen the process of
transition to a market economy by focusing on the privatisation of mostly small enterprises (SMEs).
Specifically, ESSN aims to transfer skills by providing to owners and managers of NIS enterprises access
to the know how and experience of retired managers and professionals in the EU.  This is done primarily
by arranging visits of these experts to the enterprises themselves.  During the period under review (from
1993 to 1998) DOPRVWH[SHUWPLVVLRQVWRWKH1,6 DQG0RQJROLDWRRNSODFHESSN also facilitates
visits by owners, managers and senior staff to companies and institutions in the EU which are engaged in
similar business activities as the NIS company.  0RUH WKDQPDQDJHUVhave so far participated in
these exchanges.
Success relies on a combination of advice and commitment by both adviser and host company.  The
services of the ESSN expert (including expenses in most instances) are provided free of charge.  The main
thrust is to focus on individual enterprises who need assistance to solve their problems in a rapidly
changing marketing and technological environment.  The ESSN programme was originally created by a
direct Tacis initiative and not from requests from the countries themselves.  For the first four years of
project implementation, funds for the ESSN projects came from Interstate funds.  From 1997 onwards
they have been sourced from the individual country national action programmes.  Provision of the
volunteer expertise comes from independent national senior service organisations established in EU
countries who are financed through the Tacis programme to provide the required expert inputs.
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To evaluate performance, the Evaluation Team faced a vast geographical spread and number of initiatives
in up to 12 NIS countries and Mongolia, a Project Implementation Unit in Brussels and 23 Senior Service
Organisations in the various countries of the EU who provided inputs in terms of individual expertise.  Of
necessity, sampling of results was the norm and we believe the evaluation is based on as fair a consensus
of opinion as possible from the information available to the evaluators.
Fragmentation of information over such a wide area resulted in a simplified, consolidated evaluation
schedule. Assessment of the information  was carried out in three phases:
1. At start up, an in depth DQDO\VLV was undertaken of all available materials in Brussels and
deliberations took place with a wide range of Tacis officials and with staff of the project PIU.
Written information was available but the high turnover of Tacis staff did not make for easy debate.
An interim report was prepared for Tacis on completion of this work.
2. The second phase included ILHOG PLVVLRQV to Russia (15days) Uzbekistan (10 days) and where
possible attending seminars involving project participants in the EU.  Visits were also made to two
Member State (National) senior service organisations (SSOs).
3. On return the evaluation team continued to debate the initial findings with stakeholders whilst
preparing WKHILQDODVVHVVPHQWof the team’s findings.
The approach to this evaluation was to follow a carefully structured series of interviews with all
stakeholders, surveys, questionnaires and study of documents.  Cross checking of information between
participants and providers was not a difficult process and threw up some sharp conflict and differences of
opinion.  Logical framework matrices were not used for the task in hand, primarily because of the shifting
levels of support of ESSN in the different NIS countries and the wide variation in the economic and social
stability in the countries themselves.  What had been achieved in one country was often flawed in another.
Success or otherwise has been measured against four major criteria.
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Use of these criteria provided a more than adequate base from which to evaluate the level of success of the
ESSN programme.
7KH0DLQ)LQGLQJV&RQFOXVLRQVDQG5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV
7KH(YDOXDWLRQKDVIRXQGWKDW
1. Whilst there is room for improvement particularly in the choice and delivery of the expertise and
selection and acceptance of client companies, the ESSN programme has provided valuable assistance to
the majority of clients, in the small and newly privatised companies sector, throughout the NIS and
Mongolia.
2. The facility approach to implement this type of programme is the correct vehicle to use.  This may
be in conflict with the recently introduced programming style which starts with an agreement on the
iii
financial priorities at the highest level in the NIS government and the geographic department of Tacis and
is, subsequently worked down through the respective hierarchies for implementation.  The more grassroots
approach of the ’facilities’ e.g. ESSN, is more effective in attaining success at this level.
3. ESSN is the only Tacis instrument which provides direct assistance, from experienced well-
qualified experts concerning concrete and urgent problems, to clients in the NIS and Mongolia.  Given
adequate finance and an improvement in delivery, the ESSN initiative could yield greater and more
positive results.  This is particularly relevant for the emerging companies in the SME sector.
4. The response to the Tacis ESSN support to beneficiary companies cannot be considered to be
homogeneous across the NIS and Mongolia.  The needs and the responses vary from country to country.
The level of business development in the major cities in Russia for example is, on average, higher than
that in Uzbekistan.  The host company in Russia is more often seeking much more precise information for
development purposes than its counterpart in Uzbekistan or indeed in the more remote areas of Russia
where a generalist approach is acceptable.  The level of satisfaction amongst beneficiaries therefore varies
on a geographical basis.  The quality of the matching process of the expert to the need is crucial for the
success of the programme.  To succeed, it is imperative that four major criteria are met;
½ a proper and precise assessment of the need is provided;
½ a fast and efficient response to the request;
½ a good match of the experts skills to the need and
½ the expert being able to properly communicate his advice to the host company.
An important spin off is that ESSN reinforces cooperation between enterprises in the host countries and
their counterparts in the NIS and Mongolia. Mainly through individual contacts and ESSN visits important
networks have been created.
5. The ESSN programme has benefited the SME sector in the host countries most.  Initially the
project provided assistance to this sector alone but in recent years has relaxed the qualifications and larger
companies can now participate in the programme providing that they are privatised or undergoing
privatisation.  The evaluation team is not in favour of providing ESSN expertise to other than the SME
sector.
6. The PMU is working efficiently and effectively.  The relationship between the PIU and some of
the senior service organisations is obviously turbulent from time to time although much better than in the
past. There is evidence during discussions with each party of what the team considers unwarranted
mistrust and suspicions. It should also be noted that this situation has improved considerably since
programme start up and is now much less of a problem than before.  Considerable and impressive gains
have been made in project management e.g. the present computerised accounting system and streamlining
of payments. The first two contracts entrusted management to either a consortia of senior service
organisations or a single institution.  The present incumbents of the position have high standards,
commitment and new innovative ideas.
7KHUHLVFOHDUHYLGHQFHWKDW(661LVVHHQE\VRPHDVDSURYLGHURIVXEVLGLVHGDQGWKHUHIRUHXQIDLU
FRPSHWLWLRQ WRERWK WKH60('$VDQG%&&V$OVR WR WKH HPHUJLQJFRQVXOWDQF\ VHFWRU7KLV LV DPDWWHU
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8. ESSN budgets have declined in recent years.  ESSN II had a budget of ECU 3.8 million.  ESSN
III had a budget of ECU 2.12 million in 1996.  The extension in 1997 was ECU 1.65 million The budget
(1998), for the 1999 input is ECU 1 million. There is severe competition for available funds within the
Tacis structure and the future of ESSN in the coming programming round is uncertain.
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The Evaluation Team concludes that the ESSN programme is a highly relevant vehicle to provide low
cost, flexible, direct assistance to small and medium size companies in Tacis countries.  Provision of this
expertise is making a very worth while contribution to the development of the private sector on a micro
level.
At start up Tacis correctly identified the priority of small businessmen for hands on assistance to speed up
the reform process. By initially introducing the ESSN from Brussels, Tacis acted correctly in the
prevailing circumstances as the intention was to speed up the provision of the expertise.  Nevertheless this
approach often alienated the authorities in the recipient countries which were concerned that they were not
part of the consultative process for the ESSN programme.  The horizontal facility approach proved
effective as the project was able to cater more directly to demand on the level of the beneficiaries.
Initiating ESSN at grass roots level was much more effective in producing results than by working
through state bureaucracy.
The ESSN project, if working at optimum level would be relatively inexpensive to administer. The present
budget however is too low to provide the critical mass that is needed to fully utilise the structure that is
available. The present PIU manager is mounting a very low key PR programme as a wider dissemination
will result in a flood of applications that his budgets cannot handle.  The cost of expert mission when
compared to PIU costs has increased substantially as the following table shows.
To approach minimum cost effectiveness the programme should operate at a level not below ECU 2
million per annum.
)LJXUH±&RVWRI([SHUW0LVVLRQV
Project Total value
ECU
PMU cost Cost of PMU as % of
contract
Planned
Missions as
per contract
ECU Cost per
mission compared to
cost of PMU
ESSN 3 2,120,000 293,638 13.85% 290 1012.54
ESSN 4 1,650,000 286,498 17.30% 190 1507.88
ESSN 5
indicative
only
1,000,000 270,140 27.01% 100 2701.44
To make facilities cost effective they must be quickly scaled up after having proven to be effective in
meeting demand and producing the expected outputs.  In this instance it would appear the opposite is
taking place.  The number of expert visits is being severely restricted and cost effectiveness will become
an issue.
Despite its overall success the ESSN has two distinct problems:
1. There exists too many unsatisfied beneficiaries which creates bad publicity for the
programme.  Except for the small sample that the evaluation team tested, no statistics on
beneficiary satisfaction exist which is a serious shortcoming.  From our investigations we do not
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vbelieve the number is high but of course they include the most voluble.  We can report that we
were able to observe examples of major company change achieved through a very cost effective
delivery system.
2. Real and not imagined difficulties exist between the organisations which provide the
experts and the PIU management. To management in particular they are a cause of distraction and
concern when time and resources are so scarce.
The evaluators are not aware why the project budgets are being reduced but if these issues are resolved
this would provide a stronger claim for an increase in funding.  Emphasis must continue to be placed on
the quality of expert advice and speed of response to urgent needs.
5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV
The Evaluation Team recommends that the ESSN programme continues as an instrument of particular
value to transfer direct to recipients, hands on skills in a speedy and effective manner.  The particular
value of the programme is the direct practical interface between specific sectors of expertise.  If the
programme is carefully implemented, in full compliance with the high quality standards described in the
TOR the programme would have an increased impact on recipient companies.  Several areas require
review.
½ The central PIU and the national senior expert organisations both have a major role to play and
they should continue to work together to find a common sense of purpose and avoid the
disagreements of the past. Tacis should continue to support the PIU structure.
½ The design of the programme is conducive to a high level of efficiency and increasing cost
effectiveness.  Project management with the help of the national organisations should design a
long term framework for a good working relationship which will attract increased budgets.
½ Present budgets are unlikely to be cost effective. Tacis should consider increased budgets for this
programme but an enlargement should be paralleled by enhanced methods to;
(i) attract high quality applications which should be well screened prior to
responding to the request and
(ii) selection of senior experts should be based on quality and not on any type of
allocation basis between the expert organisations.
½ Tacis should consider entering into longer contractual agreements with the contractors
implementing the ESSN programme than in the past. The programme requires continuity to
function smoothly and best profit from experience accumulated over the years.
½ The bonds between the PIU representing Tacis and the member state senior service organisations
should be cemented particularly in the EU.  Tacis should however expand the role of the Tacis
established SME DAs and BCCs in the selection of beneficiaries in the NIS countries.
½ Provision of free expert services can have an adverse effect on the fledgling consultancy industry
in the recipient countries.  The scale of the need for assistance particularly in the SME sector is
vast and unfair competition is not at the present time a major problem.  Sight must not be lost of
such a possibility if a PR programme is launched and the programme expanded.
½ A built in internal monitoring programme is essential for PIU management to function
effectively. External monitoring of the ESSN programme because of the disproportionate cost
should be carried out on a spot check, sample basis.  SME DAs and BCCs should be trained
(using the Tacis monitoring teams as a vehicle) in the monitoring role.
½  ,QFUHDVHGFRRSHUDWLRQLQWKHVHOHFWLRQRIORFDOFRPSDQLHVUHTXLULQJDVVLVWDQFHDQGVXSSRUWLQJ
WKHORJLVWLFDOQHHGVRIWKH3,8LVDQREYLRXVVWHSIRUZDUGEHWZHHQ(661DQGWKH60('$%&&
VWUXFWXUH 7R HOLPLQDWH WKH VXEVLGLVHG FRPSHWLWLRQ HOHPHQW WKH (661 H[SHUWV VKRXOG ZRUN
WKURXJKRUWRJHWKHUZLWKWKHGHYHORSPHQWDJHQFLHVDQG5XVVLDQFRQVXOWDQWV
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Multiplier effects for ESSN are small.  The major impact is on the recipient company.  This is why
selection of the beneficiary is so important.  Some of the complaints that the evaluators heard were caused
by a lack of clear understanding of what was on offer from ESSN.  Too many recipients linked the inputs
of the expertise with the solution to all their problems.
A financial analysis of this and other facility programmes would produce interesting results although the
evaluation team do not believe it would radically change any of the opinions offered above. It is
recommended that this in particular relation to cost effectiveness be included in any future evaluations.
1 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
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The European Senior Service Network Programme (ESSN) is one of the four facility programmes that
were evaluated together from April till the end of 1998.  These programmes, termed the Enterprise
Facility Support Group (ESG), are meant to underwrite or sustain the mainstream Tacis action
programmes particularly in the SME sector.  Other programmes in the group are;
½ the Tacis Productivity Initiative and Work Attachment Programmes;
½ the Mercure and Chamber Partnership Programme and
½ the NIS/CIS-Partenariat (including the participation of NIS-Managers in Europartenariats).
Each of these is the subject of a separate evaluation report.
Enterprise Support Facilities have been an instrument accompanying main stream Tacis projects in the
enterprise restructuring area since 1992.  They were conceived as a flexible, easy and fast to implement
means of direct assistance to enterprises mainly in the SME sector.  The intention was that this support
would help small privatised enterprises to become sustainable and profitable even in the turmoil of the
rapidly changing economic and political environment of the NIS.
This was far from an easy task as at transition the new private enterprises faced a harsh environment.  The
recipients expected much and some complained that the ESSN experts did not show enough understanding
of the local situation.
What was basically good advice for example, such as downsize staff, buy better machinery to replace
obsolete equipment or find a foreign partner was often difficult to implement in the new environment.
6HQLRU(661H[SHUWVKDGWRVKRZDVPXFKGLSORPDF\DVWHFKQLFDOVNLOOV
ESG projects have a high profile particularly at grass roots level.  A single failure of what is a relatively
low cost ESSN input, often provokes a disproportionate response.  Careful monitoring of progress is
necessary yet reliable independent information on the progress of the ESG group of projects was not
available in the early days of the projects.  Whereas Tacis mainstream programmes and projects have been
subject to continuous monitoring starting as early as 1993, monitoring of the ESG only started in 1997 and
only in Russia.  A small team of monitors was then assigned with the task of systematically monitoring the
facilities programmes including the ESG (ESSN) at the Moscow office of the Tacis Monitoring
Programme.
Thus, it is difficult to draw conclusions from monitoring of individual missions.  Due primarily to the cost
effectiveness of monitoring each ESSN mission and the late start to the ESG monitoring programme, only
sample monitoring of projects has taken place so far.  The evaluation will discuss monitoring again in
section 2.2.3
2Faced with this situation the present evaluation of the ESSN programme had to go far beyond screening
and reviewing material made available by both contractors and monitors.  It had to include a sufficient
number of visits and meetings in the field to balance the lack of secondary material with first hand
observations and impressions.  This was even more important because from the beginning of ESSN,
assistance to the NIS in 1993 to the end of 1998, roughly one thousand missions have been completed.
The evaluation therefore has taken care to consider both the results of the missions to two countries (The
Russian Federation and Uzbekistan) in addition to their desk studies and discussions with Tacis,
contractors and experts in the EU.  Considerable attention was paid to the systems of quality control
employed by the PIU.
ESSN was not intended to create a new independent organisation of Tacis financed assistance, but it was
intended to work through existing National senior services organisations, initially only from Germany,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.  These SSOs maintain important world-wide
senior service programmes, financed and promoted with national funding.
While these organisations provide the substance of the Tacis programme, ESSN project management has a
role to ensure that the services provided complied with the conditions and modalities attached to the Tacis
financing.  Project management also has an important role in setting and maintaining quality standards for
the senior services financed by Tacis and in spreading the concept of senior services to other EU member
states.  This particular feature explains much of the history and issues around ESSN.
Companies in all 12 NIS countries and Mongolia have availed themselves of ESSN assistance across
many and varied sectors.  Companies in the major cities in Russia tend to require much more specific
inputs than those in the other countries where a generalist approach is much more acceptable.
The report is structured;
½ to continue in this section to provide some background information to explain the importance of the
emerging small and medium size business sector in the NIS and Mongolia and to explain why
provision of the expertise offered by the ESSN programme is so important.  The purpose of which is
to emphasise and recognise the close interaction between SMEs and ESSN.  At this point it will be
necessary to briefly discuss government policies in the sector, the current status of reforms and
development of the ESSN programme over the years.
½ to describe and comment on the programme content, how it complements the Tacis programme in
general and the methods utilised to assist the companies it purports to assist.
½ to appraise the evolution of the programme which is important if it is to meet the changing needs of
the recipient companies.
6HFWLRQ  will provide more detailed information on the methodology and the organisation of the
evaluation.
&KDSWHUwill provide a detailed description of the findings of the evaluation team.  This section will be
structured following the main criteria of the evaluation, i.e., project relevance, effectiveness of
implementation, efficiency of project management, and overall impact of the programme on the target
sector.
&KDSWHUwill list the findings reached by the Evaluation Team and their recommendations concerning
future actions to be taken by Tacis.
7KH$QQH[HVprovide evidence of the evaluation process and information to support the conclusions of
the Evaluation Team.
3 7KH1HHGVRIWKH60(VHFWRU
*RYHUQPHQW3ROLFLHVDQG6WDWXVRI5HIRUPV
ESSN is interwoven with the aims and objectives of the SME programme.  Initially ESSN was targeted at
"institutions, organisations and companies in their process of reform and recovery".  However, the ToR
for ESSN II narrowed this wide target group and mentioned explicitly the SMEs as main beneficiaries of
the programme.  Further changes are described in section 1.1.4.
Enterprise restructuring attempts to rebuild companies created under the Soviet style economic system to
become efficient and profitable in a market driven environment.  This is mainly supposed to be achieved
through privatisation of the (mostly large to very large) companies.  It also means support to the creation
of a large number of new, small and medium sized companies that are able to cope with the new
environment in a better way than many of the old, large combines.  It does not matter in this connection
whether the new small and medium sized enterprises are start ups or result from spin-offs of new legal
entities from large companies.  Thus there is a great variation in the type and size of the companies that
have taken part in the privatisation process.  Most important is that different countries have adopted
alternative ways of privatisation restructuring.
Both countries visited by the Evaluation Team (Russia and Uzbekistan) in the course of the present
evaluation, have put much emphasis on SME development for many years.  However, whereas Russia has,
in parallel, pushed through privatisation of large parts of its economy speedily and aggressively,
Uzbekistan has been much less active.
Whereas SMEs did not reach the same high level of economic importance in Uzbekistan, they have been
developing into an important player in the economic field in Russia.  According to ‘SMEs in Terms of
Statistics - State Committee of Small Business Support -Resource Centre 1998’;
½ as of the 1st of January 1998, more than 860.000 officially registered small enterprises operated in the
89 oblasts of the Russian Federation;
½ the number has grown in 1997 by 4.2 per cent;
½ SMEs employ more than 8.5 million people, which amounts to 13.2 per cent of the overall number of
people employed in Russian companies and
½ SMEs occupied a share of 31.8 per cent of the total number of Russian enterprises at the beginning of
1998.
The explosion of SMEs in the NIS resulted in the need for speedy and effective advice.  Tacis responded
by prioritising support for the SME sector and the prime thrust of its support was through the
establishment of development agencies for SMEs (SME DAs) and Business Communications Centres
(BCCs) as well as other mainstream projects.  These centres offered the emerging business man exposure
to western business practice.  $ORQJVLGH WKHVH LQLWLDWLYHV ZHUH WKH (6* SURJUDPPHV LQFOXGLQJ (661
ZKLFKFRUUHFWO\LGHQWLILHGWKHQHHGQRWRQO\WRSURYLGHDGYLFHRQWKHWKHRU\RIEXVLQHVVSUDFWLFHVXFKDV
SUHSDUDWLRQ RI EXVLQHVV SODQV EXW WR SURYLGH D IDFLOLW\ ZKHUH KLJK TXDOLW\ KDQGV RQ H[SHUWLVH ZDV
DYDLODEOHDWDVXEVLGLVHGRUQRFRVW
ESSN's value is that it responds directly to the company requesting support without any bureaucratic
involvement or interference.  It is a vital link in the SME support programme providing assistance where it
is most required.  ESSN complements the other Tacis initiatives into this business revolution.  At another
4level, the Productivity Initiative Programme (PIP), trains to a high level the management of the business
sector.  7KH(661SURYLGHVWKHGLUHFWSUDFWLFDODGYLFHWRPDNHEXVLQHVVLQLWLDWLYHVZRUN
Support for the privatisation process and the important role of SMEs has been strong in the NIS.  The
examples in Russia and Uzbekistan mirror the general enthusiasm elsewhere.  In the Russian Federation, a
growing political awareness of the importance of a large number of SMEs as the sound basis of a well
functioning economy resulted in the creation of the State Committee of Small Business Support in 1995.
In 8]EHNLVWDQ the Government has been conducive in the past to the establishment of institutions that
provide services to assist the development of SMEs.  The sector was supported financially through the
establishment of a business fund that was originally fed from privatisation revenues.
7KHUHLVQRVRXQGVWDWLVWLFDOGDWDEXWLWLVFODLPHGWKDWWKHUHDUHRIILFLDOO\UHJLVWHUHG60(VDQG
PRUHWKDQLQGHSHQGHQWHQWUHSUHQHXUVRSHUDWLQJLQ8]EHNLVWDQWRGD\
Recent economic events in the both the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan have seen considerable
changes concerning SME development in 1998.  While support to the SME sector was reduced to an
insignificant level by the new Russian government nominated in the fall of 1998, the Uzbek government
adopted a more radical approach.  In a surprising step for most parties it reorganised the system of support
to SMEs in May 1998 into a top-down centralised system which provided for government’s direct
influence over small enterprises.
Whilst these apparent contradictions are a reaction to the severe economic constraints of the day LWZLOOQRW
LQWKHRSLQLRQRIWKH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPLQKLELWWKHVXSSRUWUHTXLUHGIURP(661RURWKHU7DFLVSURJUDPPHV
WRWKH60(VHFWRUOn the contrary, it will see the rise of the more knowledgeable and organised business
man who will respond to the high quality support that ESSN can provide.
It would therefore appear that political support to SMEs has sharply decreased in both countries in 1998.
Yet this is a crises in which the ESSN programme can play an expanding role.  For example the crisis
under which Russia has been suffering since August 1998 has clearly increased the future opportunities
for small Russian companies in the production and manufacturing sectors.  As imports that have been
dominating large parts of the Russian economy over the last few years have become unaffordable for both
consumers and producers, the time has come for Russian suppliers to start large scale manufacturing
activities.  This is true for the NIS and Mongolia as a whole.  With careful planning the programme can
assist SMEs which are better able to make a flexible response to changes in their environment than larger
companies particularly those which are still state controlled.  There is the strong probability that they will
benefit considerably from the resumption of domestic production.  It follows that such companies will
benefit from the speedy and effective quality expertise that ESSN can provide.
 2XWOLQHRI3URJUDPPH&RQWHQW
The first ESSN programme started in 1993, funded from Tacis 1992 Regional SME Programme, a so-
called interstate programme. It was a ‘facility programme’ which is described in section 2.1.2.
In the case of the ESSN programme, the facility approach was chosen to complement Tacis main stream
assistance to the SME sector in the NIS with speedily mobilised, ready to implement, direct assistance to
enterprises.  Tacis main stream projects have traditionally been focusing on the establishment and further
development of SME-support structures.  SME DAs were created in most of the Tacis countries and are
meant to provide small and medium sized enterprises with services in the areas of information, advice,
training and co-operation.  Later on, BCCs were created to provide for a better link of SMEs in a specific
5region/country with the outer world and to contribute to enhanced co-operation of SMEs within Tacis
countries and between the NIS and the EU.
ESSN offers enterprises in the NIS practical advice provided by EU senior experts as a complement to the
services provided by SME DAs.  The mobilisation time of an expert is expected to be short (it ranges from
several weeks to several months) and the budget of an average mission is minimal as compared with Tacis
main steam projects.  Whereas a typical Tacis main stream project assists one SME support structure in
developing into a fully operational and sustainable institution, the same budget can be used under the
ESSN facility for hundreds of missions of EU senior experts to enterprises on location.
ESSN’s overall objective is to strengthen the transition of Tacis countries to the market economy.  The
programme is designed to reach this overall objective by assisting individual owners and managers of NIS
enterprises with privatisation or restructuring of their enterprises.  It does so, by offering access to the
know-how and experience of retired EU managers and professionals with a long track record in their
respective field of business.  The programme is relying on a combination of advice and learning by doing,
to enhance the managerial capabilities of the beneficiaries.
The following are pertinent points in understanding the original objectives:
½ ,WZDVXQGHUVWRRGWKDW(661 ZRXOGIRFXVRQSULYDWH60(VDVLWZDVIXQGHGIURPWKHUHJLRQDO
60( SURJUDPPH
½ /DWHU RQ WKH WDUJHW JURXS ZDV ZLGHQHG WR UHFHQWO\ SULYDWLVHG ILUPV DQG ILUPV XQGHUJRLQJ
SULYDWLVDWLRQDQGWRODUJHUHQWHUSULVHV
½ ,UUHVSHFWLYH RI WKH VL]H RI FRPSDQLHV HOLJLEOH IRU (661 DVVLVWDQFH WKH DLP RI WKH (661
SURJUDPPHKDVDOZD\VEHHQWRSURYLGH1,6FRPSDQLHVZLWKIOH[LEOHFKHDSTXLFNO\WRPRELOLVH
DGYLFHGHOLYHUHGE\H[SHULHQFHGUHWLUHG(8H[SHUWV WR FRPSDQLHVRQ ORFDWLRQDVD UHVSRQVH WR
WKHLUVSHFLILFGHPDQGV
0LVVLRQVW\SLFDOO\FRPSULVH
 DSUHSDUDWRU\SKDVH
 WKHPLVVLRQRIWKHH[SHUWRQORFDWLRQDQG
 DUHSRUWLQJSKDVH
The preparatory phase is aimed at bringing about a best possible match between the needs for assistance
and the expertise available. This is a critical area and key to success of the mission. If the needs are not
properly matched to the skills of  the senior expert then the mission will fail. In section 2.2.1 we compare
the results of good and bad matches of senior experts.
The EU senior expert acts as a consultant to the respective company.  He will spend most of his time with
the senior management in order to fulfil his terms of reference.
Once the expert returns to his home base, it is mandatory that he prepares a report which includes a (host)
company action plan.  The report is submitted to the PMU together with the invoice.
 3URJUDPPH(YROXWLRQ
Since the beginning of programme implementation in 1993, five different contractors have been involved
in programme implementation under contracts whose duration ranged from four months to three years.
(The table below does not show the bridging contract of four months in mid 1997)
60DQDJHPHQWRI(661SURMHFWV
ESSN I Implemented by a Consortium of European Senior
Service Organisations
ESSN II Implemented by a National Sen. Serv. Organisation.
ESSN III Project managed by an EU Consultancy firm
ESSN IV Extension of III
ESSN V 1998 action programme
(YROXWLRQRI2EMHFWLYHV
The programme is designed to meet its overall objective by assisting individual owners and managers of
NIS enterprises with the privatisation and restructuring of their enterprises.
In 1993, Tacis formulated the objectives of the programme as follows: "to assist individual institutions,
organisations and companies in their reform and recovery as part of a market oriented economic system
through a facility which enables to give a rapid response to an urgent need".  Rapid response and urgent
needs were key elements ’m this formulation.  In the VHFRQG(661 contract;
½ "flexible delivery of EU senior expertise" and
½ "improved management of the programme" were key objectives.
The ToR also put emphasis on "providing inputs of practical managerial experience, know-how and
skills".
Assistance was to be delivered directly to private enterprises without passing through public institutions.
However, under the (661,, the programme introduced the involvement of the services of intermediaries
such as 60('$V and %&&V created under other Tacis projects.
While the central objective of (661,,, was practically the same as in the preceding project, Tacis added
some new objectives to the list.  The ToR stated that;
“a new objective will be to continuously improve the quality of the missions and the experts”.
In addition to that, the assistance provided under ESSN was explicitly expected to “be provided on the
basis of enterprise requests in a demand driven environment”.
Although the National SSOs have always marketed their services in the NIS and presented suitable cases
for ESSN financing, new PIU procedures have been designed to ensure that the senior expert missions
always respond to the applicants' demands.
(YROXWLRQLQ(661
V7DUJHW*URXSV
The ToR for ESSN II narrowed the initial wide target group and mentioned explicitly the SMEs as main
beneficiaries of the programme.
7It has to be noted that, in 1994, 60( development was not yet considered a priority for all Tacis
countries. Only Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and the Ukraine viewed "Enterprise restructuring and
development" (which included 60(V) as a so-called "focal sector".  Tacis SME strategy was mainly
focusing on the creation and development of the 60('$ and %&& intermediary support structures.
(661 ,, focussed exclusively on 60(V and became, together with the Work Attachment Programme
(WAP), 7DFLV¶principal instrument for transferring Western management practices and technical know-
how to SMEs in the Tacis countries.  Also, the ToR of (661 ,,changed the eligibility criteria to "include
firms in the process of privatisation".
(661,,, targeted "SMEs and larger enterprises".  The widening of the target group went together with a
decision to allow missions of teams of senior experts going to one NIS enterprise.  The team approach
made the missions less vulnerable for possible failure of one individual senior expert.  However, more
importantly, with the team approach, ESSN could include financial expertise to the specialised expertise it
was already offering.  It would make ESSN a better partner for a new stream of Tacis projects aimed at
supporting NIS enterprises in the area of company finances.
Whilst ESSN mainly concentrates on SMEs, larger companies are also eligible. Even 100% state owned
enterprises are eligible for ESSN support if the case is supported by the respective Tacis CU or EU-
Delegation and if evidence of the company’s privatisation can be demonstrated.  The companies can
belong to any sector, with priority given to enterprises in manufacturing and other production sectors.
87KH(YROXWLRQRI(661)LQDQFLQJ
Although the start-up phase of the programme was not without problems, it soon became evident that most
beneficiaries responded well to the results of the senior expert missions.  On these grounds, Tacis decided
to enlarge the programme and to provide it with a better management structure.  The development of the
financial weight given to the ESSN programme shows in ECU, the following picture.
7KHUHDUHQRUHVWULFWLRQVRQFDSDFLW\WKDWZRXOGUHWDUGSURJUDPPHJURZWK7KH3,8EHOLHYHVLWFDQ
HDVLO\GRXEOHWKHQXPEHURIPLVVLRQVZLWKLQWKHSUHVHQWVHWWLQJ  The larger participating senior service
organisations would be able to manage a higher number of missions without difficulties.  They are also
interested in an enlargement of the programme.  Some of the smaller senior service organisations would
initially not benefit from an increase in the number of missions as they would quickly reach their
capacities but this is not a limiting factor.
'HVSLWHWKHVHIDYRXUDEOHFRQGLWLRQVWKH7DFLVDOORFDWLRQVIRU(661DUHSUHVHQWO\IDOOLQJDQGZLOOQH[W
\HDUDOPRVWUHDFKWKHOHYHORIWKHLQLWLDODQQXDOEXGJHW
This projected decrease in mission activity is not due to lack of demand for ESSN services.  Potential
beneficiaries have first to know about the programme before they can apply, and ESSN management
keeps the promotion of the programme deliberately at low levels in order not to raise active demand
beyond the available financing capacity.  The Evaluation Team found this low-promotion policy reflected
in a lack of awareness about the programme with the SME DAs in Russia, ESSN’s natural partners.
Despite the lack of promotion, the number of applications increases every year.
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9One possible reason for the decrease in ESSN budget allocations lies with the budgeting process.  From
1996 onward, the then "Horizontal Facilities" -and today’s "Small Project Programmes"- were not
budgeted for by Tacis headquarters. They became subject to Tacis’ procedures for designing Country
Programmes, which give the responsibility for budget proposals to the Tacis Co-ordinating Units (CUs)
who prepare the annual or bi-annual Tacis Action Programmes. There is also severe competition for funds.
The decrease in budget allocations for the ESSN programme could therefore mirror the importance the
CUs give to the restructuring of NIS enterprises and the development of SMEs  and the related facility
projects.  Unfortunately, the CUs have, traditionally, paid little attention to the merits of the facilities
managed by Tacis-Brussels and have been slow in changing their attitudes once they were charged with
responsibility for the budget process.
7KH&8VUHTXLUHWREHEHWWHULQIRUPHGDQGPRUHLQYROYHGLQWKH(661LPSOHPHQWDWLRQSURFHVV,QVRPH
FRXQWULHV WKH\DUHDOUHDG\DFWLYHDQGSURFHVVDSSOLFDWLRQV IRUDVVLVWDQFHLQFRRSHUDWLRQZLWK WKH ORFDO
60('$RU%&&,Q8]EHNLVWDQPRVWRIWKHDSSOLFDWLRQVDUULYHYLDWKH7DVKNHQW%&&
3URJUDPPH,QSXWV
Under (661 , from 1993-95 approximately  H[SHUWPLVVLRQVwere organised to companies in the
NIS.  The EU experts were provided by the five members of the initial consortium (ESSC).
(661 ,,SODQQHGfor H[SHUWPLVVLRQVbut delivered (of this number 66 were accounted for inan
arrangement with the member states).  ,Q DGGLWLRQ IROORZXSWUDLQLQJPLVVLRQVDQGDWWDFKPHQWV
were realised involving NIS managers. Targets were 100 and 200 respectively.  The number of
seminars and workshops to be delivered was according to plan  VHPLQDUV involving more than 
SDUWLFLSDQWV.
(661 ,,,(including the extension (661,9) which was still underway while the present evaluation was
carried out budgeted to provide for another H[SHUWPLVVLRQV and up to 90 WUDLQLQJPLVVLRQVDQG
VHPLQDUVZRUNVKRSV In mid 1998, 10 seminars had already been competed with more than 230
participants.
The evaluation team are of the opinion that on current trends these targets (ESSN III) will be achieved and
probably surpassed.
Russia has been the largest beneficiary of ESSN assistance. Under the APs 1996- through 1998, 0(&8
ZHUH SURYLGHG IRU WKH (661 SURJUDPPH LQ WKH 5XVVLDQ )HGHUDWLRQ  whereas the second most
important recipient country, 0RQJROLD EXGJHWHG  7(&8 IRU WKH VDPH SHULRG 8]EHNLVWDQ
traditionally has made important allocations for the ESSN facility which amounted to a total of 
7(&8under the APs 1996 through 1998. While 5XVVLDQDOORFDWLRQVto ESSN GHFUHDVHGIURPof
the overall facilities budget under the AP 1996 WR under the AP 1998, the ESSN share in the Uzbek
overall facilities budget LQFUHDVHGIURP WR
Of 657 missions to the NIS and follow up training missions/work attachments to the EU completed under
the second ESSN contract (see table 9), SHUFHQWHTXDOWRPLVVLRQVwere accounted for under
5XVVLDand SHU FHQW HTXDO WR PLVVLRQV XQGHU8]EHNLVWDQWhile the percentageof missions
initiated by SME DAs or BCCs is quite low in Russia(only 20 applications under the ESSN 11 contract),
DSSOLFDWLRQVIURP8]EHNLVWDQFRPHDOPRVWH[FOXVLYHO\WKURXJKWKH7DVKNHQWEDVHG%&&which was
established under a Tacis main stream project.
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 (YDOXDWLRQ0HWKRGRORJ\DQG2UJDQLVDWLRQ
 (YDOXDWLRQ2EMHFWLYHV
The main objectives of the present evaluation as detailed in the ToR are uniform for each of the ESG
programmes being evaluated.  These are to;
½ provide consistent conclusions in relation to overall relevance and appropriateness of the Facility
(ESSN) programmes,
½ make specific recommendations aimed at enhancing the impact of the Facilities with regard to:
-  budget allocation
-  approach and selection criteria
-  implementation strategies
-  programme management and implementing procedures.
In its broad sense the evaluation is not simply a tool to retrospectively evaluate the results of the
programme so far.  Providing assistance to support change in any given situation cannot be seen as a
constant fixed input.  The programme itself must be flexible and be able to adjust to the ever-changing
political and economic scenario in the NIS and Mongolia.  Too often ToR are seen as fixed commitments
to follow, where in a facilityprogramme in particular, they should be considered a guide and open to
justified amendment in circumstances which are ever changing.In the ESSN programme we believe that
the programme has an inbuilt flexibility and it is the responsibility of programme management and Tacis
to respond to the prevailing circumstances.
,QWKHRSLQLRQRIWKH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPWKHSURJUDPPHREMHFWLYHVDUHEHLQJIROORZHG.  What should come
from this evaluation is what changes in strategy have to be made to react to firstly, the results so far and
secondly, who should coordinate any identified need for change.  We see our methodology as a ’process
approach’ which will enumerate the lessons learnt and what modifications are required to respond to
internal and external change.  Assuming the ESSN performance so far justifies the past Tacis support and
should be continued, which the evaluators consider it does, in short what will make it an even better
programme.  This tool for future planning is a pillar of a good evaluation.
 :RUN3ODQDQG(YDOXDWLRQ,QVWUXPHQWV
The evaluation was realised in four stages:
½ a desk study of all materials available within Tacis headquarters and the current Contractors office in
Brussels;
½ two missions to the field ( the Russian Federation andUzbekistan);
½ visits to/talks with senior expert services and senior experts and
½ report finalisation and feedback of the results to Tacis in Brussels and in Moscow.
The two week GHVNVWXG\was carried out at the end of April and beginning of May 1998 in Brussels.  It
comprised collecting, copying and screening of various material such as ToR, Technical Proposals,
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interim and final reports, etc.  It was complemented by a series of discussions with persons having been
responsible for ESSN implementation within Tacis headquarters and outside as well as with the Director
of the PIU.
The two week PLVVLRQ WR5XVVLD was realised in May 1998.  It involved the Team Leader, the SME
specialist and two Russian staff.  Interviews were made with ten companies and three SME development
agencies.  A survey questionnaire was sent to 29 SME DAs of which 14 responded.  Talks were held in
Moscow with the Tacis Co-ordinating Unit, the Delegation of the EC, the Tacis Monitoring Team, the
Federal Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and representatives of other Tacis projects as well as of
other donor organisations.
A ten day PLVVLRQ WR8]EHNLVWDQ was realised in June 1998.  It involved the Team Leader, the SME
specialist and one local expert.  During the mission, the Team held interviews with 12 companies, the
Tashkent BCC and two SME DAs in the regions.  The Evaluation Team also met with the Tacis
Coordinating Unit in Tashkent, the Chamber of Commodity Producers and Entrepreneurs, the Uzbek
Business Fund, other Tacis projects and other donor organisations.
Upon return from the second mission, a back to the office report was produced.  Simultaneously, two EU
senior expert services (NMCP in The Hague and SES in Bonn) were visited and discussions held by phone
with EU experts having implemented ESSN missions in the past.  Several additional, personal talks were
held with the Director of the PIU and the Team had an extensive telephone discussion with the current
project contractor.
Three further instruments were developed by the Evaluation Team:
½ guidelines for personal interviews with the companies in Russia and in Uzbekistan;
½ a questionnaire for SME DAs and BCCs in Russia inwhich they which were asked their assessment
of both programme performance and if they had played a role in the programme and
½ a separate questionnaire was developed for the Co-ordinating Units and SME DAs/BCCs in other
Tacis countries which asked about their experience with ESSN implementation in their respective
country.
Survey instruments are described in Annex 8.
The draft final report was then submitted to Tacis for approval.  After acceptance of the report it is
intended to hold a seminar in Brussels and one in Moscow to discuss the findings, conclusions and
recommendations of the Evaluation Team.
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 (YDOXDWLRQ&ULWHULD
The major criteria used for the present evaluation comprises relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and
impact of the ESSN programme.
5HOHYDQFH is understood here as the degree to which the ESSN programme focuses on enhancing the
development of the private sector, specifically the development of SMEs in Tacis countries.  We try to
identify to what extent the ESSN objectives are appropriate to the needs of the client and to assess how
well they interface and support the development of the privatisation programme particularly amongst the
SMEs.
(IIHFWLYHQHVV is viewed as the extent to which the objectives of the ESSN programme are being achieved
and to what extent the results are contributing to attainment of the programme objectives.  Do the clients
see definite change and positive results from implementation of the expert’s recommendations?  Is there a
low level of effectiveness? Is it caused by poor expert skills, bad matching or a communication problem?
(IILFLHQF\is understood as the degree to which human, physical and financial resources are used in the
implementation of the ESSN programme implementation.  We view efficiency not just as the cost of
inputs and how they result in outputs be they technical or financial.  External variables in this situation
play a most significant role in assessing levels of efficiency.
,PSDFW is understood in the present exercise as the extent to which the ESSN programme is bringing
about distinct changes in the companies which were provided with senior expert advice and is there a
significant demand in the level of requests for ESSN technical assistance.  What are the consequences of
the results of the project and will the programme continue under any other guise when Tacis support is
withdrawn?
In order to be able to accurately assess these criteria, the Evaluation Team developed a set of qualitative
and quantitative performance indicators to identify how well criteria were being met.  Indicators were
where possible, performance based.  These were designed around the interviews and questionnaires which
formed the main foundation for the evaluation.
The qualitative performance indicators started from the assessment of the outcomes of the programme
through the questionnaire used by the ESSN programme itself following completion of expert missions.
However, as the ESSN questionnaire was not completed by all recipient companies, and additional
information was required, the following indicators regarding qualitative performance were added to the
survey:
½ the extent to which the mission contributed to solving the recipient company’s problem(s);
½ the degree to which the company action plan produced by the expert was actually implemented;
½ the level to which companies having received assistance under a mission submit applications for a
follow-up mission;
½ the extent to which companies of former participants are looking for additional Tacis assistance in the
form of participation in PIP or WAP, advice provided by Enterprise Support Centres, SME DAs,
BCCs etc.
½ the extent to which improvements in the economic situation of companies have occurred after the
mission.
The quantitative performance indicators comprised such indicators as:
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½ the development of the number of applications;
½ the development of number of missions completed;
½ the development of the spread of missions over the whole country (for the RF) and the other Tacis
countries;
½ the awareness of the programme among;
-  the Russian/NIS business community;
-  domestic business support structures (such as Chambers, Associations, Unions etc.);
-  Tacis-funded business support structures (such as SME DAs, BCCS, T0s, ESCs etc.);
-  other enterprise restructuring-related Tacis-projects (e.g., TERF, sectoral enterprise
restructuring projects, etc.).
 6DPSOH6HOHFWLRQ
Given budgetary and time constraints and the large number of ESSN missions realised so far, the present
evaluation exercise is unable to categorically state that conclusions from the sample of missions are
representative of the whole.  This is true on both a sectoral or regional basis.  However, sample selection
corresponds with the process of selection of missions by the PIU which itself follows the randomised
inflow of applications from various regions and different sectors.
The sample analysed here comprises both companies which have already received senior expert advice
and companies having applied for ESSN assistance and still waiting for the arrival of the senior expert.
This allows for a comparison of expectations concerning the benefit a company can draw from an ESSN
expert and the actual benefit as viewed by the recipient company.  It comprises companies from all
possible sectors with more emphasis on the service sector in Russia and the manufacturing sector in
Uzbekistan.  This bias is mainly due to the fact that the mission to the field in Russia was focused on
Moscow and the Moscow region (both of which are characterised by a high percentage of service oriented
companies).  Whereas the mission to the field in Uzbekistan, covered the capital Tashkent as well as
several locations in the rural areas.
The missions in the field did not only involve final beneficiaries, i.e. companies.  It also included
intermediaries between companies applying for assistance and the PIU, such as SME DAs, BCCs and Co-
ordinating Units.
7KHVDPSOHRI5XVVLDQFRPSDQLHVLQFOXGHGLQWKHHYDOXDWLRQRIWKH(661SURJUDPPHDQGYLVLWHGE\WKH
(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPHYHQWXDOO\FRPSULVHGDWRWDORIWHQFRPSDQLHV7KUHHRIZKLFKKDGDSSOLHGIRUDVVLVWDQFH
DQG ZHUH VWLOO ZDLWLQJ IRU WKH H[SHUW RQH FRPSDQ\ KDYLQJ DSSOLHG DQG VXEVHTXHQWO\ FDQFHOOHG WKH
DVVLJQPHQWDQGVL[FRPSDQLHVKDYLQJDOUHDG\UHFHLYHG(661DVVLVWDQFH
7KH VDPSOH RI8]EHN FRPSDQLHV YLVLWHGE\ WKH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPFRPSULVHGD WRWDO RI  FRPSDQLHV RI
ZKLFK  FRPSDQLHV KDYLQJ DOUHDG\ UHFHLYHG (661 DVVLVWDQFH RQH FRPSDQ\ KDYLQJ DSSOLHG IRU
DVVLVWDQFHDQGVWLOOZDLWLQJIRUWKHH[SHUWDQGRQHFRPSDQ\KDYLQJDSSOLHGDQGVXEVHTXHQWO\FDQFHOOHGWKH
DVVLJQPHQW
The sample of Russian intermediary institutions included 17 SME DAs/BCCs of which 14 were contacted
in writing and three visited personally by the Evaluation Team.  The sample of Uzbek intermediaries
comprised one BCC and two SME DAs, all of which were visited personally by the Evaluation Team.
In addition, 8 Co-ordinating Units and SME DAs in other Tacis countries were contacted by fax and 6
responded to the questions asked by the Evaluation Team.  This exercise was undertaken to secure a wider
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representation of opinion as many of the NIS have specific political and economic environments.
Although limits were placed on the team because of financial constraints, we tried as far we could to make
the sampling as representative as possible.  The team are only too well aware that one or two countries
cannot be representative of the whole ESSN area of operations.
 &RQVWUDLQWVWRWKH(YDOXDWLRQ
A usual complaint is lack of time and funds.  We do not raise this as it is an open ended argument.  There
were no major constraints to the evaluation met by the Evaluation Team.  A minor problem was that staff
of several of the companies who had originally consented to being interviewed in both Russia and
Uzbekistan did not make themselves available as agreed for various reasons.  Another problem
encountered by the Team concerned the material made available by staff at Tacis headquarters in Brussels.
Whilst they were helpful and supportive, due to Tacis being in the middle of what seemed to be a series of
removals from one location to another, many of the documents which the Team would have liked to
consult were simply not to be found.  At times this comment could have been applied to task managers.
Patience was necessary on all sides.
There was misunderstanding of the format of the report particularly as the team were commenting on four
facility projects within the ToR.  This resulted in a delay in submission.
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 3URJUDPPH(YDOXDWLRQ
 5HOHYDQFHDQG$SSURSULDWHQHVV
 5HOHYDQFHRI2EMHFWLYHV(6616XSSRUWWR7DFLV3ULYDWH6HFWRU6WUDWHJ\DQG
3ROLF\
Given that the ESSN programme was directly linked from inception to SME development (section 1.1.2),
it follows that the relevance of the ESSN is related to Tacis initiativesin this sector.  The evolution of the
programme clearly shows that support to the SME sector continues to be the thrust of the ESSN and there
is no doubt in the opinion of the evaluators that this should continue as a matter of policy.  We are
required to examine the value and impact of the expert inputs into the companies requesting assistance and
couple the outputs of improvingmanagerial skills and knowledge with company development.
7KHVWDWHGREMHFWLYHRIWKHILUVW(661SURMHFWZDV

WRDVVLVWLQGLYLGXDOLQVWLWXWLRQVRUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGFRPSDQLHVLQWKHLUSURFHVVRIUHIRUPDQGUHFRYHU\DV
SDUWRIDPDUNHWRULHQWHGHFRQRPLFV\VWHPWKURXJKDIDFLOLW\ZKLFKHQDEOHVWKHPWRJLYHDUDSLGUHVSRQVH
WRDQXUJHQWQHHG
This objective fitted perfectly the overall economic transition objectives of NIS countries and responded
to their own priorities by promising fast mobilisation of assistance for enterprises in transformation.  It
also responded very well to the needs of the beneficiaries targeted by the programme, as it provided them
with access to Western know-how within short delays and at affordable costs.  Finally, it fitted the Tacis
strategy that sought channels to assist NIS enterprises without involvement of intermediaries.  Because
ESSN is operating through EU national senior service agencies, mostly subsidised by their respective
Governments, the objective was also in compliance with Tacis’ overall objective of "fostering the
development of harmonious and prosperous economic and political links between the European Union and
the Tacis countries".
Better than some other Tacis initiatives, it met with the Tacis objective to work closely with the partner
countries, to determine how funds should be spent in order to ensure WKDW7DFLV IXQGLQJ LV UHOHYDQW WR
HDFKFRXQWU\
VRZQUHIRUPSROLFLHVDQGSULRULWLHV6XPPDU\RI,QGLFDWLYH3URJUDPPHVS
There is no doubt that the objective and the intervention logic of the ESSN programme fitted very well
into the overall economic transition objectives of NIS countries.  Appropriately it offered speedy
assistance to support country strategies.  It also responds very well to the needs of the final-beneficiaries
targeted by the programme, i.e. private enterprises such as SMEs.  It is not an issue in the minds of the
Evaluation Team whether or not this assistance should have been linked directly to SME development.
The hard fact of the time was there was no other appropriate vehicle to which assistance could be targeted.
Then and now, companies and other individual "structures" as part of the transition process urgently
needed fast, tailor-made advice by practitioners who would assist them in adapting to the new economic
environment.  Many of these small emerging companies could not afford expensive consultancy support.
The Evaluators see the ESSN programme as an important and appropriate element of the Tacis overall
strategy towards SME development in Tacis countries.  The Tacis SME strategy was (and still is) mainly
focused on the creation and development of intermediary support structures for SME agencies in the shape
of SME DAs (SME Development Agencies) and BCCs (Business Communication Centres).  In addition
to this indirect assistance to SMEs, Tacis offered specialised programmes to indirectly support SMEs
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amongst which ESSN was the only one that provided advice and inundate access to management know-
how (see figure 3).
)LJXUH7DFLV6XSSRUWWR60(V
7DFLVVXSSRUWIRUVPDOOEXVLQHVV
National Initiatives
6SHFLDOLVHG3URJUDPPHV
Development Agencies
Business Communication Centres
European Senior Service Network
Work Attachment Programme
Joint Venture Programme
Eurochambers Mercure Programme
Europartenariat/NIS Partenariat
EFER Initiative
Source: Supporting Small Businesses in the New Independent States and Mongolia - A sector profile,
Tacis services DG IA, 1996
The Evaluation Team can conclude that:
%RWK WKH UDWKHU JHQHUDO REMHFWLYH RI WKH ILUVW(661 FRQWUDFW DQG WKHPRUH VSHFLILF IRFXV RI WKH VHFRQG
(661 FRQWUDFW RQ LQGLYLGXDO VPDOO DQG PHGLXP VL]HG HQWHUSULVHV 60(6 DQG QHZO\ SULYDWLVHG
FRPSDQLHVLQWKH1,6ZHUHLQSHUIHFWFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHRYHUDOO7DFLVVWUDWHJ\LQWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU
7KHHPSKDVLVRQSULYDWHPDLQO\VPDOODQGPHGLXPVL]HGFRPSDQLHVUHVSRQGHGZHOO WRWKHSULYDWLVDWLRQ
SURJUDPPHVWKDWZHUHJDLQLQJPRPHQWXPLQPRVWRIWKH1,6FRXQWULHVDWWKDWWLPH
7KLV SROLF\ DOVR VXSSRUWHG WKH DWWHPSWV LQPDQ\ 7DFLV FRXQWULHV WR FRQWULEXWH WR WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI D
FULWLFDOPDVVRIVPDOODQGPHGLXPVL]HGFRPSDQLHV
Under subsequent projects the following eligibility criteria were included:
(661,, "to include firms undergoing privatisation as eligible final beneficiaries".
(661,,, to include government owned enterprises subjected to privatisation as "eligible beneficiaries"
7KH(YDOXDWLRQ 7HDP TXHVWLRQV WKH UHOHYDQFH DQG DSSURSULDWHQHVV RI WKH(661 SURJUDPPH IRU ODUJHU
FRPSDQLHVDQGFRPSDQLHVQRW\HWSULYDWLVHGThis could be considered contradictory when viewed against
the objective of assisting the (private) SME sector.  Rationale for this inclusion would seem to be
recognition that larger companies going through the privatisation process including those in the state
owned sector also need assistance.  If so, should free expertise be provided to this sub sector especially
when inputs can be larger than for the SME?
:HZRXOGSUHIHUWRVHHDFHLOLQJRQWKHDPRXQWRIDVVLVWDQFHSURYLGHGWRODUJHUFRPSDQLHVEXWTXHVWLRQ
WKHQHHGWRDVVLVWDWDOO
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 5HOHYDQFHRI'HVLJQ
7KH)DFLOLW\$SSURDFK
Tacis explicitly created ESSN and other similar programmes to complement assistance to SME’s without
the direct involvement of national or regional governments. It was decided that public sector
intermediaries should be avoided and that SMEs would be offered direct access, for individual companies
across all the participating states, to expertise and counterparts in the EU.
To implement the ESSN strategy, Tacis used a mechanism referred to as the ’facility approach’.  Originally
referred to as framework programmes they package projects or services of a similar type under one
umbrella so that services can be delivered to different organisations quickly and efficiently.
7KHFKRLFHRIWKLVPHFKDQLVPKDGWKHIROORZLQJDGYDQWDJHV
½ it provided Tacis with an effective mechanism for the delivery of the programme;
½ it allowed Tacis to by pass governmental bureaucratic procedures;
½ it put the beneficiary in closer contact with the provider and
½ it allowed Tacis greater flexibility in programme management if the host country for example wished
to allocate resources elsewhere;
7KHUHZDVRIFRXUVHDGRZQVLGH
½ the Tacis project cycle is basically not well adapted to the management of facilities. For example
cash flow problems are common;
½ the facility approach does not enjoy a high reputation in Tacis. This is more the fault of management
rather  than the instrument itself and
½ in the field, when budgets were on an interstate basis, governments viewed the programmes with
suspicion.  Indeed two Co-ordinating Units visited by the team adopted preliminary positions of non
co-operation as they said this was a ’Brussels Project’ outside their competence.
In the 1997 programme, Tacis decided that the allocations to the facilities had to be part of the normal
procedures for the indicative programmes and combined together for horizontal implementation.
Allocations have since then decreased although this cannot be contributed solely to the countries
concerned.
7KH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDP UHPDLQ FRQYLQFHG WKDW WKH IDFLOLW\ DSSURDFKZLWKLQ WKH RYHUDOO QHHGV LV WKH EHVW
LQVWUXPHQWDYDLODEOHWR7DFLVDWWKLVWLPHIRU(661LPSOHPHQWDWLRQEHFDXVH
½ the structure can be tailored to the diverse needs of a large number of individual beneficiaries; infact
they are ideal instruments to serve plural society;
½ it can be easily expanded and replicated over a wide area;
½ it decentralises decision making away from busy task managers;
½ if horizontal facilities are abandoned possible cost effectiveness would be lost if the become
mainstream projects and
½ the SSOs will respond better to a NIS programme rather than an individual country programme.
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7KH3ROLF\(QYLURQPHQW
The new programming and budgeting procedure resulted in differing allocations for ESSN from country
to country.  Not all countries included allocations in their country programmes.  The decision making
environment had dramatically changed.  We do not necessarily see this as a wrong decision.  If Tacis is to
practice the market economy that it preaches then the market should indicate the value and demand for the
programme.  The PMU and the Senior organisations have to market their product.  Allocations varied
from 1.4% to 10.3% of national facility allocations.
7DEOH7KH6KDUHRIWKH(661%XGJHWLQ1DWLRQDO)DFLOLW\%XGJHWV
&RXQWU\ )DFLOLWLHVEXGJHW
LQWRWDOLQ7(&8
(661EXGJHW (661SHUFHQWDJH
,QIDFLOLWLHV¶EXGJHW
$3

$3

$3

$3

$3

$3

$3

$3

$3

$UPHQLD      
%HODUXV
$]HUEDLMDQ      
*HRUJLD    
.D]DNKVWDQ   
.\UJK\]VWDQ   
0ROGRYD   
0RQJROLD     
5XVVLD         
7DGMLNLVWDQ    
7XUNPHQLVWDQ    
8NUDLQH         
8]EHNLVWDQ      
Source: Evaluation Team from Annual Programmes
                                                
3
 NB: a) Figures do not include Tempus facility;
b)Figures are partly actual and partly planned
c) Two years’ figures are provided for countires with a two year budget
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Only one Tacis country (Turkmenistan) did not make any budget allocation for ESSN since 1996.  The
fact that all other countries are making more or less important allocations for ESSN does in the opinion of
the evaluators indicate that assistance provided by ESSN reflects the country demand in a competitive
market for funds.  It does not necessarily reflect the needs of small and medium sized countries for ESSN
assistance.  As we have noted above, the economic situation in the NIS and Mongolia could result in a
weakening SME political lobby and a reduction in allocations in future assistance programming.  The
Evaluation Team believes this to be an area of concern.
7KHUHIRUH LW LVFOHDU WKDW(661DVVLVWDQFH LVVWLOO UHOHYDQWDQGRSHUDWHVVDWLVIDFWRULO\XQGHU WKH IDFLOLW\
SURJUDPPLQJSURFHGXUHV HYHQZKHQ IXQGV KDYH WR EH SURYLGHG IURP FRXQWU\ DFWLRQ SURJUDPPHV :H
ZRXOGVXJJHVWKRZHYHUWKDWLIRQHVWLOOYLHZV(661DVDYHKLFOHWRSURYLGHDVVLVWDQFHWR1,6EDVHG60(6
LQGHSHQGHQW RI D UHVSHFWLYH FRXQWU\
V RIILFLDO SROLF\ UHOHYDQFH ZDV EHWWHU VHUYHG EHIRUH  ZKHQ
EXGJHWDOORFDWLRQVZHUHVWLOOPDGHFHQWUDOO\IURP%UXVVHOV
 7KH8VHRI(86HQLRU([SHUWLVH
Retired management has long been seen as a valuable human resource in western countries and a
justifiable and inexpensive way of transferring know how particularly to economically depressed regions
in the western world.  International aid donors have used this pool of expertise for a multitude of needs in
developing countries primarily in the area of enterprise development.  7DFLVRIILFLDOVLQZHUHFRUUHFW
LQLGHQWLI\LQJWKLVDVDPDMRUUHVRXUFHWKDWFRXOGSOD\DPDMRUUROHLQ WKHWUDQVLWLRQDOHFRQRPLHVRIWKH
SRVW6RYLHWEORF
In reviewing the situation, which pertained at the time of the collapse of centralised economic system, it is
necessary to note that:
½ certainly at programme start up and to a lesser extent now, professional consulting is under developed
in the NIS;
½ financial resources of the SMEs were unable to meet the cost of international consultants and
½ low cost assistance was needed with a minimum of delay.
Because of the urgency to provide assistance in order to launch the project with a minimum of delay, in
our view, Tacis was correct to ask the experienced EU national service organisations to manage the
programme. These organisations which had been operating in this sector for some years, had the
experience and a unique pool of volunteer senior managers available.
7DFLV LVDOVR FRUUHFW LQ WKHRSLQLRQRI WKH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDP WR FRQWLQXH WRXVH WKH H[SHUWLVHDYDLODEOH
IURPWKHPHPEHUVWDWHRUJDQLVDWLRQVDOWKRXJKLQDPHQGHGIRUPDVZHGLVFXVVLQVHFWLRQ
In discussions with local entrepreneurs it was clear to the evaluators that when well matched, the western
expert talking with a professional in the same sector quickly established a common language.  This rapport
allowed for an effective and fruitful exchange of views.  Yet it was equally clear that the benefits of a
common professional language only fully develop in cases where the expert and the manager can actually
reach common understanding or in other words if the expert’s skills correspond to the advice requested by
the recipient company.  From the numerous interviews that we conducted it is evident that the
communication between expert and entrepreneur is easiest, the narrower and more technical the definition
of the problem is.  A beneficial, relevant and successful transfer of know-how becomes more difficult if
the advice provided by the senior expert is general in character.  Other variables then come into play such
as the specific local, economic, regulatory and legal environment.
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7KH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPLGHQWLILHGFRQVLGHUDEOHGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHDSSURSULDWHQHVVRI(8VHQLRUH[SHUWLVHIRU
FRPSDQLHVLQ5XVVLDDQGLQ8]EHNLVWDQFrom the field visits and discussions with various stakeholders
there are underlying differences which the evaluators believe reflects not only the economic development
in both countries but shows up differences in the level of business development in the Russian Federation.
:HFDQFRQFOXGHWKDWWKLVVFHQDULRDSSOLHVWRWKH1,6DQG0RQJROLDDVDZKROH
In general terms, programmes for the fast moving countries in SME development had to be adapted to
changing needs. Some countries have obviously remained longer in the initial phases of adjustment.
Discrepancies in the speed of transition created an increasing gap in the type of assistance needed.  In the
1992/95 period, mere ’exposure’ of business men to the general needs and alternative models of business
in the free market economy was acceptable.  But after a few years the entrepreneurs in the more advanced
industrial regions such as Moscow and St. Petersburg had absorbed the broad picture of the free market
economy and started to ask advice on specific issues of business management or production. 7KLVZHFDQ
FRQFOXGHKDVOHGWRDZLGH 
H[SHFWDQF\JDS
EHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWFRXQWULHVDQGUHJLRQV :HWKHUHIRUHILQG
WKDW ZKLOVW WKH HDUO\ (661 DSSURDFK LV VWLOO DFFHSWDEOH LQ UHODWLYHO\ LVRODWHG 8]EHNLVWDQ WKH VDPH
DSSURDFKLQWKH0RVFRZDUHDZRXOGEHKHDYLO\FULWLFLVHGE\WKHUHFLSLHQWV
Russian companies, which were interviewed by the Evaluation Team were more critical of ESSN support
than Uzbek companies concerning the relevance of the assistance on offer.  Complaints such as the expert
lacking understanding of the country, the company and the present economic environment and the expert’s
advice being too general were common.
We posed the following question to a number of Russian companies who had or are participating in the
ESSN programme.  ’what assistance did you want from the ESSN mission’.  The responses are tabulated in
Table  2 as follows.
7DEOH0LVVLRQ2EMHFWLYHVDV8QGHUVWRRGE\5XVVLDQ5HFLSLHQWV
½ To assess the technical quality of products and elaborate proposals how to obtain international
certification.
½ To help with the search for respectable Western partners who would organise/increase manufacturing
and promote the product on the world market.
½ To identify western clients interested in collaboration, in the manufacturing of scientific products
(equipment, technology), which would be able to compete on world markets.
½ Assistance in identifying appropriate technology for manufacturing specific industrial package
materials, for protecting the quality of goods. Advice on how to design an up to date package
manufacturing system.
½ Provision of expertise to conduct specialised courses and seminars in the application of international
trading standards.
½ Advice in the preparation of a proposal for an investment project to construct of a building for training
and commercial use.  Assistance insearching for a foreign investor to participate in the construction of
the building.
½ Advice aimed at improving the organisation and technology in the manufacturing of a specific range
of goods in order to reduce the cost of production.
½ Advice in real estate and finance management procedures.
½ Advice inthe development of transportation services inparticular:
- planning of sales campaigns;
- evaluation of sales results;
- marketing studies.
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This response provides specific rather than general information as to how the interviewees understand the
ESSN programme.  They identified the question only in respect of their own specific needs.  Whilst some
of these responses are still couched ingeneral terms they do indicate that the expert provided must have
relevant sector business experience.
Uzbek entrepreneurs, the Evaluation Team found, have not inmost cases been exposed in a major way to
Western style business culture and are running their companies on a different level of development as
compared to Russian enterprises. Thus, ESSN assistance is even relevant for them if it provides them with
a more general insight into the Western way of managing companies in a market environment and into
ways how best to adapt to developing market mechanisms in their own economy.
Relevance of EU expertise for NIS companies is also linked with the extent to which EU experts are
acquainted with both the general economic situation of the respective country and the more specific
environment within which companies are operating.  Serious concerns were raised by several of the
recipient companies to the Evaluation Team inRussia and by the EU monitors in Moscow concerning
senior experts who were not well enough informed about country-specific issues.
We have observed that there are participating SSOs, which spend much time in briefing their experts
before they start their missions.  They provide their experts with written material, and organise briefing
sessions etc.  Other participating senior expert organisations either do not have the capacity to do so or
simply do not consider that it is important enough to ensure the expert is comprehensively prepared.
The Evaluation Team have also noted that in some cases the expert organisation and/or the selected expert
contacts the recipient company for further information while preparing for the mission. This is good
practice.
 ,GHQWLI\LQJWKH1HHGVDQG6HOHFWLRQRI1,6&RPSDQLHV
It is relevant to the success of the programme that ESSN provides the recipient company with expertise,
which exactly meets the needs they themselves describe.  The concept is that the owner or general
manager of a NIS based company who wishes the advice of an EU expert specifies the assistance required.
Thus the programme should be judged appropriate to the needs of the recipient companies.  As the expert
is normally addressing the owners or directors of small companies decision making is not a time
consuming exercise.  This, the Evaluation Team would emphasise is the situation when the expert is
working LQharmony with the beneficiary which as we will discuss below is not always the case.
6R IDU ZH KDYH VWDUWHG WR GHEDWH WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI TXDOLW\ H[SHUWV EXW UHVXOWV LQ WKH RSLQLRQ RI WKH
(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPZLOOEHQHJDWLYHLIGXHFRQVLGHUDWLRQLVQRWJLYHQWR
L HQVXUHSURSHU IRUPXODWLRQFODULW\DQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQRI WKHQHHGVRI WKHFRPSDQ\DSSO\LQJ
IRUDVVLVWDQFHDQG
LL DSURSHUDVVHVVPHQWLVFRQGXFWHGRIZKHWKHUDFRPSDQ\ZDUUDQWVDVVLVWDQFHRUQRW
The formulation and the communication of needs to ESSN management can be realised in three different
ways.
)LUVW, NIS companies are identified by agents of national senior expert services who discuss the needs of
the company for assistance with them and help them to correctly formulate their specific needs.  In this
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case, requests are normally presented by the agents.  More than two thirds of applications come from this
source.
6HFRQGinterested companies contact a SME DA or a BCC or any other SME support institution which
assists them in correctly identifying and formulating their needs and transmits the application to the PMU
in Brussels.  Applications can also come via Coordinating Units.
7KLUGa company applies for assistance directly, without the help of any intermediary.  In this case, the
company sends an application form to the PMU or submits its application through the Internet.
7KH (YDOXDWLRQ 7HDP FRQVLGHUV WKDW ERWK WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI WKH DSSOLFDQW FRPSDQ\
V QHHGV DQG WKH
DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH GHJUHH WRZKLFK LWPDNHV VHQVH WR RIIHU WKH DSSOLFDQW FRPSDQ\(661 DVVLVWDQFH DUH
SUREOHPDUHDV
In many cases as briefly highlighted in figure 4, the problem/need description is too short and vague for
the PMU to get a clear picture of what precise kind of advice of assistance is actually needed.  Although
the application forms are conceived in a way which leaves much space the for exact description of the
need and the concrete advice be’ requested, we observed that most applications do not contain more than
one line in identifying the need.
For example, under the question $VVLVWDQFHUHTXHVWHGtypical answers are:
"For production of garments and uniforms, competitive on the world market"; "Specialist in the sphere of
production and processing agricultural products"; "How to do poultry-farming effectively under
conditions with the least expenditures"; "Consultant inthe sphere of thermo-technical equipment.
This is despite the application asking applicants to
“JLYHDFRPSOHWHDQGGHWDLOHGGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHQDWXUHRIWKHSUREOHPRUSUREOHPVZKLFKKDYHOHDG
WRWKHUHTXHVWIRUDVVLVWDQFHDQGWKHZRUNWKHFRQVXOWDQWZLOOEHH[SHFWHGWRSHUIRUPand to EHDV
VSHFLILF DV \RX FDQ DQG SURYLGH XV ZLWK DV PXFK UHOHYDQW LQIRUPDWLRQ DV SRVVLEOH VR WKDW D
FRQVXOWDQWVXLWDEOHH[SHULHQFHGIRUWKHDVVLJQPHQWFDQEHIRXQG
Although strong efforts have been made by the PIU to improve the content and the size of the problem
description, too few applications are still sufficiently informative on this topic.  It is therefore a paradox
for some beneficiaries to claim that the expert’s knowledge is not precise enough to enable him / her to
provide proper assistance.
7KH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPZKLOVW DFFHSWLQJ WKDW LW LV LQFXPEHQWXSRQ WKH FRPSDQ\UHTXHVWLQJDVVLVWDQFH WR
SURYLGHDSURSHUGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHQHHGPXVWSRVHWKHTXHVWLRQZK\WKHUHFHLYLQJSDUW\LHWKHDJHQWRU
WKH60('$GRHVQRWLQVLVWRUDVVLVWWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHDSSOLFDWLRQLVFRPSOHWHGFRUUHFWO\
An assessment must be made whether or not it is worthwhile offering an applicant company ESSN
assistance.  This requires an evaluation of its current situation and its future prospects.  This is also needed
if the appropriate expert is to be identified.
In the opinion of the Evaluation Team neither agents of national senior expert services nor local
intermediaries such as SME DAs and BCCs are always able to make an appropriate judgement.  The latter
in most instances have even less experience.  It is also clear that a company applying directly for
assistance through postal mail or the Internet will not paint too negative picture of itself. 7KXV WKHUH LV
DOZD\VDFHUWDLQULVNWKDW(661ZLOOSURYLGHDVVLVWDQFHWRLQDSSURSULDWHFRPSDQLHVZKLOVWDFDUHIXOSULRU
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DVVHVVPHQWRIWKHFRPSDQ\ZRXOGKDYHVKRZQWKDW(661FRXOGQRWFRQWULEXWHWRWKHVROXWLRQRILWVVSHFLfic
SUREOHPV
 6HOHFWLRQ3URFHGXUHVIRU(8([SHUWV
An issue, which still has to be resolved inthe opinion of the Evaluation Team, is the creation of a clear
definition of the respective roles of the ESSN and the national senior expert organisations.  Simply, is the
ESSN a Tacis programme or member state programmes under the EU umbrella?  The larger expert
organisations maintain their own similar activities and as we discuss further in section 3, in the minds of
the Evaluation Team it is not clear if they support the ESSN programme independently of their own
national programme.
Whereas, umbrella organisation or not, it may be difficult to collect enough reliable information on the
problem to be solved and the situation of the company applying for ESSN assistance, it should be much
easier to select an appropriate expert once the problem of the applicant enterprise is clearly defined.  It is
rare that specific expertise cannot be found among the many thousands of senior experts made available to
ESSN though the 23 EU based senior expert institutions which participate inESSN implementation.
6WLOOWKHPDWFKEHWZHHQWKHDSSOLFDQWFRPSDQ\
VQHHGVDQGWKHDGYLFHSURYLGHGE\WKHH[SHUWLVRQHRIWKH
FRUHDUHDVRIFRQFHUQUHJDUGLQJWKHDSSURSULDWHQHVVRIWKH(661LPSOHPHQWDWLRQSURFHVV
Whilst this is often due to the shortcomings in the selection of recipient companies, there are also
problems related to the identification of appropriate senior experts which affect the quality of the match.
7KH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPEHOLHYHVWKDWDPDMRUSUREOHPLVWKHREOLJDWLRQRIWKH308WRVHOHFWH[SHUWV
IRU DVVLJQPHQWV RQ ORFDWLRQ IROORZLQJ D URWDWLRQDO SULQFLSOH  $OO GLUHFW DSSOLFDWLRQV LH
DSSOLFDWLRQV WKDWDUHQRWSURVSHFWHGE\QDWLRQDO VHUYLFHVDUHGLVWULEXWHG HTXDOO\ WRRQHDIWHU WKH
RWKHU RI WKH SDUWLFLSDWLQJ QDWLRQDO VHUYLFHV LUUHVSHFWLYHO\ RI WKHLU FDSDFLW\ WR SURYLGH DQ H[SHUW
ZKLFK EHVW PHHWV WKH QHHGV RI WKH DSSOLFDQW FRPSDQ\  (TXDOO\ VR SUHIHUHQFH LV JLYHQ WR 662V
SURYLGLQJ QRQ GLUHFW DSSOLFDWLRQV UDWKHU WKDQ VHULRXVO\ DWWHPSWLQJ WR LGHQWLI\ WKH EHVW H[SHUWLVH
DYDLODEOH
The rotational principle was meant to ensure that not only the large senior service organisations are
involved in project implementation but smaller services get their just percentage share also.  This has led
WRFRQFHUQV IURPGLIIHUHQWVLGHV WKDWD VWULFWREVHUYDQFHRI WKHURWDWLRQSULQFLSOHJRHVDJDLQVW WKHKLJK
TXDOLW\GHPDQGVRIWKH(661SURJUDPPH Should an SSO be offered a placement and not have a suitably
qualified expert, the risk is high that they dispatch an expert merely to participate and also gain some
remuneration for the mission.
The rotational principle certainly involves such risks but the blame for low quality missions should not be
placed solely at the door of the smaller institutions.
½ Of 567 missions (including follow-up training/work attachments) implemented under the Tacis II
contract, 62,5 % per cent were implemented by the three largest national services (BESO, NMCP,
SES).
½ A further 22.5 % were completed by four services which do not belong to the category of "small,
inexperienced services".
½ Only 15 per cent of all assignments were implemented by these smaller services.
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Furthermore;
(i) none of the missions identified as unsuccessful by the Tacis monitors in Russia was carried out by
a small senior expert institution and
(ii) the same applies to those projects whose results were assessed quite critically by the recipients
during the evaluation mission to Russia.
Therefore, all in all, the Evaluation Team has not found any confirmation of a strong correlation between
the size of a service and the quality of the missions executed by its experts.
7KH (YDOXDWLRQ 7HDP FRQFOXGHV WKDW WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI D URWDWLRQDO V\VWHP LQVWHDG RI D V\VWHP VROHO\
EDVHGRQSURIHVVLRQDODGHTXDF\LVORZHULQJWKHHIILFLHQF\RIWKHVHOHFWLRQSURFHVVRI(8H[SHUWV
The question arose several times in the course of the evaluation whether the recipient company should be
involved in the selection of "its" expert or not.  There are quite controversial views between the PIU and
the national services concerning this issue.  It is uncontested that should the recipient company be
involved into the selection of the expert, the complaints about the expert not meeting expectations would
be considerably reduced.
The interviews the evaluators conducted with recipient companies showed that inthe very few cases they
had the choice between several experts, the opportunity of choice was much appreciated.  The president of
the Russian Agency for Small Business Support even suggested putting the CVs of ESSN experts on the
homepage of this umbrella organisation of all Tacis supported SME DAs and BCCs inRussia.  This
comes close to the intention of the current PIU to create a search function for ESSN experts at the ESSN
web-site.
Conversely participating senior expert organisations claim that a CV does not say enough about an expert
and that they know their experts best which is the best guarantee for an optimal choice of the expert.  As a
representative of a large senior expert organisation advised the evaluators: 7KH\ (i.e. the companies)
know their problems best - that is why they are requested to give as precise a description of their problems
as possible.  We (i.e., the senior expert organisations) know our experts best - that is why we are best
suited to select the experts to be sent out."
:H FHUWDLQO\ FDQQRW FRQFXUZLWK WKLV DSSURDFK DQG WKH YLHZ RI WKH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDP LV WKDW WKH
H[SHUW VKRXOGZKHQHYHUSUDFWLFDO EH FKRVHQ IURPD VPDOO VKRUWOLVW SUHVHQWHG WKURXJK WKH308
(YHQEHWWHULIWKHQDPHVRQWKHVKRUWOLVWFRPHIURPPRUHWKDQRQHRUJDQLVDWLRQ 7RGHQ\FKRLFH
FRQWUDGLFWVWKHHWKRVRIDPDUNHWHFRQRP\
(IIHFWLYHQHVV
In the case of ESSN, the Evaluation Team had to assess the extent which missions of EU senior experts to
the NIS and follow-up training/work attachments of NIS managers in the EU were successful and
contributed to achieving the objectives of the programme.  The assessment whether a mission was
successful or not was partially based on the personal interviews the Evaluation Team had with recipient
companies.  Analysis was made of the answers provided to the questionnaire sent out to intermediaries
and on the monitoring reports for those missions, which were monitored by the Tacis Moscow Monitoring
Unit.
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 7DUJHWVDQG$FKLHYHPHQWV
5XVVLD
Of the 10 companies visited in Russia by the Evaluation Team, six had received ESSN assistance prior
to the present Evaluation.  Three were preparing for a mission and one company had withdrawn its
application.  2I WKH  PLVVLRQV DOUHDG\ FRPSOHWHG  ZHUH YLHZHG DV YHU\ VXFFHVVIXO E\ WKH
UHFLSLHQWVDVSRVLWLYH WRD FHUWDLQ H[WHQW DQGRQHDVQRW VXFFHVVIXO (See Table 3). No company
amongst those in Russia had applied for a follow-up training or work attachment.
7DEOH5HVXOWVRIWKH6L[0LVVLRQVDV$VVHVVHGE\5XVVLDQ5HFLSLHQWV
1 *HQHUDODVVHVVPHQWRIWKHDVVLJQPHQW ,PSURYHPHQWVDFKLHYHG
1 It is a very useful programme, which
facilitates the transfer of the market
economy technologies into the Russian
economy.
There was no direct positive result, as the
consultant didn’t meet the requirements of
our application, but there were positive side
effects – business contacts, recommendations.
We received assistance to minor questions.
2 The consultant-instructor was helpful but as
he was a teacher of rather average level, he
was not familiar with Russian situation and
requirements.
The result did not meet our expectations.
The expert started a course in international
bookkeeping.
3 It is useful because it provides experience
exchange and learning the formal side of
producing certain documents (business
plans, applications, etc.)
It helped prepare documentation on
investment according to the international
requirements. Though the final result
(receiving investment) was not achieved, it
wasn't the expert's fault.
4 Experience exchange in the field of
management; eliminating the faults in the
work of Russian companies, in business
planning, in forecasting the development of
certain elements of the market economy.
A very positive result. The services of the
consultant provided for 40%  increase in
profit in a 2 months period without any
additional expenses. Strategic proposals
were received, a marketing plan for the
subsequent year was elaborated.
5 The company was provided with provided
with useful information, the organization of
the enterprise and the structure of
management were improved, an economic
analysis was carried out.
The prime cost of production has been
reduced; we received structured practical
recommendations; the workshops are
currently provided with new equipment.
6 ESSN expert provided us with highly
qualified assistance.
A comparative analysis of our products and
their foreign analogues was implemented.
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From the interviews with the recipients it becomes quite obvious that incases with a good match between
the needs of the applicant company and the expert’s specific know-how the results were distinctly more
positive than in the other cases.  7KH (YDOXDWLRQ 7HDP DJDLQ HPSKDVLVHV WKDW D JRRG PDWFK EHWZHHQ
GHPDQGDQGVXSSO\LVDSULRULW\SUHUHTXLVLWHIRUWKHVXFFHVVRIDPLVVLRQOr inother words, the results
which did not meet expectations were mainly because the match was not an optimal one and not due to
other reasons as, e.g., lack of professional experience, unawareness of the situation in Russia etc.  Table 4,
below expands on the findings expressed in Table 3 making specific reference to the matching process.
7DEOH5HVXOWVRI0DWFKLQJ([SHFWDWLRQVLQ5XVVLD
0DWFKThe expert did not meet the requirements of our application, but he was a good specialist
in other fields; he knew about the company and was given additional information here.
5HVXOWno direct positive results; we received assistance in minor problems.
0DWFKThe expert did not have the level of teaching and communication skills we requested; he
was well prepared as a specialist but not as a teacher; he did not know anything about the
company.
5HVXOWThe result did not meet our expectations.
0DWFKWe are completely satisfied with the work of the expert, he was very well prepared, he
knew everything about our company.
5HVXOW It helped in preparing documentation on investment according to international
requirements.
0DWFKThe results even exceeded our expectations, he was very well prepared and knew very
much about our company and problems.
5HVXOWThe services provided for a 40% increase in profit.
0DWFKThe expert met our expectations, he was well prepared and he knew enough about our
company.
5HVXOWThe cost of production has been reduced.
0DWFKThe expert met with our expectations.  So far only partially as his work has not
yet been completed.  He was well prepared and knew enough about the subject and got
additional information here.
5HVXOWA comparative analysis of our products and their foreign analogues was     implemented.
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A similar picture is reflected by the monitoring reports.  Of the 12 missions monitored by the Tacis
Moscow Monitoring Unit, 6 were assessed as successful (expressed by a (B) or (C) mark in the report line
"Results (against agreed outputs)"). 4 missions were viewed as adequate with some poor aspects ((D)
mark), and 2 were viewed as poor ((E) mark) (see 7DEOH  below). In the monitoring reports “A”
constitutes the highest grade and “E” the lowest.
7KHPRQLWRUV
JHQHUDO LPSUHVVLRQZDV WKDW LQ WRRPDQ\ LQVWDQFHVQRW HQRXJKFDUH LV WDNHQ WRHQVXUHD
JRRGPDWFKEHWZHHQQHHGVRIWKHUHFLSLHQWFRPSDQ\DQGH[SHUWLVHGHOLYHUHG
7DEOH7KH$VVHVVPHQWRI5XVVLDQ0LVVLRQ5HVXOWVE\7DFLV0RQLWRULQJ7HDP
&RPSDQ\QDPHORFDWLRQ 7\SHDQG
GXUDWLRQ
2I
0LVVLRQ
7\SHDQGGXUDWLRQ
RIIROORZXSLQWKH
(8
0RQLWRUV
DVVHVVPHQW
RISUREOHPGHVFULSWLRQ
LQDSSOLFDWLRQ
0RQLWRUV

PDUN
6FDOH$
KLJK(ORZ
Guildia, Moscow 4 days’ seminar No "Not specified very
well"
(D)
Inertek,St. Petersburg 5 days
presentations
No "Mission objective  was
vague"
(D)
Interlion/TZ, Torzhok No 4 weeks’ study tour "The specific objectives
were inadequately
described"
(E)
Lomonovakaya Poultry Farm,
Gorbunky
2 ten days’
missions
1 ten days’ training
course
"Outputs were not well
defined"
(B)
Military Insurance Company,
St. Petersburg
2 weeks’
workshop/training
1R "There was an
information gap in
respect to the
objectives"
(D)
Murmansk Airport, Murmansk 1 identification
mission, 1 advice
mission
1 study tour "The objectives were
not fully defined"
(D)
Nevskaya Manufaktura, St.
Petersburg
3 missions
totalling 11 days
No "The expected outputs
were not well defined"
(C)
Hotel Poliarne Zori,
Murmansk
1 advice mission No "No ToR available" (B)
Progress Neva, St. Petersburg 1 three days’
training mission
No "No specific objectives
were agreed upon"
(E)
Styling JSC, Kirov 1 nine days’ advice
mission
No "Clear specification of
the project tasks"
(B)
TIRA company, St. Petersburg 12 days’ training
mission
No "No specific objectives
indicated"
(C)
Zarya Sewing Factory, Kirov Three weeks’
advice and training
mission
No ** (B)
* Defined as "Results (against agreed outputs)"
** Monitors do not refer to the issue in their report
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8]EHNLVWDQ
The results and outcomes of the ESSN programme are seen quitedifferently in Uzbekistan as compared
with 5XVVLDIn general, there is a much more positive assessment of the assistance provided by Uzbek
recipient companies.
2IWKH UHFLSLHQWV LQWHUYLHZHG LQ8]EHNLVWDQ WKH YDVWPDMRULW\ZHUHKDSS\ZLWK WKHDVVLVWDQFH
SURYLGHGDQGYLHZHGWKHUHVXOWVDVSRVLWLYHWRYHU\SRVLWLYH2QHFRPSDQ\ZLWKGUHZLWVDSSOLFDWLRQ
RQHZDVVWLOOZDLWLQJIRUDQH[SHUW 2QO\RQHFRPSDQ\ZDVFOHDUO\GLVVDWLVILHGZLWK WKHH[SHUWLVH
SURYLGHGVHH7DEOHRQWKHIROORZLQJSDJH7KLVLV DQLQWHUHVWLQJUHVXOWDVLWFRXOGEHVDLGWKDWWKH
8]EHNHFRQRP\LVHQFRXQWHULQJHYHQPRUHVHULRXVSUREOHPVWKDQWKDWRI5XVVLD :HZRXOGKDYH
H[SHFWHGWKDWWKHVLWXDWLRQZRXOGPDNHLWPRUHGLIILFXOWIRUH[SHUWVWRILQGVROXWLRQV
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7DEOH5HVXOWVRIWKH0LVVLRQVDV$VVHVVHGE\8]EHN5HFLSLHQWV
1 *HQHUDODVVHVVPHQWRIWKHDVVLJQPHQW ,PSURYHPHQWVDFKLHYHG
1 It was useful. Produced both general and
concrete results.
Helped us in improving the internal
organisation: how to organise staff meetings,
how to structure the work and how to best
manage a team of journalists.
2 Excellent, helped us in starting restructuring of
the company and in understanding that we have
to improve the performance of our company if
we want to survive and develop further.
We started restructuring of the company
following a five years’ plan. Changed 50% of the
personnel, started training of staff.
3 It was very important and very concrete.
Changed completely my mind and my
understanding of both our production technology
and the market.
Identified a profitable market niche, changed
production, bought new equipment in the West and
started new production.
4 Very helpful. The expert found out much more
about our company than we knew. Created a
vision for our company together with us.
Made us pay more attention to the appearance of
our newspaper. Opened our eyes for money
questions and made us more profitable. The
printing quality also became better.
5 Very useful. We continue to follow the expert’s
recommendations on how to produce, which
conditions to improve, which buildings to
construct and which veterinarian rules to respect
Through the assistance of the expert, a EU based
investor was identified who is preparing an
investment into the poultry farm at present.
Support has been secured during several visits of
the investor on a regional and national level.
6 ESSN expert did not provide us with valuable
advice as he did not meet our request.
Some recommendations which we cannot apply.
Expert brought brochures on British tourist
association.
7 Excellent.. The expert helped me in developing
further production of a product which was still
relatively new to me and which is gaining a
more and more important share of the market.
One month after the visit of the expert,
developed a new product that is an innovation
for Uzbekistan and of which the expert can be
viewed as a co-creator.
8 Extremely useful as the expert was a very
knowledgeable person in the field who has
worked as a manager in companies producing
similar products for many years.
We got in contact during a follow-up visit with
EU based companies which are not yet starting
business with Uzbekistan (due to non
convertibility of the currency) but for whom we
will be a good partner in the future.
9 Very helpful as the expert was very well
experienced in our sector. He showed us that we
are not the only country with such problems and
provided very practical advice.
Succeeded in solving several minor problems
during training-on-the-job and partially revised
their price policy as with regard to the price for
repair. Visited 8 Italian companies during a
follow-up study tour.
10 Very valuable for us as the expert was
specialized in exactly our area of production.
Improved quality of granulate, identified
supplier of new machinery in Italy, are currently
in negotiations with IFC because of loan for new
equipment.
The Evaluation Team examined the application forms prepared by the Uzbek recipients.  Table 7 provides
an overview of the objectives of the ESSN assistance as seen by the applicants.  These were of course
prior to the mission and the response is limited to those application forms (4) available to the Evaluators.
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7DEOH7KH2EMHFWLYHVRI(661$VVLVWDQFHDV9LHZHGE\8]EHN$SSOLFDQWV
$VVLVWDQFHUHTXHVWHG 4XDOLILFDWLRQVRIWKHFRQVXOWDQWH[SHFWHG
"Assistance for production off garments and
uniforms, competitive on the world market"
"Specialist in marketing"
"Expertise in the sphere of production and
processing of agricultural products"
"To have an experience in the mentioned
sphere"
How to farm poultry effectively under Uzbek
conditions with the least expenditures"
"Highly skilled specialist in the sphere of
poultry –farming, having knowledge in
veterinarian science"
"Advice in the sphere of thermo technical
equipment"
"Consultant to be well experienced in the
sphere of thermotechnical equipment"
Comparing tables 6 and 7 would suggest that it was not only the clear definition of the assignments that
led the Uzbek recipients to assess the results more positively than their Russian counterparts.  The
Evaluation Team suggests that it is because that Uzbek enterprises are working from a less developed base
than those inRussia.
7KH IROORZLQJ WZR H[DPSOHV FRQFHUQ DGYLFH RQ DGYHQWXUH WRXULVP )LJXUH  DQG WKH
SURYLVLRQRIDVVLVWDQFHWRDSRO\PHUSURFHVVLQJIDFWRU\)LJXUHDQGXQGHUVFRUH\HWDJDLQ
WKDWWKHPDWFKEHWZHHQWKHUHFLSLHQWV¶QHHGVDQGWKHH[SHUWLVHSURYLGHGLVWKHSUHGRPLQDQW
IDFWRU LQWKHVXFFHVVRIDQ(661PLVVLRQ $OWKRXJKWKHQHHGVRI WKHFRPSDQ\DVNLQJIRU
DGYLFHRQWRXULVPDUHSHUKDSVPRUHVSHFLILFLWZDVWKHPDWFKHGVNLOOVRIWKHH[SHUWWKDWZDV
FRQFOXVLYHLQWKHILQDODQDO\VLVDQGSURYLGHGIRUVXFFHVVRUIDLOXUH
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)LJXUH6XPPDU\RI$GYLFH3URYLGHGWR8]EHN+RWHOLHU
$GYLFHRQKRZWRGHYHORSDPDUNHWQLFKHLQDGYHQWXUHWRXULVPLVUHTXHVWHGZLWKSUHFLVHGHWDLOVRI
UHTXLUHPHQWV
a) trips to ancient citiesof the "Silk Route"; Mountain trekking; Rafting; Camel safari in the desert;
Bicycle tours. Also assistance in enlarging hotel business and supplementary services
%DFNJURXQGLQIRUPDWLRQ
Determine tourist possibilities for trips to Uzbek cities and adventure tours (mountains, riverscaves and
deserts).
4XDOLILFDWLRQVRIWKHFRQVXOWDQWH[SHFWHG
A consultant should have worked in tourism and trip organisation.
The expert who was sent to Uzbekistan in January (when it is also deep winter in Central Asia) was a
hotel expert who was not acquainted with adventure tourism and did not know any tour operators inthis
sector.  He left recommendations about hotel quality assessment with the recipient at the end of his
mission
7KHUHVXOWZDVWKDWWKHFRPSDQ\ZDVFRPSOHWHO\GLVVDWLVILHGZLWKWKHPLVVLRQ
)LJXUH6XPPDU\$GYLFH3URYLGHGWR8]EHN0DQXIDFWXUHU
$GYLFHWRD&RPSDQ\WKDWSURFHVVHVSODVWLFUDZPDWHULDOVLQWRRQHVLQJOHSURGXFWRQKRZWRPDNH
SURGXFWLRQLPSURYHPHQWV
ESSN sends an expert of whom the recipient says that the co-operation with him was very concrete from
the very beginning because "he was not only a specialist in plastics but - more specifically - in polymers
(as requested) and he was able to provide very practical advice".
The expert makes several concrete, alternative propositions concerning production methodology which are
accepted by the recipient
Immediately after the end of the first mission, the recipient applies for a second mission which is realised
three months later.  Expert and recipient jointly develop a conception for investment into new equipment.
The expert identifies suppliers in the EU and the local SME DA assists the recipient with getting access to
IFC - The International Finance Corporation which isinterested in financing the investment.
5HVXOW WKHUHFLSLHQWLVYHU\SOHDVHGZLWKWKHDVVLVWDQFHSURYLGHGDQGZLOODSSO\IRUDWKLUGPLVVLRQ
RQFHWKHLQYHVWPHQWLVUHDOLVHG
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2WKHU7DFLV&RXQWULHV
The strong correlation between good matching and positive results of missions is not confirmed to the
same extent by the answers to the survey addressing CUs and other intermediaries (See Annex 8).  The
majority of intermediaries have the view that ESSN experts normally adequately address the requirements
of the companies (i.e. there is a good match) but, intheir opinion, the results only partially help companies
inovercoming their problems (see Table 8).  In such cases these problems are often outside the experts’
control such as the supply of credit for new business plans.
This would mean that effectiveness is not well served as even a good match (combined with a good
expert) does not provide for success in some of the cases.  This view could, however, also be influenced to
a certain extent by the fact that only Co-ordinating Units and SME DAs which are themselves acting as
intermediaries for the ESSN programme have answered the questionnaire.  As they bare a good part of the
responsibility for the matching process, their attribution of results to single elements of programme
implementation could be somewhat biased.
7DEOH$VVHVVPHQWRIPDLQ(661)HDWXUHVE\,QWHUPHGLDULHVLQRWKHU7DFLVFRXQWULHV
4XHVWLRQV $QVZHUV
Yes Partly No
Are the experts normally well prepared for the assignment? 3 1
Do they know enough about the company and the country in
Advance?
2 2
Are the experts normally meeting the expectations of the
Companies?
4
Do ESSN assigmnents actually help SMEs overcome (some
of) their problems?
2 2
 4XDOLWDWLYHDQG4XDQWLWDWLYH2XWSXWV'HOLYHUDEOHV(6610LVVLRQV
A chapter on the TXDOLW\DQGTXDQWLW\RIRXWSXWVis included at Annex 1. This is summarised below.
The Evaluation Team is convinced that the large majority of senior expert missions is successful.
Nevertheless there are clear indicators that there is a wide variation in the quality delivered as well as the
level of acceptance.  Russia, which absorbs around 37% of the missions, has a large number of unsatisfied
customers.  In Uzbekistan, recipient of 12% of the missions, the score is excellent.  The PIU and Tacis are
aware of this problem and have taken steps to increase the parameters for quality control in the terms of
reference for the last two projects.  Much will depend on the PIU and the expert organisations themselves
coming together to meet this challenge.
Whilst the onus is on the provider to ensure that quality is maintained, the Evaluation Team sense an
attitude of over expectation on the part of some recipients.  Together with an attitude that h/she knows it
all, and some agents promising what the project cannot deliver makes the experts’ task very difficult.  This
attitude coupled to overselling of the product is a very dangerous mixture.  ESSN must therefore give
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closer attention to the identification of beneficiaries.  By giving a choice of expert to the recipient, ESSN
would diffuse much of the unwarranted and unconstructive criticism.  7DFLV VKRXOG LQVWUXFW WKH3,8 WR
FDUHIXOO\ UHYLHZ WKLV SURSRVDO  An area which cannot be quantified is the socio- political attitudes
particularly in Russia.  The sceptics are eager to point out that the ills of the business community are a
result of the country embracing a free market economy whilst receiving poor advice.  Thus a cynicism
towards new ideas has developed over the past two years which has resulted in suspicion and sometimes
hostility towards any initiative which does not, ’with the sweep of a magic wand’ solve the receiving
companies problems.
7KLV VKRXOG QRW GLYHUW DWWHQWLRQ IURP SRRU TXDOLW\ PLVVLRQV  7KH DEVHQFH RI VWDWLVWLFV ZKLFK ZRXOG
H[SOLFLWO\UHFRUGWKHUHDFWLRQRIEHQHILFLDULHVLVDSUREOHPWKH308KDVWRUHVROYHDVVRRQDVSRVVLEOH
7KHSUHVHQWUHSRUWLQJSURFHGXUHGRHVQRWSURYLGHDGHTXDWHLQIRUPDWLRQSULPDULO\EHFDXVHRIWKHODFNRI
UHVSRQVHIURPWKHEHQHILFLDULHVWKHPVHOYHV
Figure 5 summarises an example of a successful mission.  This is presented as a short case study inAnnex
2. A further case study is presented in this annex which describes the expertise and commitment of a
senior expert also working in Uzbekistan in the poultry sector. These examples researched by the
Evaluation Team confirm that levels of assistance can exceed basic terms of reference and are a clear
indicator of the high quality work delivered by many senior experts.
4XDQWLW\RI2XWSXWV
The targets and outputs are already described in section 1.1.4. Targets have been and still continue to be
bettered, in some instances quite substantially.  This is welcome and most of the savings to effect these
increases come,  we were informed, from shorter missions and possibly the negotiation of cheaper travel.
:KLOVWZHIRXQGQRHYLGHQFHWRLQGLFDWHWKDWVKRUWHUPLVVLRQVKDGDQHJDWLYHLQIOXHQFHRQTXDOLW\LWLVDQ
DUHDZKHUHWKH308PXVWH[HUFLVHFRQVLGHUDEOHFDUH
We have noted in section 1.1.4, that the provision for ESSN V has dropped substantially and cost
effectiveness is now a real issue.  It is possible that there will be less than 130 missions conducted under
the financial allocation for 1999.  The present management team believes that under present structural
arrangements they could handle up to 500 expert missions per year.  It appears obvious that ESSN has no
problems meeting targets.  The constraint is funding.
7KH (YDOXDWLRQ 7HDP YLHZV WKLV DV DQ LPSRUWDQW LVVXH WKDW VKRXOG EH VSHHGLO\ DGGUHVVHG by Tacis.
(661LVLPSOHPHQWHGLQSDUWE\PHPEHUVWDWHLQVWLWXWLRQVZKRDOVRZRUNZLWKQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWV
$V$QQH[ SRLQWVRXWWKHUHLVPLVVHGRSSRUWXQLW\KHUHHFRQRPLHVof VFDOHFRXOGEHDFKLHYHGQRWRQO\
E\LQFUHDVHG7DFLVIXQGVEXWE\FORVHUFRRSHUDWLRQZLWKWKHPHPEHUVWDWHV
 )OH[LELOLW\5HVSRQVLYHQHVVDQG0RQLWRULQJ
The Evaluation Team considers that under the facility type approach, there is adequate flexibility in
programme design to cope with most eventualities.  Equally so this has to be transposed to the programme
management. The Evaluation Teamhas no doubt that this programme has the potential to increase its
success rate but needs fine tuning to improve delivery.  We have identified several key areas such as
matching needs with demand, which requires Tacis and PIU attention.
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7KLVLPSURYHPHQWQHHGVWKHMRLQWHIIRUWRIWKHSURJUDPPHSDUWQHUVWKH3,8DQGWKHPHPEHUVWDWHVHQLRU
VHUYLFHVDQG7DFLV
Responsiveness is a two way business:
(i) from the field; the staff, the institutions and the beneficiaries who desperately need a better
understanding of what is on offer and ;
(ii) from Tacis through the PIU to the relevant demands of the same group.
It was clear to the Evaluation Team that those who had given careful and accurate thought to what was on
offer and where the response was well researched and prepared, the recipient company could benefit
greatly from the senior expert input.  $OVRSHUKDSVit VKRXOGEHHPSKDVLVHGPRUHWKDWWKLVDVVLVWDQFH
FRPHVZLWKWKHFRPSOLPHQWVRI7DFLVDWYLUWXDOO\QRFRVWImprovements indelivery are a management
matter but needs the goodwill of both the PIU and SSOs.
0RQLWRULQJ
In general terms project monitoring both internally and externally has fallen short of optimum levels.  This
is not unusual with the facility programmes, which have suffered with the late start of external Tacis
monitoring and scarce resources for internal monitoring
([WHUQDOPRQLWRULQJof the ESSN programme was first introduced in 5XVVLDin 1997 when the Moscow
based Tacis Monitoring Unit specifically assigned a team of monitors to the facilities.  Unfortunately the
Evaluation Team found that:
½ there is little or no evidence of Tacis having reacted to the monitoring reports so far although
the issues which were emphasised by the monitors requiredin some instances corrective action;
½ adverse comments made by the external monitors did not appear to have been passed to the PIU
or on to the respective senior expert institutions in all instances.
Reports from external monitors on facilities projects are done on a sample basis because of cost
effectiveness.  To achieve maximum benefit, Tacis and the PIU should make contact with the monitors to
identify areas of concern and maximise their input.
,QWHUQDOPRQLWRULQJof the ESSN programme started under the PIU contract in 1996.  A task of the PIU
manager would comprise - in the first place - to "monitor and evaluate the programme policies, procedures
and activities". The present system has to be reviewed but while the Evaluation Team considers it a
priority they also understand that it must be done with the understanding of the physical and budgetary
constraints.  The PIU manager is not bionic, he can only achieve so much.
Before trying to implement new ideas and refocus scarce management time the Evaluation Team suggests
that new emphasis be put on existing systems and where possible introduce penalties for non-compliance
unless these requirements are met.  Much of the monitoring in this situation has to be done by the PIU
manager personally during his missions to the Tacis countries and he should concentrate the little time he
has available on the supporting documentation supplied with mission invoices and an (en)forced response
from beneficiaries who are invited to complete PIU questionnaires concerning their assessment of the
assistance provided.
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 6\QHUJ\:LWK3DUDOOHO,QWHUYHQWLRQV
7DFLV0DLQVWUHDP60( 3URMHFWV
The ESSN programme was viewed from start up as being complementary to the Tacis mainstream SME
projects and it has been successfully performing as such over the years.  Mainstream projects in the SME
sector focus on assistance to SME support structures and ESSN offers direct assistance to enterprises.
Yet a random check of the awareness of other Tacis-funded Business support structures and related Tacis
projects did not show a high level of awareness of the ESSN programme.  It would appear that knowledge
of ESSN is contingent on the expatriate expert(s) being acquainted or not with the programme.  Neither
does there appear a procedure by which Tacis projects are informed automatically about the opportunities
the programme offers.  When communicating with several SME DAs in Russia for example, most of them
claimed to have little information about the ESSN programme.
2YHUDOOWKHUHLVQRZDQHHGIRUJUHDWHUFRRSHUDWLRQDQGLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH60('$V%&&VDQG
(661 LI WKH SURJUDPPH LV WR RSHUDWH HIILFLHQWO\ DQG LQIRUPDWLRQ KDV WR EH SURSHUO\ GLVVHPLQDWHG $Q
LQWHQVLYH WUDLQLQJSURJUDPPH LV UHTXLUHG (YLGHQFHRI WKLV LV WKHQXPEHURIDSSOLFDWLRQV VXEPLWWHGE\
60('$V%&&VDQGWKHVXFFHVVUDWHRI6HHWDEOH7KLVLVDQDFFHSWDQFHUDWHRIZHOO
EHORZWKHRYHUDOODSSURYDOUDWHRI
There is the possibility of a conflict of interest that has to be addressed if the SME DAs and BCCs are to
work more closely with ESSN.  The principle developed by ESSN of offering free advice is now being
questioned.  ESSN does not charge fees.  Recipient companies are requested to contribute to cost for
accommodation, subsistence, local transport and interpreters only.  In some instances part or all of these
costs are waived.
Tacis has made strong efforts in mainstream SME projects to install commercial practices and charge for
their services.  This follows the overall logic that each product and each service has a certain price in a
market driven economy.  To many therefore, it is a paradox that ESSN offers free advisory services
delivered by experienced EU experts.  7KHUHDUHWKHUHIRUHWKHVHHGVRIIXWXUHFRQIOLFWSeveral directors
of SME Development Agencies raised thisissue to the Evaluation Team.  The response of two agencies to
this problem is shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 below
)LJXUH5HVSRQVHWR(661$GYLFHE\60('$([HFXWLYH
7KH0$'( 9LHZ
MADE, the Moscow Agency for the Development of Entrepreneurship, is one of the most advanced SME
support agencies in Russia. Created under Tacis, and provided with Tacis assistance for several years, they
are able today to deliver high quality advice to SMES.  When asked why the agency did not participate
more actively in the ESSN programme, the Director stated that she would create competition to her own
consultants in doing so.  "Why should I arrange for an EU expert giving advice to one of my clients free of
charge when I am selling the services of my own consultants?
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)LJXUH5HVSRQVHWR(661$GYLFHE\60('$([HFXWLYH
7KH9RURQH]K60('$5HVSRQVH
The Director of the Voronezh SME DA confirms the point of view of the director of MADE.  His agency -
which was created under a Tacis project in 1994 - has reached a high degree of sustainability today.
When asked by the Evaluation Team why he was not interested in co-operation with the ESSN
programme, he stated that this would be counterproductive.  As he put it: "Tacis experts have been telling
me for two years that I must sell the services of the agency to my clients.  And now, there is another Tacis
programme offering the provision of free services.  Where is the logic?"
The Evaluation Team suggests that there is a strong case to review the provision of such free services.
Whilst in the present economic climate there is little doubt that SMEs are unwilling and more often unable
to pay commercial EU rates, a subsidised system could be considered approximating to the fee rates of
local consultants. Whilst little opportunity has developed for consultancy in the NIS and Mongolia country
SMEs so far, it is being carefully nurtured by the SMEDAs and BCCS.
7KHUHDUHVHYHUDOPHWKRGVZKHUHE\WKLVVLWXDWLRQFRXOGEHUHJXODULVHG7KH(661H[SHUWFRXOGEHKLUHG
WKURXJK WKH 60('$%&&ZLWK WKH DJHQF\ SD\LQJ WKH H[SHQVHV DQG WDNLQJ DPDUJLQ IRU SURYLGLQJ WKH
VHUYLFHVDQGRUJDQLVLQJWKHYLVLW2UWKHDJHQF\FRXOGEHSDLGDQLQFUHDVHGIHHIRUSURYLGLQJWKHVHUYLFHV
%DVH OLQH FRVW IRU SURYLVLRQ RI VHUYLFHVZRXOG KDYH WR EH HVWDEOLVKHGZKLFKZRXOG HTXDWH WR WKH ORFDO
FRVWV7KHFKDUJHRXWUDWHVKRXOGQRWEHOHVVWKDQWKHH[SHQVHVRIWKH(661H[SHUW
,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH DJHQFLHV VKRXOG QRW EH JLYHQ WKH EHQHILW RI XVH RI WKH (661 VHUYLFHV WR JLYH WKHP DQ
DGYDQWDJHRYHUWKHLUFRPSHWLWRUV:KLOVWIHHUDWHVDUHNHSWWRORFDOOHYHOVORFDOFRQVXOWDQWVDQGFRPSDQLHV
VKRXOG EH RIIHUHG XVH RI (661 VHUYLFHV LI QRW LQGLYLGXDOO\ WKURXJK WKH 0RVFRZ EDVHG FRQVXOWDQWV
DVVRFLDWLRQRUDVLPLODULQVWLWXWLRQ
:HZRXOG KDVWHQ WR DGG WKDW WKHVH DUH SULQFLSOHV WR EH IROORZHG EXWPLJKW SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ WKH FDVH RI
ZRUNLQJZLWKORFDOFRQVXOWDQWVEHGLIILFXOWWRLPSOHPHQW,WLVQHFHVVDU\KRZHYHUWKDWWKHVLWXDWLRQYLVDYLV
WKH60('$VDQG%&&VEHUHVROYHGDVVRRQDVSRVVLEOH7KHSULQFLSOHVKRXOGEHWKDWSURYLVLRQRI(661
DVVLVWDQFHVKRXOGQRWEHDOORZHGWRGLVWRUWWKHORFDOPDUNHW
We are dealing with a vast market and it is difficult to generalise but we can observe that:
½ there are a good number of SME DAs and BCCs which are successfully assisting the ESSN PIU
particulary with dissemination and prospecting for client companies and the ESSN PIU reports and an
increasing number of applications from these institutions;
½ about 25% of the successful applications now come from this source;
½ this participation isstronger outside the Russian Federation as shown in Figure 9.
$VWKHLQIRUPDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJWKHVSUHDGRIDSSOLFDWLRQVSHU60('$%&&VHH7DEOHVKRZVRQO\
5XVVLDQ60('$V%&&VDFWLYHO\SDUWLFLSDWHLQWKH(661SURJUDPPH
Fees are paid to SME DAs and BCCs for provision of services to the project PMU and these should
remain.
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Table  9 also provides an analysis of the numbers of applications and approvals received from SME DAs
and BCCs in Russia and the other NIS under the ESSN II project.  It excludes applications received from
co-ordinating units, technical offices and direct from enterprises.
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7DEOH$SSOLFDWLRQVYHUVXV$SSURYDOVSHU60('$%&&LQ5XVVLDDQG7DFLV&RXQWULHV
(661,,
$JHQF\ 60( '$ 
%&&
$SSOLFDWLRQV
VXEPLWWHG
60( '$ 
%&&
0LVVLRQV
DSSURYHG
2YHUDOO 0LVVLRQV
&RPSOHWHG
Yerevan BSC, Amernia
Baku Kosia-SME DA, Azerbaijan
Minsk BCC, Belarus
Georgia
Aktyubinsk SME DA, Kazakstan
Almaty BCC, Kazakstan
Kyrghstan
Kichinev BCC, Moldova
Ulaanbataar MBDA, Mongolia
Moscow MADE, Russia
Altai SME DA, Russia
Chelyabinsk SME DA, Russia
Ekaterinburg SME DA, Russia
Murmansk SME DA, Russia
St. Petersburg BCC, Russia
Tajikstan
Ashgabat SME DA, Turkmenistan
Kiev BCC, Ukraine
Tashkent BCC, Uzbekistan
9
7
21
5
54
11
63
3
2
4
3
4
4
5
9
92
1
3
5
3
23
1
27
1
2
3
2
4
2
2
5
41
14
14
75
4
2
23
24
14
34
Russia
Total 243
3
3
124
80
7RWDO   
There are two further issues, which the Evaluation Team considers warrant comment:
1. Local and international commercial consultants have been operating for years in the mid to large
company sector particularly in the Russian Federation.  Therefore Tacis is encouraging conflict by
extending ESSN support to such enterprises and should develop a more precise position.
2. Provision of ESSN assistance could be much closer related to the activities of the SME support
institutions.  If entrepreneurs wish for assistance they will always be able to make some level of
payment.  Amalgamation and the role of the member state senior service institutions are subjects we
discuss in our conclusions.
7DFLV(QWHUSULVH5HVWUXFWXULQJ$FWLYLWLHV
Following the decision under the Tacis ESSN II and III contracts to extend the eligibility of beneficiary
companies to larger and even state owned ones preparing for privatisation, the ESSN programme must
also be viewed as complementing Tacis activities in the enterprise restructuring area.  This is however, a
critical issue as there is a risk of ESSN interfering into areas which are reserved for other actors under
Tacis programmes/ projects as, e.g., TERF - The Tacis Enterprise Restructuring Facility or the Enterprise
Support Centres in various regions of the Russian Federation.
The Evaluation Team suggests that ESSN should not unless specifically invited involve itself in this area.
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7KH3URGXFWLYLW\,QLWLDWLYH3,3DQG:RUN$WWDFKPHQW:$3 3URJUDPPHV
The ESSN strategy from the beginning was part of the overall strategy for the development of SMEs in
the NIS and Mongolia. All three have follow up training and work attachments to the EU. ESSN activities
to a certain extent run in parallel to the Tacis Work Attachment programme (WAP) and the Productivity
Initiative Programme (PIP) in the area of follow-up training and work attachments in the EU. The
Evaluation Team considered the question posed, for cost effectiveness should the ESSN be offered these
initiatives under PIP and/or WAP (which will be replaced in Russia with the Tacis Managers’ Training
Programme in the future).
The Evaluation Team does not believe that the initiatives should be amalgamated primarily because they
are programme specific. (For example, ESSN visits to Europe to identify appropriate equipment for
investment accompanied by the ESSN expert). Therefore, the Evaluation Team is of the opinion that the
facility to organise such trips under the auspices of ESSN should remain.
Conversely, ESSN complements study visits and internships of CIS managers under PIP and WAP
Participants in these programmes are sometimes keen to receive an ESSN expert to assist them in
implementing changes once they return to their home companies. Approximately 25 missions on this basis
have been organised for companies whose staff have participated in WAP.
Furthermore ESSN can be used as a vehicle to identify applicants for both PIP and WAP. The Evaluation
Team found the following relevance:
½ Several candidates have already been introduced into the PIP in the past through ESSN and closer co-
ordination could increase the number of participants identified though the ESSN programme.
½ In many instances however when ESSN assistance was offered, it was not followed through by PIP
participants particularly when connected with implementation of action plans.
7KH 3DUWHQDULDW 3URJUDPPH  ESSN has been involved in the participation of NIS managers in
Europartenariat events since the Dortmund Europartenariat in 1995.  The skills and experience of senior
experts has been used to assist NIS managers intheir business dealings with exhibitors and other visitors
during the Europartenariat events.  This assistance was particularly needed by those NIS managers who
had no previous exposure to Western Business culture.
Without the help of their peers from the EU, many of them would not have benefited from the
opportunities offered by their participation in the Europartenariat.
ESSN has continued to assist NIS visitors during Europartenariat events since 1995.  ESSN experts
participated inEuropartenariats in Lisbon (autumn 1995), Lulea (June 1996), Genova (Autumn 1996),
Athens (June 1997), and Clermont-Ferrand (October 1997).  The number of senior experts assisting NIS
managers during their Europartenaniat visits is shown in table 10:
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7DEOH1RRI([SHUWV$VVLVWLQJ1,6(XURSDUWHQDULDW9LVLWRUV
/RFDWLRQ 1RRI(661
([SHUWV
Dortmund 1995 18
Lisbon  1995 36
Genova 1996 36
Athens 1997 
Clermont-Ferrand. 1997 15
Interestingly, appreciation of the role of the ESSN expertise followed a similar pattern as with the
provision of expert assistance itself.  On some specific occasions NIS visitors questioned their specific
contribution and felt that they could have contributed more detailed sector advice.
,I 1,6 SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH (XURSDUWHQDULDW HYHQWV FRQWLQXH (661 LQSXWV VKRXOG DOVR FRQWLQXH RQ D
VHOHFWLYHEDVLV
 0XOWLSOLHU(IIHFWVDQG'LVVHPLQDWLRQRI3URJUDPPH,QWHUYHQWLRQV
So far, ESSN has not produced strong multiplier effects.  A prime reason has been that the promotion of
the programme has been curtailed due primarily to financial constraints on the number of participants.
7KH HYDOXDWRUV FDQ UHFRUG WKDW WKH\ ZHUH FRQIURQWHG VHYHUDO WLPHV E\ LQWHUORFXWRUV VKRZLQJ VWURQJ
LQWHUHVWHYHQDOWKRXJKWKH\ZHUHQRW\HWDFTXDLQWHGZLWKGHWDLOVRI WKHSURJUDPPH,WZDVDOVRVWUHVVHG
VHYHUDOWLPHVGXULQJLQWHUYLHZVWKDWWKLVSURJUDPPHZDVH[DFWO\ZKDWZDVQHHGHGLQWKH&,6WRVWUHQJWKHQ
PDUNHWRULHQWHGPDQDJHPHQWVNLOOVLQDSUDFWLFDOZD\
Multiplication comes from increasing numbers equivalent to an increase in finance.  Dissemination is
through word of mouth from successful missions.
0DQDJHPHQW(IILFLHQF\
The quality of the management of the programme has evolved perhaps not speedily enough but
satisfactorily since the initial foundations laid by the five senior service organisations in 1993.  7KH
(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPKDVVHHQ WKDW WKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIPDQDJHPHQW LVQRWRQO\ UHIOHFWHG LQ LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
LVVXHVEXWDOVRLQSURMHFWGHVLJQ7KLVLVFOHDUIURPWKHLQYROYHPHQWRIERWKWKH3,8DQGWKHVHQLRUVHUYLFH
RUJDQLVDWLRQVLQWKHFRQWLQXRXVHYROXWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWVRIWKHSURJUDPPH
Tacis itself has reacted to various issues when required.  It has:
½ contracted management from outside the initial large service organisations when it was prudent to do
so;
½ responded to the financial constraints imposed on management inESSN I by introducing a new style
of financing facility in ESSN II and
½ tightened the terms of reference in ESSN III to respond to criticism of poor expert quality.
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Since ESSN II, the programme has been run by a PIU, (originally a Projecrt Management Unit, PMU)
contracted directly to the commission.  This switch of management from the original senior service
organisations to ’outside’ management by consultants brought some tension in to the equation, which we
have already discussed and will do so again in section 3.
The Evaluation Team favours the use of the outside contractor and the parameters of the present system
and will assess the present situation and avoid the details of the past.
 6HOHFWLRQDQG8VHRI&RQVXOWDQWV
The Evaluation Team is of the opinion that the technical assistance provided through the present PIU is
used in a most efficient way to support project implementation;
½ a small staff of three persons (one of whom is an accountant) is running the programme smoothly and
professionally based on very sensible use of modern information technology;
½ in addition to managing the programme on a day-to-day basis, the staff are also editing ESSN News, a
newsletter that appears twice a year;
½ despite time and financial constraints the PIU are able to fulfil almost all their terms of reference.
,WLVPRUHGLIILFXOWWRSUHFLVHO\DVVHVVWKHHIILFLHQF\RIWKHVHQLRUVHUYLFHRUJDQLVDWLRQVLPSOHPHQWLQJWKH
SURJUDPPHEHFDXVH
½ the mandate to do so is questionable;
½ this evaluation does not have the resources to survey a suitable sample of the large number (over 20)
organisations involved
The Evaluation Team has observed however, that it varies between services and that participating services
that have a large number of staff are more able to prepare missions in a very thorough and careful way.
Some of the small participating services are constrained because of their limited resources.  Nevertheless
the Evaluation Team (see section 2.1.5) on the basis of available information cannot conclude that small
size is related to low quality of inputs.
(DFK LQGLYLGXDO VHQLRU H[SHUW LV D FRQVXOWDQW DQG ZH KDYH GLVFXVVHG WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI
H[SHUWVNLOOVXQGHUWKHPDWFKLQJSURFHVV:KDWDOVRPXVWQRWEHIRUJRWWHQLVWKHDELOLW\WR
WUDQVIHUWKHVHVNLOOV
 (IILFLHQF\RI,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ
2YHUDOO3URJUDPPH0DQDJHPHQW6WUXFWXUH
Management of the ESSN programme is complex and of necessity, comprehensive. It involves a
considerable number of different players and decision making layers which interact in Brussels, inthe EU
member countries and in the Tacis countries participating inESSN implementation.  This is shown in the
organigramme below,
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2UJDQLJUDPPH
The fulcrum of the management structure is the Project Implementation Unit (PMU), based in Brussels
and reporting to the relevant task manager inTacis.  Annex 3 provides more detail of the membership and
the role of the various committees and groups inthe structure.
The first major changes to the structure were the introduction under ESSN II of two new management
tools
½ a Programme Management Unit (PIU)and
½ a Programme Payment Facility (PPF)
7KH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPEHOLHYHVWKDWZLWKRXWGRXEWWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIDSURIHVVLRQDOO\FRQWUDFWHG3,8ZDV
WKHPRVW LPSRUWDQW GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH(661SURJUDPPH Not only did it introduce independent high
EU Tacis
Task Manager
,GHQWLILFDWLRQRI
&OLHQW&RPSDQLHV
i Senior Expert Orgs.
ii SME DA’s / BCC’s
iii Others
iv Direct
Senior Expert Orgs.
Expert Selection
Programme Coordinating
Committee
Client Companies
Expert Missions
Seminar and News Editorial
Committees
Sub Committee
Project Steering Committee
P.I.U. (PMU)
Project P.M.
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quality management, but it allowed access to the programme from then onward, to all senior service
organisations in the EU.  In its own way the PPF established another milestone.  It established a financial
procedure to avoid the agonies of the previous contract where payment disagreements almost bankrupted
some senior service organisations.
From 1995 the PIU became responsible for project implementation with the management responsibilities
detailed in Annex 3. As the organigramme indicates this included receiving applications from the field and
negotiating with the EU senior service to supply the expert assistance.
From the establishment of the PIU in 1995, applications for missions had to be submitted to the PIU,
which in principle had to seek the task manager’s approval for each mission. (In practice as the PIU
matured this was only followed in a few instances).
The decision-making committee is the PSC and the PCC on which Tacis, management and the senior
service organisations are represented.  7KH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPEHOLHYHVWKDWWKLVLVDVRXQGVWUXFWXUHZKHUH
DOO WKHSDUWLFLSDQWV FDQ DLU WKHLU YLHZV DQG SDUWLFLSDWH LQ WKH VWUDWHJLHV DQGPDQDJHPHQW RI WKH(661
SURJUDPPH
1DWLRQDO6HQLRU([SHUW6HUYLFHV0DQDJHPHQW6WUXFWXUH
$ FUXFLDO DUHD IRU WKH (YDOXDWLRQ 7HDP LV GLYLVLRQ RI UHVSRQVLELOLW\ EHWZHHQ WKH 3,8 IRU DOO JOREDO
PDQDJHPHQWLVVXHVFRQFHUQLQJWKHSURJUDPPHDQGWKH6HQLRU6HUYLFHRUJDQLVDWLRQVZKRDUHUHVSRQVLEOH
IRUWKHVHOHFWLRQRIWKHH[SHUWVDQGIRUVHQGLQJWKHPRQORFDWLRQ7KXVRQFHDQDSSOLFDWLRQLVDFFHSWHGE\
WKH3,8LWLVDWWULEXWHGWRRQHRIWKH662VZKLFKLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHSUHSDUDWLRQDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI
WKHPLVVLRQ
7KLVLVDSRWHQWLDOIDXOWOLQH
Present operational procedures rule that:
1. The SSO has to submit the CV of the proposed expert(s) to the PIU for approval and if necessary the
Task Manager.  The PIU can however stillreject an expert ifit is of the opinion that the proposal will
result in a poor match.  The Evaluation Team considers that it is necessary to strengthen central
direction of the selection process with the PIU to ensure that the best candidates are selected.
2. Once a mission is terminated, the national service submits its invoice, together with the report and the
action plan created by the expert, and supporting documents to the PIU.
3. The PIU checks all the documents submitted and releases the payment to the respective service if the
submission is in compliance with the regulations.
3URJUDPPH0DQDJHPHQWLQWKH1,6
Appointed agents identify suitable clients in the Tacis member countries.  Representatives of the senior
services identify between 65-75% of the present clients.  An increasing number of companies are being
identified by SME DAs and BCCS.  In some Tacis countries (like Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan), the Co-
ordinating Units also play an important role inthe identification of clients.  Although small, the number of
direct applications via the internet is increasing.  The field representatives are also expected to disseminate
information concerning the ESSN programme.
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7KH$SSOLFDWLRQDQG,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ3URFHVV
Concern was raised by both intermediaries and recipients concerning the long lead time from application
to implementation for many missions.
,QWRRPDQ\FDVHVLWWRRNEHWZHHQDQGPRQWKVIURPWKHDSSOLFDWLRQE\WKHFRPSDQ\WRWKHDUULYDORI
WKHH[SHUW7KLVKDSSHQVWRRIUHTXHQWO\DQGLVLQFOHDUFRQWUDGLFWLRQRIWKHREMHFWLYHVRIWKH(661IDFLOLW\
WRSURYLGHDIDVWUHVSRQVHWRWKHQHHGVRIVPDOOFRPSDQLHVH[SHULHQFLQJSUREOHPV
6XFKWLPHODSVHVPXVWEHHIIHFWLYHO\HOLPLQDWHGIURPWKHSURJUDPPH
A quick response to a request for assistance is one of the key elements for programme success.  When the
opposite occurs applicants lose interest and may withdraw.  An example discovered by the mission was
that of the Uzbek agricultural producer who was informed that an expert for harvest issues would be
provided in response to his request.  The problem was that the expert was scheduled to arrive four months
after harvest was completed even though he was requested six months in advance.
Long mobilisation times are not infrequent and this is confirmed by the results of the interviews in Russia
(see table 11) and in Uzbekistan (see table 12).  Nine company representatives were asked the lead in time
in Russia and 12 in Uzbekistan;
i from the initial application till a CV was presented (those awaiting a mission) and,
ii from application till the arrival of the expert (those who had participated in a mission)
7DEOH/HDGLQWLPHVIRUPLVVLRQV±5XVVLD
N° Answer
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1st application was sent to ESSN in1996, there has been QRDQVZHUIRU\HDUV
2nd application was filed to AGIR on 11/02/98, CV was received on 04/05/98 PRQWKV
Application was filed through RFC on 20/04//97, CV came on 21/04/98 PRQWKV
Applied to ESSN for 3 experts , a fax came PRQWKVlater without CV
Application was filed to EKTI in February of 1997, CV came on 14/05/98 ( PRQWKV
Application was filed through MCCI, CV came  ZHHNVlater.
Application was filed to NMCP; the consultant came PRQWKVlater.
Application was filed through Tacis MCU; consultant came PRQWKVlater.
Application was filed to ESSN inMay of 1996; consultant came PRQWKVlater.
1st application was filed to ESSN inNovember of 1997; QRDQVZHUIRU7 PRQWKV
2nd application was filed to ESSN in February of 1998; the answer came PRQWKVlater.
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7DEOH/HDGLQWLPHVIRU8]EHNLVWDQ
N° Answer
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Application not yet LQBrussels.
Applied LQMarch, expert arrived in October PRQWKV
2QHPRQWK
Waited many months, made several inquiries why no expert was sent, eventually declined.
Applied in August, expert arrived in February ( PRQWKV
Applied LQ1995, expert arrived in1997 \HDUV
PRQWKV
Selection of the expert: 3 months, mobilisation: 1,5 months; total: PRQWKV
PRQWKV
Applied in March, got answer in September that expert would arrive LQNovember, asked for
postponing visit till February, which was accepted (UHVSPRQWKV). WRPRQWKV
Applied in April, expert arrived in January ( PRQWKV
Such responses can only be considered indicative.  The Team had no way of verifying the accuracy of
these claims.  Nevertheless it is clear that a problem does exist and this was confirmed by the PIU in
Brussels.  7KH3,8KDVSURSRVHGDOHDGLQWLPHRIQRORQJHUWKDQPRQWKVApplications older than 6
months being considered as obsolete.
7KH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPVWURQJO\VXSSRUWV WKH3,8LQHIIRUWV WRUHVWULFW WKH OHDG WLPHDQG UHGXFH LW EHORZ
SUHVHQWOHYHOV
On balance, the average lead time from application to arrival of the expert has been decreasing since
programme start up but there are still too many delays.  However, the PIU only has limited influence as
the identification, preparation and dispatch of the expert lies with the participating senior service
organisations.  ,W LV WKH\ ZKR KDYH WR HQVXUH WKDW OHDG LQ WLPHV DUH DGKHUHG WR 7KH (YDOXDWLRQ 7HDP
VXJJHVWVWKDWWKH3,8VKRXOGKDYHWKHSRZHUWRUHFRQVLGHUDJUHHPHQWVZLWKRUJDQLVDWLRQVZKRDEXVHOHDG
LQWLPHVZLWKRXWUHDVRQDEOHH[FXVH
The SSOs give two main reasons for a long lead time.
1. First, the respective service may be unable to work any quicker due to its size and small number of
administrative staff.  As a rule, it takes these services quite a long time to prepare a mission and to
send out the expert.
2. Secondly, the more carefully the selection of experts is carried out, the longer the lead time may
become.  There are cases where very specific know-how is needed by the recipient company and
appropriate specialists are difficult to find.  Even large national services may experience problems in
identifying suitable experts within a reasonable period of time.
7KH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDP IHHOV WKDW WKLVYLQGLFDWHV WKHSURSRVDO WKDWPRUH WKDQRQHRUJDQLVDWLRQVKRXOGEH
DVNHGWRIXOILODUHTXHVWHVSHFLDOO\LIWKHSRVLWLRQPD\EHGLIILFXOWWRILOO
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(IILFLHQF\DQG7UDQVSDUHQF\RIWKH$GPLQLVWUDWLYH$UUDQJHPHQWV
Due to the number of management layers involved (see above), it is not easy to make and keep the
administrative arrangements fully transparent, especially to the client.  The ESSN handbook (introduced
by the PMU in ESSN II) however clearly explains procedures from the point intime when an expert has
been identified and starts preparing for his mission.  The reports the PMU periodically sends to the Task
Manager provide comprehensive, detailed information on all the important issues of the programme
management.
The Team considers that there is less transparency concerning two important steps during the mission
preparation phase:
½ the decision whether a mission will be implemented under ESSN or under a bilateral programme in
which the national SSO is participating and
½ the allocation of missions to the participating national services.
7KH GHFLVLRQ ZKHWKHU D PLVVLRQ LV LPSOHPHQWHG XQGHU WKH 7DFLV (661 SURJUDPPH RU D ELODWHUDO
SURJUDPPH OLHV ZLWK WKH UHVSHFWLYH QDWLRQDO VHUYLFH  If a field representative identifies a prospective
client, the national service concerned often has more than one source of funding, for example ESSN or a
bilateral programme.  This situation may conceivably lead to misunderstandings and conflict.  Concerns
were expressed to the Evaluation Team in Moscow regarding the dual role played by some expert
organisations.  Although the expert organisations say that recipients of assistance are clearly informed of
the funding source there is the opportunity for error.
The Evaluation Team considers that this situation is to open to serious misunderstandings and we will
discuss this further in section 3.
Whilst the expert organisations have expressed the view that such a situation rarely occurs, the Evaluators
have had this problem confirmed not only by the EU Delegation but by beneficiaries and a representative
of an expert organisation.  The Tacis monitors repeatedly mentioned in their reports that most recipient
companies do not know that the expert mission was funded under an EU programme.
This must be an area of concern and is not new to Tacis. The PIU contract in 1995 states that the PIU
would co-ordinate and encourage promotional activities for several reasons.  One of these listed was "to
avoid confusion inthe marketplace between the operations and image of the programme as a whole and
those of its individual participating organisations".  It would appear that Tacis has not taken appropriate
steps to address this situation.
The allocation of missions to the participating services and rejection of applications are issues which
causes disquiet amongst several of the national services.  The fault line we referred to above.
½ they complain of a lack of transparency in the selection process;
½ that applications sourced by them inthe field are rejected without adequate and transparent reasons:
½ the PMU disclosure of information concerning the allocation of missions based on the rotational
principle is inadequate.
,WLVFOHDUWRWKH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPWKDWWKHLQIRUPDWLRQIORZEHWZHHQWKH3,8DQGWKHSDUWLFLSDWLQJVHUYLFHV
LVQRWFKDUDFWHULVHGE\DKLJKGHJUHHRIWUDQVSDUHQF\7KH3,8KDVDZHOOGHYHORSHGLQIRUPDWLRQV\VWHP
DQGWKHHYDOXDWRUVEHOLHYHWKDWLWZRXOGQRWFUHDWHDVHULRXVSUREOHPWRSURYLGHWKHUHTXLUHGLQIRUPDWLRQ
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The Evaluation Team can only reiterate that in 1995 Tacis decided to establish the PIU as an independent
co-ordinating body with far reaching tasks and responsibilities for overall programme administration and
the PIU is only fulfilling its TOR. Tacis made it clear that the recruitment of senior experts and the
management of their missions (would) remain a responsibility of each participating Senior Expert
Organisation. It was also clearly stated that it intended the responsibilities of the PIU to:
½ review every mission application in relation to the eligibility of the beneficiary and the proposed
interventions;
½ manage the decision making process related to such applications and
½ monitor the timely implementation of approved missions.
The Evaluation Team would further note that:
1. It is understandable that the SSOs regard themselves as best suited to organise senior expert
missions since they have been running such programmes an a bilateral basis for many years.
2. It is also understandable that Tacis lays specific emphasis on a strong co-ordinating function which
makes sure that the overall ESSN principles and guidelines are respected with priority over those of
national programmes.  This was one of the main reasons we believe why Tacis invited independent
organisations which do not have direct ties with any of the mission implementing national
institutions, to tender for the Tacis III contract
7KHWHQVLRQVWKDWKDYHDULVHQEHWZHHQVRPHRI WKH ODUJHUQDWLRQDOVHUYLFHVDQG WKH3,8UHVXOW IURPWKH
GLIIHUHQWYLHZVRIWKH308¶VDFWXDOUROHZLWKLQWKH(661SURJUDPPH$OWKRXJKPRVWRIWKHSDUWLFLSDWLQJ
VHUYLFHVDSSDUHQWO\HQMR\XQVSRLOWUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH3,8WKHGLIILFXOWUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQVRPHRIWKH
ODUJHVWQDWLRQDOVHUYLFHVDQGWKH3,8FRQVWLWXWHVDPDMRUSUREOHP7KH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPEHOLHYHVWKDWLW
LV GLOXWLQJ MRLQW HIIRUWV WR FRQWLQXRXVO\ LPSURYH SURJUDPPH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ DQG PXVW EH VSHHGLO\
DGGUHVVHG
(IILFLHQF\RI,QIRUPDWLRQ'LVVHPLQDWLRQ
Information about the ESSN programme is disseminated both a prior and a posterior, i.e. for promotional
purposes and as an outcome.
A priori dissemination is done at a low level by the PIU.  This low key approach results from the serious
limitations placed on the number of missions due to Tacis budget restrictions.  It would discredit Tacis if
expectations among the NIS Business community were raised to a level that could not be fulfilled.  The
upper limit has been 300 missions per year and that was when the budget was at its highest.
The Evaluation Team see it as a fair reflection of the problem that demand could far out strip supply but
are convinced that controlled marketing would not be beneficial as it would reduce the number of requests
from which the most suitable could be chosen.  Competition between applicants and the intermediaries in
the field would most probably result in an improvement in the quality of applications submitted.
7KH1DWLRQDO6HUYLFHVDUHSDLGDOXPSVXPDPRXQWSHUPLVVLRQZKLFKLVPHDQWWRLQFOXGHRYHUKHDGFRVWV
RI WKHVHUYLFHV LQFOXGLQJSURPRWLRQDOH[SHQVHV 7KH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPKDYHQRWHG WKHFRQIXVLRQDPRQJ
WKHPDMRULW\RIUHFLSLHQWVFRQFHUQLQJWKHRULJLQRIVHQLRUH[SHUWDVVLVWDQFHSURYLGHGDQGKDYHFRQFOXGHG
WKDWSURPRWLRQDODFWLYLWLHVRQEHKDOIRI7DFLVE\WKH1DWLRQDO66VLVZHDN7KH7HDPKDVUHDFKHGWKLV
FRQFOXVLRQ QRW RQO\ E\ GLVFXVVLRQV ZLWK UHFLSLHQWV DQG ILHOG VWDII EXW E\ H[DPLQLQJ WKH SURPRWLRQDO
OLWHUDWXUHRIWKH662V7KHFRQFOXVLRQLVWKDWWKHEXGJHWIRU(661SURPRWLRQWKURXJKQDWLRQDOVHUYLFHV
FRXOGEHXVHGPXFKPRUHHIILFLHQWO\WKDQLWLVDWWKHPRPHQW
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Such a low profile approach has resulted in a low level of awareness of the programme particularly in
Russia and in the other Tacis countries.  Even in countries like Uzbekistan where the programme is
actively marketed by a local agent, the vast majority of companies only become aware of the programme
when they are directly contacted by the agent.  7KHVHPLQDUV WKDWDUHKHOGE\ WKH3,8URXJKO\SHU
\HDUFHUWDLQO\UHDFKDVPDOODXGLHQFHLQWKHUHVSHFWLYHUHJLRQRUFRXQWU\EXWGRQRWFRQWULEXWHWRDEURDG
GLVVHPLQDWLRQRI LQIRUPDWLRQ (YHQDPRQJEXVLQHVV VXSSRUW VWUXFWXUHVNQRZOHGJHRI WKHSURJUDPPHLV
SRRUGHVSLWHVWDIIKDYLQJDWWHQGHG(661GLVVHPLQDWLRQVHPLQDUV
The Team addressed, by electronic mail, Tacis established SME DAs and BCCs general questions
concerning the programme.  The response indicated even here a low awareness of the ESSN programme.
Of the 14 agencies who responded, 11 said they did not know a single company having received ESSN
assistance.  This is somewhat alarming at best.
From their own experience as contractors in the SME development sector, the Evaluators know that it is
difficult for Russian SMEs to get any reliable information on ESSN outside Moscow.  A random check of
the awareness of other Tacis-funded business support structures and related Tacis projects, did not show
high awareness of the programme within these structures/ projects either.  Even with such a low
recognition level the programme is well subscribed.
 )LQDQFLDO0DQDJHPHQW
(IILFLHQF\ DQG7UDQVSDUHQF\ RI WKH )LQDQFLDO $UUDQJHPHQWV  Financial management of the ESSN
programme has been a continuous problem from start up.
The Evaluation Team are of the opinion the commission accounting procedures are not designed to
respond effectively and speedily enough to the needs of such a programme.  This was the ’bed rock’ of the
problem.  The time consuming reimbursement procedures caused liquidity problems to both the initial
contractor and the SSOs.  Neither was able to establish a cash flow sufficient to pre-finance a large
number of missions.  This situation was compounded in the early days of the programme by lack of
experience of  Tacis invoicing needs and also the initial inability of the commission to amend established
procedures to reflect the needs of this programme.
Tacis approached the problem in two ways;
½ by creating a new payment procedure ’a Programme Payment Facility’ (PPF) which speeded up
reinbursment procedures and
½ when preparing the tender for ESSN III, clearly setting out the financial structure of the project in
order that bidders would clearly understand the cash flow requirements of the programme.
The Evaluation Team interprets this as a restrictive response.  It severely limits those who can pre qualify
and many smaller but qualified organisations particularly those in the non profit sector were de facto, not
in a position to bid.  The Team cannot say that this was, because of the in place commission financial
regulations, the wrong way forward but it believes that this situation warrants comment.
In effect, invoicing and payment procedures became more transparent and liquidity problems were
distinctly reduced when the PMU took charge of the payment process.  Introduction of a detailed
computerised payment system and a precise cash flow in line with what could be expected from the
commission has produced a payment schedule acceptable to the contractor and the participating national
services.
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The basis structure of the mission related budget is quite simple.  It comprises mission overhead costs,
reimbursable travel expenses and per diems.  These can be summarised as follows;
(i) a lump sum rate is paid per mission to cover all overhead organisational and promotion costs;
(ii) SSOs are reimbursed actual travel costs of the expert;
(iii) the rate of per diems is calculated according to the level of contribution made by the recipient e.g.
accommodation, subsistence etc.;
(iv) SME DAs and BCCs are allowed a fee for each successful client application.
Training and work attachments payments follow the same procedure.
$FRPSOLFDWLRQ LV WKDW HDFK LQGHSHQGHQW RUJDQLVDWLRQ KDV LWV RZQ LQWHUQDO UXOHV DQG UHJXODWLRQV  7KH
(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPLVRIWKHRSLQLRQWKDWWKHUHKDVWREHDFRPPRQV\VWHPHYHQ LIVRPHUHVSHFWLYHH[SHUW
RUJDQLVDWLRQVWKLQNRWKHUZLVH
%XGJHW (IILFLHQF\  The Team has divided the project into four components to evaluate budgetary
management.  There is a clear distinction between the different areas of implementation particularly when
such a large proportion of the funding is disbursed by the PIU to sub contractors.
L 3URJUDPPH3URPRWLRQDQG'LVVHPLQDWLRQThere are no specific budget lines.  Allocations are
implicit in organisational overheads, news publications and seminar/ workshop costs.  Presently the ESSN
News has small budget line of only ECU 7,000 equivalent to about 12,000 copies.  We have also
discussed (see section 2.3.2), if the SSOs use their allocation to effectively promote the ESSN programme.
Information provided during field visits indicated that contrary to agreements some National Service
personnel actively promote their home organisations whilst on Tacis funded missions.
It is not clear to the Evaluators how much of the mission overhead costs is provided for promotional
activities.  As far as could be ascertained this approximates to ECU 600 per mission.  In the opinion of the
Evaluation Team from the interviews conducted by recipients, officials and others;
½ Tacis does not receive value for money from this allocation;
½ low key policy of dissemination itself is integral to the discussion and the absence of evidence to show
how mission promotional allocations are spent, reinforces this view and
½ at the very least, national service organisations should be required to report on the promotional aspects
of their missions.  For this to be done a clearer policy and strategy has to be developed for the
recipient identification process.
LL 'HFHQWUDOLVHG3URJUDPPH0DQDJHPHQW Decentralised programme management refers to all
those activities contributed to programme implementation by the SSOs and intermediaries in beneficiary
countries. It covers activities in the area of client identification, the selection of experts, and the
preparation of missions (including briefing and debriefing meetings with the experts).
There are 23 National Services involved in the supply of expertise.  The efficiency of the funds used for
these decentralised contributions to programme management is mainly contingent on the quantity and
quality of the services provided by the national services and intermediaries.  The Evaluation Team are
satisfied that whilst there are bad matches the number of successes is high enough to indicate a positive
response to requests for assistance.  It is also clear, as has already been emphasised that there are different
levels of service between organisations.  More often that not it is, in the opinion of the team, the
knowledge and people skills of the mission expert that is the defining factor between success or failure. A
fixed fee is paid to each service (currently ECU 3,000) for the services of an expert to conduct a mission.
This is paid no matter the size, sophistication or back up available from the organising service.  It would
50
appear that the more efficient organisations who expend more time and effort in recruiting and supporting
their experts make better use of the allocation than others.  This effectively financially discriminates
against the more efficient.  7KH3,8VKRXOGEHDEOHWRRSHUDWHDEHWWHUTXDOLW\FRQWUROV\VWHPEHIRUHDQG
GXULQJ WKH PLVVLRQ DQG UHTXLUH SUH PLVVLRQ DVVXUDQFHV WKDW WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ LV LQ WKH SRVLWLRQ WR
HIIHFWLYHO\VXSSRUWWKHH[SHUWLQWKHILHOG
The Evaluation Team was pleased to note that on PIU insistence not only were pre mission briefings
increasing but that more experts were making contact with the recipient prior to mission start up.  From
comments in the field this was viewed as a positive development.
The need for improved applicant selection has already been discussed and another area where deficiencies
have been identified is in the reporting structure.  Too many reports and action plans (some are missing
entirely) do not meet basic set standards.  The Evaluation Team recommends that the Task Manager gives
the PIU maximum support to reject poor reports particularly low quality action plans and thus improve the
existing standards.
2YHUDOOWKHYDU\LQJOHYHOVRIHIILFLHQF\XVLQJ WKHSUHVHWEXGJHWVUHLQIRUFHGWKH(YDOXDWRUVRSLQLRQ WKDW
WKHUH LV WKHQHHG IRU FHQWUDOLVHGTXDOLW\ FRQWUROZKLFKFDQRQO\EH HIIHFWLYHO\ LPSOHPHQWHG WKURXJK WKH
3,87KLVRSLQLRQDSSOLHVHTXDOO\WRWKHVHUYLFHVSURYLGHGE\WKH60('$VDQG%&&6
LLL 0LVVLRQ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ The cost of mission implementation is relatively low as no fees are
paid to the experts.  From figures made available to the Evaluation Team;
½ The cost per mission under the ESSN II contract was:
H[FOXGLQJthe cost of the PIU was approximately (&8
LQFOXGLQJcost of the PIU approximately  (&8
½ The cost per follow-up-training under the ESSN II contract was:
H[FOXGLQJthe cost of the PIU was approximately ECU
LQFOXGLQJWKHFRVWRIWKHPIU (&8
½ The cost per workshop/seminar under the ESSN II was:
- H[FOXGLQJthe cost of the PIU was approximately 18,112 ECU
- LQFOXGLQJthe cost of the PIU was approximately 19,100 ECU
The Evaluation Team considers that this is a cost effective programme but there is a disturbing trend
evident in the funding for the 1997 and 1998 financial allocations.  To maintain efficiency and direction
the PIU must be maintained.  If we view this as a fixed cost the reducing ESSN budget for the past two
years means less missions and therefore higher unit costs.  In 1996 the budget was 2.1 MECU, 1997 it was
1.6 MECU and 1998 it was 1 MECU.  Cost effectiveness is therefore rapidly being eroded and the
discussion above concerning increasing capacity becomes academic.  The Team believes that if anything
the role of the PIU should be strengthened.  Therefore it is difficult to see any reduction in costs.  The
ESSN 111 budget was 2.1 MECU of which 14% was management costs.  The planned project for 1999 (1
MECU) will cater for less missions and the Evaluation Team believe that the cost of the PIU could
increase to over 25% of the total budget.
$GGLQJ WR WKH FRQFHUQV RI WKH(YDOXDWLRQ 7HDP LV WKH UHGXFLQJ GXUDWLRQ RIPLVVLRQV The TOR of the
current contractor allows for a minimum of 14 days and a maximum of 45 days.  The average length of the
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missions is decreasing.  For ESSN II it was 11 days.  There is no set formula for length of missions and
the only difference to cost is the level of per diem paid.  A formula must be introduced to control the
number of days spent on mission otherwise this could be seen as a way of decreasing costs for more
missions with a corresponding drop in quality.
,QWKHYLHZRIWKH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPWKHPRVWFRVWHIIHFWLYHVSHQGLQJRIWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQEXGJHWZRXOGEH
IRU7DFLVWRSURYLGHIXQGVIRUWUDLQLQJRISHUVRQQHOLQWKH1,6WRDGHTXDWHO\LGHQWLI\VXLWDEOHFOLHQWV For
some, payment of a financial bonus is not sufficient.  Some agents are more concerned with quantity
rather than quality.
The Evaluators suggest that it is more efficient use of the budget to improve the quality of applications by
training prospective agents and intermediaries than to fund a lot of short "fact finding" missions.  In
addition, there is no evidence in practice so far of subsequent missions being much longer than
identification missions.
LY &HQWUDOLVHG 3URJUDPPH 0DQDJHPHQW (PIU).  The running cost of PIU operations is low
compared with the cost of similar programme management units within Tacis main-stream projects.  It
amounted to roughly 10% of the budget for missions, training/work attachments and seminars under the
ESSN 11 contract and roughly 17% under the ESSN 111 contract.  The increase of budget under the
ESSN Ill contract is mainly due to an increase in fees and other running cost due to the fact that the PIU
became part of the Contractor under the ESSN 111 contract.
The Evaluators have expressed the concern however that this satisfactory ratio would appear to be under
threat if the budget drops to a level where the number of missions is lowered too far.
The role of the PIU is central to the success of the programme.  Whilst the comments made so far are
more fine tuning of the programme they require attention and time.  It is therefore unrealistic to believe
that the PIU could be downsized.  With the vast geographical spread of the programme, the opposite is
probably the case.
,PSDFW6XVWDLQDELOLW\DQG5HSOLFDELOLW\
 2YHUDOO,PSDFW
It became obvious from the interviews with the recipient companies that the impact on those enterprises
which were happy with the match between their needs and the expertise provided, was high. This is
confirmed by the comments in Tables 2 and 6 above.  Although recorded from conversations and there is
no written record, they are diverse and interesting enough to convince the Evaluators of the successful
impact if many if not all the expert missions.
The two cases described in more detail above (see the F.a.r.t and the Rovada Cases in Annex 2) provide
confirmation of the substantial impact that ESSN assistance can provide.  They clearly show that the two
entrepreneurs acquired market oriented management skills which were new to them as a result of the
expert mission.
The Evaluators believe impact of most ESSN missions is high if and when the mission has been properly
researched and prepared and attention given to the following detail;
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½ the background and the needs of the applicant company have been assessed thoroughly;
½ the expert has been selected based on the detailed problem description;
½ the duration of the assignment is long enough;
½ the expert actually prepares a plan of action at the end of the assignment and
½ he/she writes a thorough and comprehensive report which is handed over to the recipient.
The Evaluation has clearly indicated poor impact where mission preparation was insufficient.  The number
of companies who have requested follow up missions and/or a reining work attachment is also not
inconsequential.  This is an indicator of the value placed on the programme.  Level of impact does clearly
vary from country to country with Russia perhaps separate from most, in attitudes to the programme.
 5HSOLFDELOLW\DQG6XVWDLQDELOLW\
5HSOLFDWLRQ of the ESSN programme is not a major issue.  National service organisations have been
operating similar programmes before the Tacis input and could well do so after it is completed.  ESSN
should be more concerned with replicating quality missions and sorting out its image problem particularly
in Russia.
6XVWDLQDELOLW\of the programme (i.e. continuation of the Tacis programme) is purely dependent on Tacis
funding.  It is not possible to forsee a situation where the programme would continue after withdrawal of
Tacis financial support.  The National Services may continue but not under the Tacis banner.  The larger
organisations have bilateral funding, as already discussed, and industrial assistance as well as some money
of their own.  Should Tacis decide to withdraw support it would be wrong not to use the project
experience to promote an EU strategy.  Because of its unique position Tacis could help to promote
permanent co-operation between EU National Organisations.
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),1',1*6$1'5(&200(1'$7,216
The evaluation team concludes that ESSN is an appropriate and effective initiative to deliver relevant
expertise to the SME sector in the NIS and Mongolia. It is important to recognise that this is the only
Tacis instrument, which transfers hands on practical skills from specialists to entrepreneurs on a direct one
to one basis. This is a valuable management tool for beneficiaries. In the 5 years that it has been operating
there are clear and proven indicators of success and the programme warrants further Tacis support.
It is unfortunate that statistics providing the beneficiaries response to the senior expert inputs are
incomplete. :HZRXOGUHFRPPHQGWKDWVWHSVDUHWDNHQWRUHFWLI\WKLVVKRUWIDOODVVRRQDVSRVVLEOHFrom
our sampling of the mission results we would estimate a 70-75% success rate.
When interviewing USAID officials the team found
that they expect a 95% success rate in their senior
service programme. They relate their success to
continuous site visits by USAID staff during the
expert inputs. This is too expensive for Tacis but is
an indicator of the need for increased field
participation through, we recommend, SME DAs
and BCCs.
ESSN operates in a partnership with Member State SSOs. It is not adequately resourced either financially
or physically to either identify genuine and worthwhile applications for assistance or monitor the results of
the programme. Apart from improving the flow of completed questionnaires there is little more it can do.
The PIU therefore should seek more assistance from the SME DAs and BCCs in implementation.
Already they receive a fee for identifying suitable beneficiaries but this needs review. It is neccessary that
a more precise and increased role be defined in return for fee payments.  These organisations could;
1. increase and improve assistance to identify companies which would genuinely benefit
from ESSN advice and ensure that their requests are properly documented and
2. monitor the results of the assistance provided by the expert, to help with the
need to maintain  an accurate record of results.
For this assistance to be worthwhile, the PIU will have to introduce more training of SME DA and BCC
staff. A more innovative approach to monitoring should be adopted. 7KH7DFLVPRQLWRULQJWHDPVKDYHLQ
PRVWRIWKHUHJLRQVRIWKH1,6DQG0RQJROLDORFDOO\EDVHGWUDLQHGPRQLWRUVZKRDUHHPSOR\HGRQDSDUW
WLPHEDVLV7KHUHLVQRUHDVRQZK\WKLVH[SHUWLVHVKRXOGQRWEHXWLOLVHGRQDQ(661WUDLQLQJRSHUDWLRQDO
EDVLV
In the opinion of the evaluation team project design is well conceived. Quite properly, participation in the
programme should be open to all member state SSOs. This means that there has to be, although not for
this reason alone, a central independent management point (the PIU) to co-ordinate inputs and to ensure
that fair play is maintained in the allocation of resources. To believe that management should be done by a
single SSO or group of SSOs is ignoring the obvious
7DFLVKDVDFRPPXQDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\LQWKLVUHJDUGDQGLQWKHRSLQLRQRIWKH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPLVFRUUHFWWR
FRQWUDFWDQLQGHSHQGHQWO\PDQDJHG3,8
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The design is appropriate for both a high level of efficiency and increasing cost effectiveness. It should
also bind together the SSOs of all member states and the PIU. Yet it is clear to the evaluation team that
tensions have arisen between some of the National Senior Services and the PIU. These have resulted
primarily from different views on their respective role within the ESSN programme. Whereas most of the
participating services enjoy good relations with the PIU, the difficult relationship between some of the
large SSOs and the PIU constitutes a major obstacle to achieve the continuous improvement the
programme needs. The evaluation team see the SSOs as a critical part of the ESSN philosophy. Yet Tacis
must establish clearer parameters on how they should participate in the ESSN programme.
On this important issue the evaluation team would make the following observations:
½ The national services are correct in regarding themselves as the specialists in how best to organize
senior expert missions but some are more efficient than others.
½ Tacis is correct to put strong emphasis on the co-ordinating function of the PIU to make sure that the
overall principles and guidelines are respected and given priority over those of the national
organisations. The PIU should be strong but should not interfere into the relationship between the
SSOs and their experts.
½ All transactions between the SSOs themselves and the PIU should be transparent to avoid the mistrust
and suspicion that occurs.
On several occasions the attention of the Evaluation Team was drawn to the potential conflict of interests
between the SSOs who also manage bi-lateral programmes and the ESSN programme. For example, when
a client is identified, to which funding source is the request directed? Twice the Team faced a recipient
company who claimed not to know the funding source for their senior expert. The SSOs are firm in their
response that they are impartial and that their data base can adequately cope with demands from both
ESSN and National requirements.
Together, the ESSN programme with the SSOs, has produced a dramatic turnaround in many NIS and
Mongolian companies. It has also left too many unsatisfied clients. The PIU has the expertise to rapidly
close the quality gap. It does not have the mandate or capacity to involve itself in the management of the
SSO experts. The substance of the ESSN programme lies with the national SSOs. They hold the key to
quality improvement. They must work collectively with the PIU to exchange ideas and experience and
accept collective rules and regulations. Otherwise the Senior Service instrument, particularly in Russia
will become discredited.
Tacis has to decide whether the SSOs with a dual function can effectively participate in ESSN.
Alternatively do Tacis view ESSN as a long or short term programme? If it is the former, the role of the
SSOs has to be reviewed as soon as possible.
In order for the programme to provide the speedy high quality assistance described in the terms of
reference and improve on the success ratio there are areas that require assessment. In many instances these
suggestions are not new to the stakeholders. But, if the Tacis ESSN programme is to fully display its
opportunities for development, improvements in design and delivery will have to be initiated. The
Evaluation  Team considers that the following are relevant:
½ About two thirds of the applications come via the SSOs although other sources are increasing. Mutual
agreement must be reached between the PIU and the SSOs on the identification and acceptance
process of clients. Too many companies in the opinion of the evaluation team see the expert as a
magician who can solve their problems. The advice of the expert is to assist WKHP to solve their
problems. This is not being clearly transmitted to the client in many instances.
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½ If quality is to be improved the key areas are;
(i) the matching process;
(ii) the communication skills of the expert (this is too often ignored);
(iii) quick lead in times and
(iv) a well prepared and researched mission;
½ There are five areas of controversy on which the evaluators would wish to comment.
1. The rotational principle in the choice of experts was introduced to balance the allocation of inputs
between the large and small organisations. 7KH HYDOXDWLRQ WHDP UHFRPPHQGV WKDW H[SHUWV PXVW EH
FKRVHQ RQ WKHLU DELOLW\ DQG DYDLODELOLW\. Quality, which is becoming a major issue, must not be
compromised. We would recommend that this system be replaced by a straight request to a short list
of SSOs to supply the expert and the final selection be left to the PIU.
 There is a division of opinion as to whether a generalist should first mount a mission to identify the
specific needs and what expertise is required. This appears to accept that this cannot be done by staff
in the field.  However, we believe if they are well chosen and trained, field staff should carry out this
function. 7KH(YDOXDWLRQ7HDPGRHVDFFHSWWKDWWKHUHLVVRPHWLPHVDQHHGIRUWKLVW\SHRIPLVVLRQEXW
WKDWLWVKRXOGQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGWKHQRUP,QDQ\LQVWDQFHWKHGHFLVLRQVKRXOGEHWDNHQRQDPLVVLRQ
E\PLVVLRQEDVLV
 Whilst the responsibility for the missions and initial choice of experts should be firmly anchored with
the SSOs, the PIU is responsible for quality control. This includes feedback on expert’s missions to
the PMU DQGRQWRWKHUHVSHFWLYH662  The PMU should also be firm in raising the issue of poor
delivery with the organisation. 7KHHYDOXDWLRQWHDPDOVREHOLHYHVWKDWWKDW662VPXVWDFFHSWWKDWWKH
3,8KDVWKHULJKWLIQHHGEHWRUHMHFWSURSRVHGH[SHUWVHLWKHUEHFDXVHDEHWWHUDOWHUQDWLYHLVDYDLODEOH
RUWKHSHUVRQLVQRWSURSHUO\TXDOLILHG,QWKHODWWHULQVWDQFHZHZRXOGH[SHFWWKLVYHWRWREHXVHGRQO\
LQH[FHSWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGDIWHUGLVFXVVLRQEHWZHHQWKH3,8DQGWKH662
4. /RQJOHDGLQWLPHVVXFKDVWKRVHRYHUPRQWKVDUHQRWDFFHSWDEOH7KH3,8VKRXOGHVWDEOLVKFOHDU
SDUDPHWHUVDQGUHMHFWDQ\PLVVLRQWKDWWDNHVORQJHUWRPRELOLVHWKDQODLGGRZQSURFHGXUHV.
5. Unfair competition with the emerging commercial consultancy business must be avoided. The PIU
should take steps to put in place some general guidelines to assist field staff in this regard.
The Evaluation team recommends that Tacis review the ESSN budgetary allocations with the recipient
governments, if necessary. Present levels of funding are not cost effective. It is unhealthy for the PIU to
artificially restrict dissemination of a successful programme. A programme which has the capacity to
deliver much needed assistance at SME company level should be directed to prove that efficiency is
increasing and if so more funds will be made available. The Evaluation Team can compare this with the
PIP and future management training programmes. They certainly have their place but do not substitute the
on the job professional transfer of know how.
Finally, the ESSN programme gives an immeasurable boost to EU-NIS and Mongolia relations at
grassroots level. A successful mission by an experienced and committed senior expert gives not
only good advice but enhances a network of similar business contacts and in the process creates
many friends often beyond the recipient company itself. This spin off effect does not require
evaluation.
$QQH[
4XDOLW\DQG4XDQWLW\RI2XWSXWV
1. Quality of Outputs.   The ESSN programme has an intrinsic problem of wide differences
in quality of outputs from case to case.  Both for the national senior service organisations and
the PIU it is impossible to control all parameters of success.  While the Evaluating Team is
convinced that the vast majority of senior expert missions is appreciated by the beneficiaries,
the Team found a large number of them not satisfied with the results, in particular in Russia
that absorbs 37 percent of the ESSN missions.  In Uzbekistan, that receives 12 percent of the
ESSN missions the score was much better.  Tacis is fully aware of the vulnerability of ESSN
in this respect and made quality improvement a central theme for ESSN III.  Missions that
turn out less than satisfactorily perhaps disproportionally influence the judgements of those
who make the budget decisions.  While the Evaluation Team believes that ESSN has much to
gain from advantages of scale, too frequent negative reports about the senior expert missions
would discourage the authorities from investing more in the programme.
2. What is missing, are comprehensive statistics on the satisfaction of the beneficiaries.  The
PIU has kept, rightfully so, the satisfaction reporting separate from the expert mission itself,
but is not receiving sufficient response.  In particular Russia is notorious for lack of response
on surveys.  The Evaluation Team visited more than ten beneficiaries each in Russia and
Uzbekistan.  This was enough for an understanding of the problems, but cannot replace a
comprehensive satisfaction review in the decision whether or not ESSN should be enlarged.
The Team also did a survey among 29 regional SMEDAs in Russia but received only 14
answers.  Eleven of them said not knowing companies that worked with ESSN.
3. Russian companies are not fully satisfied with the quality of services they were provided
by the ESSN experts in quite a considerable number of cases.  The main reasons they claim
for the mission not being up to their expectations are: i)lack of understanding for the country,
the company and its economic environment in which it is operating, and ii) too general advice
provided.  The degree of acquaintance of ESSN experts with both the general economic
situation of the country and the more specific environment within which companies are
operating is contingent on the mission preparation by the national services. There are
participating senior service organisations that spend a lot of efforts to brief their experts
before they start their missions.  One organisation visited by the Team had "country officers"
and "sector officers", both working with teams of people with recent mission experience that
are called in for the briefing and debriefing meetings.  This organisation also provided their
experts with written material.  It also happens in many cases that the participating
organisation and/or the expert selected get in contact with the recipient company while
preparing the mission. They ask for more detailed information concerning the actual problem
the company is suffering from and the concrete assistance that is expected from the expert.
However, some other participating senior expert organisations do not lay much emphasis on a
comprehensive preparation of the experts and may not have the knowledge and capacity to do
so.  The national organisations have no system to share their country experience and written
material.  The PMU could insist on the presence of formal country briefing documents (in
most countries this sort of material is provided freely by the national trade promotion
agencies) or make an "inventory" of briefing practices as applied by the different participating
organisations.  The Evaluation Team believes that the PIU itself should not engage in briefing
activities, because this would require additional specialised staff and duplicate work that is
already done by the more sophisticated national organisations
4. When it comes to the complaints about the advice provided being too general, several
elements have to be taken into consideration.  First, the general ESSN philosophy as with
regard to the question whether generalists or specialists should be sent out to first missions.
Secondly, the selection process of the experts.  Third, the result which realistically can be
expected by a client from a consultancy assignment. The selection of experts has been
discussed extensively in the main report.
5. The PIU and some of the participating senior services are in favour of sending generalists
rather than specialists on the first missions.  These generalists would then decide what further
expertise should be provided in a follow-up mission.  However, much harm can be done to
the reputation of ESSN in case very specific advice is expected and only general assistance
provided (mostly a Russian complaint).  The Evaluation Team believes that the emphasis
should be on collecting a maximum of information at the application stage and apply a
flexible approach when it comes to the mission composition, to be decided entirely by the
national organisation.  In case it becomes clear during the acquisition process that the expert
is supposed to help solving a specific problem, a specialist will be sent.  In cases without clear
perception of a specific problem, the national organisation may prefer to send a generalist
first.  When such a mission is presented as a "problem identification mission", the beneficiary
will probably appreciate this approach.  The difficulty in making this type of decisions can
best be understood by looking at some typical problem descriptions as received from the
applicants:
½ preliminary assessment of the technical quality of products and elaboration of
proposals of its international certification;
½ search for respectable Western partners able to organise large scale manufacturing
and promotion of the product on the world market;
½ search for Western clients interested in the elaboration and production of
experimental samples and putting into manufacturing scientifically complicated
products able to compete in the world market (equipment, technology);
½ assistance in applying the technology of manufacturing specific industrial package
materials providing the preservation of the quality of goods; advice concerning the
technology of adjusting such materials to industrial conditions; organising the
manufacturing of special packaging;
½ a need in consultants with teaching experience for conducting specialised courses
and seminars in accordance with international standards;  advice in the preparation
of an investment project providing for the constructing of a building for this
educational establishment and its commercial use; assistance in searching for a
foreign investor for constructing the building;
½ the improvement of organisation and technology of a manufacturing process with
advice aiming at the reduction of prime cost of production;
½ Advice in real estate, in finance management and concerning equipment;
½ Advice in the development of transportation services:
- planning of sales campaigns;
- evaluation of sales results;
- marketing studies;
- Revealing the most efficient sales.
6. Rather often, the monitors mention that there is a lack of specification of the outputs
expected.  They mention, e.g., that "the planned outputs were not specified very well in the
application form ",and "there was obviously an information gap between the Contractor, the
project partner and the executing expert in respect to the objectives of the mission".  Better
targeting of the missions would increase the quality of the results.  The Evaluation Team is of
the opinion that the normal set of mission planning procedures should apply but that, in the
case of senior expert missions, the process of setting detailed mission objectives is not always
possible.  For that reason, plenty of leeway should be created for the senior expert to pursue
the path that promises most benefit for the improvement for the enterprise concerned (see
F.a.r.t. case).
7. Regarding the results that a beneficiary can realistically expect from a senior expert
mission, it has to be taken into consideration that too many companies (not only in Russia)
expect that problems can actually be resolved by the consultant.  Of course, this is a wrong
expectation.  In some of the NIS countries, life for private enterprises is very difficult, without
immediate solutions available.  Moreover, the Western consultant cannot be supposed an
expert in these, for him unusual circumstances.  The consultant’s task is to help the company
in better coping with problems by providing him a West European perspective on the
problem, but the problem has to be resolved by their own efforts. Thus, a senior expert
assignment will normally not produce concrete results in the sense of "problems completely
resolved". If the PIU wants to look for better ratings, it should start to put the finger on senior
service representatives over-selling the senior services to potential clients.  Clients should
already be made aware of what they can realistically expect from the assignment in the
acquisition phase in order to avoid misunderstandings. In addition to that, the Action Plan for
the enterprise will help make expectations more realistic.  The Action Plan will make clear
that the expert’s mission is only the beginning of a series of measures which have to be taken
by the management of the enterprise itself to improve the performance of the company.
8. The degree of satisfaction with the quality of ESSN expert missions is generally  higher
in Uzbekistan than in Russia as with regard to all three issues mentioned above:
organizational issues, quality of the assistance provided; and, result achieved.  Unlike in
Russia, the implementation of the ESSN programme is very much centralized in Uzbekistan.
Most of the ESSN assignments are prospected by the Tashkent based BCC (and its regional
offices) which was created under the Tacis programme several years ago. The BCC also
accompanies the implementation of most missions to a certain extent.
Direct applications are almost always channeled through the BCC.  As a rule, the
Tacis supported SMEDAs (in Samarkand and Gulistan) and Small Business Advisors
(in the remaining 12 regions of the country) prospect and pass applications to the
BCC in Tashkent which forwards them to Brussels.
9. Only few representatives of national services are active in Uzbekistan, which contributes
to the central role of the Tashkent BCC as an ESSN intermediary.  As the BCC is a structure
established under Tacis and is proud to present itself as a Tacis supported agency, every
applicant knows of ESSN being a Tacis funded programme from the beginning.  This
apparently also applies for many other smaller CIS countries without important prospective
activities of the national services.  The recipient Uzbek companies are very happy with the
support provided by the B CC.  In most cases, they did not have any contacts with foreign
companies or institutions before and would be unable to submit an application themselves .
The BCC is investing a considerable amount of time in prospecting applications which also
leads to applicants normally being quite well informed about the features of the ESSN
programme.
10. In general, the Uzbek recipient companies were satisfied with the degree of the expert’s
understanding of the overall situation of the country and the Business environment.  Knowing
the quality of the Tashkent BCC, the Evaluation Team would not be surprised if the experts
receive a good country briefing in the office of the BCC.  The beneficiaries were, normally,
happy with information concerning the industry sector and technological development of
machinery over the last few decades.  As a considerable percentage of experts got in contact
with the company before arriving, they were normally quite well prepared with regards to the
company's problems.  With very few exceptions, Uzbek companies were very much satisfied
with the results of the expert missions.  Although Action Plans were only written in a
minority of cases (like in Russia), many Uzbek recipients wrote down quite a lot of what the
expert told them. In the case of F.a.r.t., the entrepreneur even recorded the statements of the
expert on audiocassettes. After return, experts assisted the companies by sending them
samples of goods, etc.  In a considerable number of cases, follow-up missions by the same
expert were organized several months after the first visit.  This contributed to the
development of a good mutual understanding between expert and managers of the recipient
company, which sometimes resulted in the Uzbek managers being invited to follow-up study
tours to the EU and introductions to European suppliers etc.  In two cases of the series of
company visits that Evaluation Team made, the ESSN mission resulted in attempts to the
create a Joint Venture with an EU based company.  By the completion date of the present
report, funding for one of the two cases seems to be secured and the creation of the JV being
imminent.  The Evaluating Team is reporting so extensively on the Uzbekistan experience
because, in this case, the ESSN was working as it was supposed to.  Valuable lessons can be
drawn for changes in the programme in countries were ESSN is working less satisfactorily.
11. Quantity of Outputs.   The quantity of the missions delivered was far above the contracted
targets.  While the ToR for the ESSN II planned for 340 expert missions, approximately 540
have been executed of which. Even if one takes into account that part of the training/work
attachment budget was used for expert missions, the number of missions completed surpasses
by far the expectations.  However, the missions were of shorter length than expected.  The
number of seminars realised corresponded to plan. 183 follow-up training/work attachments
were realised involving 266 NIS participants which is in excess of the target of 100 missions
for 200 managers.
If the programme was more actively promoted, it is certain that the number of qualified
applicants would strongly increase.  However, the PMU was reluctant to over-promote the
programme in the Tacis countries to avoid a situation whereby large number of valid
applications would have to be rejected due to lack of funds.  The PMU states that they would
be able to manage up to 500 expert missions per year under the current arrangements.  The
Evaluation Team believes that also the national organizations could realize substantial
economies of scale if the ESSN programme would be enlarged.  Despite these considerations,
the size of the programme is being reduced, creating an even bigger disproportion between
overhead and operating costs.  The Evaluation Team
$QQH[
&DVH6WXGLHVRI([SHUW$VVLVWDQFH
7KH)DUW&DVHUHRULHQWDWLRQRISURGXFWLRQWRZDUGVDPDUNHWQLFKH
F.a.r.t is a small private polymer processing company in the outskirts of Samarkand.  Having
learn about the activities of the Tashkent based Tacis BCC though a newsletter at the Swiss
Embassy, the director visits the BCC in order to find out whether they can do something for
him, a small entrepreneur struggling for survival.  Quickly they agree on asking for ESSN
support in order to help him in improving the quality of his products,  which he himself
assesses as quite weak.
Once the expert (who has been working in the plastics industry for decades) is identified, he
sends a list of questions to the company through the BCC in order to get a picture of what is
expected of him.  The questions are promptly answered and the expert fills his luggage with
large amounts of material concerning polymer processing before leaving for Uzbekistan.
The first talks with the director and the staff show that they are completely unaware of the
properties of polymer and polymer fluid dynamics as well as polymer processing techniques.
Intensive training on these issues complemented by a careful check of the machines in use
follows.  All machines were outdated and suffered from serious deficiencies.  The expert
makes proposals on what to change in order to at least partially enhance the quality of the
products.  He even visits the machine building plant together with the director in order to
make them aware of construction mistakes.
All talks are recorded on a cassette recorder and will help the F.a.r.t staff to very closely
follow the advice of the expert.  In addition to these records, the expert draws a list of priority
activities needed to improve the quality of the products.  However, it is clear to him and the
director that investment would be needed to distinctly raise quality.
Once the expert departed, the company staff start implementing changes and the director
begins looking for funds which would allow him to purchase a new machine.  He receives
remote assistance from the expert in identifying a suitable machine in Canada and succeeds in
settling a lease arrangement with the producer,
Today, the company is producing printed plastic bags, a market niche so far not occupied by
any other company.  Instead of producing low cost, low profit polymer products for a market
strongly contested by Chinese companies, F.a.r.t is now producing higher quality products in
an exclusive market niche.  The probability is high that F.a.r.t would not have survived
against the Chinese competitors who are placing cheap products on the Uzbek market if they
had not have discovered a market niche with the assistance of the senior expert.
5RYDGD±860LOOLRQ,QYHVWPHQWLQWR3RXOWU\)DUPLQJ
Rovada is an agricultural enterprise near Tashkent focusing on meat production.  When the
Director decides to diversify into poultry breeding and egg production in late 1996 without
really knowing how best to proceed, the Director of the local SMEDA tells him about the
ESSN programme.  With the assistance of the SMEDA, the Rovada Director files an
application which is soon approved by Brussels.  Two months later, a senior expert arrives
from Austria who is assigned to assist Rovada in developing a concept "for carrying out
poultry-farming effectively with a minimum of expenditures".
The first assessment of the expert shows that the Rovada concept is not sound.  There is no
chance for profitability due to the small scale of the proposed production.  Other agricultural
companies in the area are invited to join Rovada’s poultry-farm project. Then a concept is
developed by the senior expert of a poultry farm including a mixed feed production plant.
The concept is discussed with the city and the regional administration before being submitted
to the national Ministry of Finance.  Full support is promised by all administrative layers -
however, no funding is available domestically.  Rovada therefore asks the expert to assist
them in looking for partners for a Joint Venture.
After his return to the EU, the expert identifies suppliers of machinery, feed and specialised
construction which are basically interested in a co-operation agreement.  The Director of
Rovada is invited in summer 1997 to visit similar enterprises in the EU and to discuss the
concept more thoroughly with the potential partners.  A basic co-operation agreement is
concluded in the creation of a poultry producing enterprise on the condition sufficient funds
are secured for the investment.
After several months, an institutional investor is identified which is prepared to finance the
US$ 8 million investment project.  A further trip is organised to Uzbekistan to clarify
contractual issues and to start preparation for the construction of the buildings.
Finalisation of the investment is expected for mid-1999 when a poultry producing enterprise
based on Western experience will start its operations in a highly favourable market, at a size
which promises high profitability.
$QQH[
(6610DQDJHPHQW6WUXFWXUH
7KH3URJUDPPH6WHHULQJ&RPPLWWHH36&  The PSC has an advisory role and is headed
by the Task Manager.  It is also comprised of representatives from each Consortium member
and the EU Senior Experts Organisations.  It is concerned with the implementation of the
programme in accordance with Tacis rules, the allocation of funds per country, establishing
priority sectors, etc.
7KH 3URJUDPPH &RRUGLQDWLQJ &RPPLWWHH 3&&  The PCC was comprised of a
representative from Tacis and one representative from each Consortium member.  The PCC
was responsible for screening and selecting applications for senior expert assistance.
3URMHFW ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ 8QLW 3,8  It was the PIU’s responsibility to establish a
professional and systematic day to day management system for the ESSN Programme.  The
PIU was a focal point for project continuity, cementing the functions of the various
participants to efficiently deliver high quality inputs.  The PMU implemented:
½ the instructions of Tacis and relevantpolicies and strategies;
½ close liaison with all European senior service organisations;
½ notification of local EU mission of programme availability;
½ invitations to senior service organisations to submit applications;
½ preparation of promotion materials;
½ agreements with the PSC on reporting formats and procedures;
½ organisation of general administration procedures.
3URMHFW 3UHSDUDWLRQ )DFLOLW\  The PPF was set up specifically to establish invoicing
procedures and simplify the payment process.  Costs claims were made to the PPF which
decided whether to make advance payments to participating senior expert organisations or
not.  Mission cost claims were authorised within one week of submission and payment was
processed with little or no delays.
6HPLQDUDQG1HZV(GLWRULDO&RPPLWWHHV  These committees were set up to assist with the
organisation of seminars and the publication of newsletters for the ESSN programme.
6HQLRU ([SHUW2UJDQLVDWLRQV  The Senior Expert Organisations were responsible for the
selection of experts by matching applicants’ needs to experts’ skills.  The organisations were
also required to brief experts, send them on location and ensure efficient mangagement of
these experts.  The selected experts were approved by the PMU, after which the Senior Expert
Organisation took responsibility for the preparation and implementation of the experts’
missions.
,GHQWLILFDWLRQRI&OLHQW&RPSDQLHV  The applications for expert assistance were generally
received from three sources.  Occassionally other sources were used but not in any significant
numbers.  The applications were made through SME DA’s and BCC’s, through senior expert
organisations who had representatives in the field or through direct contact from companies
themselves.
$QQH[
,%$&.*5281'
The Tacis Enterprise Support Facility Group programmes are part of the overall Tacis Facilities
Programme.  Facilities are meant to simplify and lend support to National Action Programmes.
The Tacis Enterprise Support Facility Group is composed of  the following facilities:
• Productivity Initiative Programme
• European Senior Service Network
• Co-operation between Chambers of Commerce
• NIS Europartenariat4
 7KH%XGJHW
The expenditure breakdown for the Enterprise Support Facility Group is 19.08 MECU for 1996/19975:
• Productivity Initiative 5,91 MECU;
• European Senior Service Network 5.27 MECU;
• Co-operation between Chambers of Commerce 0.82 MECU and;
• NIS Europartenariat 0.66 MECU.
The funding is deducted from the country allocations agreed with each partner country in the context of
discussions on their National Programme.  The Tacis Management Committee has approved facility
allocations from the National Action Programmes for Russia (1996), Ukraine (1996-1997), Uzbekistan,
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova
 2EMHFWLYHVDQG$FWLYLWLHVRIWKH(6*
3URGXFWLYLW\,QLWLDWLYH3,3
The PIP aims to transform the management systems and processes in the NIS and thus support their
transition to a market economy.  It does this by offering the opportunity of getting work experience in a
EU company.  A three-month on-the-job training programme and three seminars of one week each
(preparatory, introductory and concluding seminar) provides the managers with the knowledge to
initiate and manage change when they return to their own company. For the Western EU host
companies the programme offers the possibility to establish links with NIS companies.
(XURSHDQ6HQLRU6HUYLFH1HWZRUN(661
The objective of the ESSN is to assist individual SMEs and newly privatised companies in the NIS by
providing practical managerial experience, know how and skills.  Activities encompasses the following
elements:
• advice on reorganisation and restructuring of SMEs
• on-the-job training and advice to managers and key staff of enterprises
• advice concerning the introduction of improved management practices and operations
• assistance in the establishment of business to business relations
• organisation of tailored training programme activities within the EU or the partner countries and,
• design tailored seminars for SME managers.
&RRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQ&KDPEHUVRI&RPPHUFH
The programme aims to contribute to strengthening NIS economies and to facilitate trade and industrial
cooperation between the EU and the NIS. Thus the programme enables executive staff of NIS
Chambers to make useful contacts and to develop small projects with their counterparts of EU
Chambers and to learn from their experience.
The programme is divided into two component :
• the Mercure Programme
• the Chamber Partnership Programme (CPP)
                                                
4
 The Joint Venture Programme which is also part of the Enterprise Facility Group will be
evaluated in a separate study.
5
 The 19,08 MECU comprises also the Joint Ventures Programmes.
The Tacis overall Programme budget in 1996 represents 536 MECU.
(9$/8$7,212)7+(7$&,6(17(535,6(6833257)$&,/,7<*5283(6*
352*5$00(6,17+(1,6
7HUPVRI5HIHUHQFH
The Mercure Programme was organised three times on 92, 94 and 96 budget. The aim of the
programme is to strengthen the capabilities of NIS Chambers by enabling them to become important
services providers to enterprises in a market setting.
It addresses the following issues:
• how to properly organise a Chamber;
• what are the services to be offered;
• in what way Chambers differ from other SME support institution.
The programme also aims at assisting the Chambers to:
• develop a strategy towards their membership and the supply of services to non members
• identify of the needs of enterprises (members and non members)
• establish their niche in the business services market and their role vis-a vis other business advisory
bodies and,
• develop products and services to meet the needs identified.
The activities foreseen to achieve the programme objectives are a programme visit and a training
workshop:
The Programme visit consists in a two week visit of members of NIS Chambers to two EU Chambers
and a one week visit of EU members of Chambers to one NIS Chamber.
The training component foresees 5 training workshops to be delivered to NIS Chambers.  Each
workshop last one week.  Two are organised in the Russian Federation, two in the Caucasus and one in
Central Asia.
The Chamber Partnership Programme (CPP) formed part of the Tacis 1994 Interstate Programme for
the development of the SME sector. The CPP is a natural outcome of a successful Mercure and aims at
using the positive results of it in a practical and flexible way, encouraging the Chambers to build closer
relationships amongst themselves and with their EU counterparts. The Programme allows the EU and
NIS Chambers to implement joint projects, which must fulfil at least one of the following objectives:
• to support the establishment of a structural link of co-operation and support between the EU and
NIS Chambers;
• to assist NIS Chambers to develop services which meet the needs of business.
13 cooperation projects were selected involving 43 Chambers which received a grant of 30.000 to
50.000 ECU.
1,6(XURSDUWHQDULDW
Europartenariat aims at encouraging cooperation between industries, services and particularly SMEs.
Bilateral meetings are set up in advance between senior managers of potential partners and take place
during a two day fair. The objective is to support the potential establishment of trade links between
participants in the framework of a cooperation approach.
Therefore, Tacis participation in the Europartenariat enables owners and managers of SMEs in the NIS
to make useful contacts with companies from more than 50 companies in Europe. The same scheme
was applied in February 1997 within the NIS.
 3URJUDPPH0DQDJHPHQWDQG,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ6WUXFWXUH
Each programme is managed by an external technical assistance office.
3URGXFWLYLW\,QLWLDWLYH
Two offices, one in Moscow and one in Brussels, are managing the Programme. The office in Moscow
supervises activities related to the selection and the preparatory seminars, which are both handled with
the assistance of the State Academy of Management. Specific selection criteria are utilised.  The office
also takes the responsibility for the promotion of the programme in the INS.
The management unit in Brussels supervises the matching process, the promotion of activities in the
EU, it covers all activities relating to logistics and seminars in the EU.
Candidates can be nominated either by an EU-based company or by their own NIS companies.  They
must always have full support of their own company management and be sufficient senior to be able to
take decisions and make changes in their company on their return.
Under the new contract the Moscow and the Brussels Office respond to the same employer.
(XURSHDQ6HQLRU6HUYLFH1HWZRUN
The Programme is managed by a Programme Management Unit (PMU) located in Brussels. Financial
aspects of the Programme were up to recently being processed by a separate company in the
Netherlands. The renewal of the contract to the PMU in Brussels will probably modify the situation
with a view to unifying the technical and financial activities within the PMU.
To participate in the ESSN any NIS company may apply directly to the PMU, or send applications to
the participating Senior Expert Organisations; or the Tacis SME institutions like Business
Communication Centres or SME development agencies in the NIS.  The applications are processed by
the PMU in co-operation with the task manager.  The senior specialists are providing voluntary
services and receive no fees.  They get per diem for daily expenses.  The NIS companies are supposed
to contribute to the local costs.
&RRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQ&KDPEHUVRI&RPPHUFH
Eurochambres, the Brussels based Association of European Chambers of Commerce, manages the
ensemble of the Programme following a direct agreement procedure.  EU and NIS Chambers of
Commerce may directly apply to Eurochambres that selects the proposals in co-operation with Tacis
according to specific selection criteria (language, interest, personality of participant...).
1,6(XURSDUWHQDULDW
Two Europartenariat are organised every year.  A contract is awarded to a company to organise the
participation of NIS companies in the fair.
NIS small and medium size companies are selected by the National Counsellors.  These National
Counsellors are in most cases the directors of the Tacis Business Communication Centres. The
selection is supervised by the EU contractor which receive the list established by the National
Counsellors. Visit to SMEs may be organised to verify the appropriateness of the selection.
,, 2%-(&7,9(62)7+((9$/8$7,21
The evaluation will mainly focus on the analysis of relevance, complementarity, impact,
implementation strategy and management efficiency of the Facility programmes as instruments of EC
cooperation.
Therefore the main objectives of this evaluation exercise are as follows:
a. provide consistent conclusions in relation to overall relevance and appropriateness of the Facility
programmes
b. make specific recommendations aimed at enhancing their impact with regard to:
• budget allocation
• approach and selection criteria
• implementation strategies
• programmes management  and implementing procedures.
,,, (9$/8$7,21$3352$&+
In order to allow for a clear presentation and feed back, the evaluation report will be presented in
accordance with the structure presented below.  This structure relates to the different stages of the
facilities cycle management.
$ $QDO\VLVRIWKH)DFLOLW\SURJUDPPHV
This section concerns the Facility programmes as a cooperation instrument. It will therefore be relevant to
take into consideration the following issues.
$SSURDFKDQGVHOHFWLRQSURFHGXUHV
1 Analysis of the context and evaluation of the relevance and 
complementarity
The analysis will be implemented taking into consideration the specificity of the country context in the two
selected NIS.
The main elements to be taken into consideration for the evaluation of relevance of programme and
projects objectives are:
PIP and ESSN
• private sector reform process with particular reference to the policy and institutional environment,
• the specific issues that are to be addressed at enterprises level
• the appropriateness of selected NIS enterprises in relation to their commitment to restructuring
• the position in the enterprise of the selected managers and their ability to influence management
changes
• the appropriateness of EU senior experts in relation to the needs of the beneficiary enterprises in the
NIS;
Cooperation between Chambers of Commerce
• Chambers of Commerce institutional reform process
• appropriateness of selected Chambers in relation to their commitment to restructuring and potential
ability (position in the market, experience of Chamber officials, rapport with local enterprises) to
provide services to enterprises;
NIS /Europarternariat
• Commercial / export potential, and opportunities for joint-ventures of the overall SME sector and of
the selected enterprises
Finally, the complementarity and coordination between facilities and sectoral programmes will be
analysed.
2 Analysis of the process
On the basis of the outcomes of the analysis of relevance and complementarity, the appropriateness of the
iijk following elements will be evaluated,:
• facilities demand driven approach and of the residual level of policy guidance ensured by the
Commission
• facilities specific approach (twinning, stages, short term consultancy, fair) in relation to other
approaches adopted by Tacis in the framework of private sector development and management training
programmes
It will be also analysed the appropriateness of:
• application requirements which allow for selection of best qualified individuales/companies..
• selection criteria and mechanism as far as NIS and EU enterprises, NIS and EU managers, (PIP and
ESSN) chambers of commerce and SME are concerned
• the mechanisms put in place to ensure the coordination and complementarity with other Tacis
programmes and projects
• the transparency of the selection mechanism
• monitoring and evaluation procedures
,PSOHPHQWDWLRQVWUDWHJLHV
At this level the evaluation will concern the effectiveness of the implementation strategies in relation to
achievements of  programme wider and specific objectives.  The analysis will concern:
1 the effectiveness of the implementation strategy
The implementing strategies are the following:
• 3URGXFWLYLW\,QLWLDWLYH: a 13 week “on the job training” in Western Europe and a 3 week seminar in
the EU and NIS
• (661 : visit of senior expert on the field
• (XURSDUWHQDULDW : organisation of a two day fair and targeted meetings
• (XURFKDPEUHV : Programme visit in EU and NIS, seminars
The analysis should mainly concern:
• structure and length of the actions
• appropriateness of technical message delivered
• follow up of the initiatives
• application requirements
2 the appropriateness of  the technical message with regard institutional capacity
building and specific project objectives
3URJUDPPHVPDQDJHPHQWDQG,PSOHPHQWDWLRQSURFHGXUHV
At this level the evaluation will concern the efficiency of  implementing procedures and decision making
process and their impact on the implementation of the programme
The contractor should carefully analyse the respective functions and tasks of the parties involved
(Commission, Technical Assistance structures based in EU or NIS, Delegation, BCC, etc.). It should
analyse the rationale which stands behind this division of responsibilities.
Furthermore the consultant will have to evaluate the efficiency of the technical Assistance structure for
programme's administration, in particular:
• the pace of the process from initial screening of application to approval and implementation
• how appropriate and adequate is the level of management costs in relation to project budget (ratio of
management costs over project budget)
• are the proportion and the amount of funds used for the various purposes appropriate?
• is the technical assistance being used effectively to support project implementation
• the extent to which information is provided to all the potential programme beneficiaries, both in the NIS
countries and in the European Union.
• the efficiency and the transparency of the administrative and financial arrangements applying to the
project contractors
• the effectiveness of monitoring feed back
• the effectiveness of programmes results and dissemination
,PSDFWDQG6XVWDLQDELOLW\
Whenever possible specific indicators have to be developed to analyse the impact of the different actions
implemented within the four programmes.
The evaluation should focus on:
at the level of individual
• acquisition of market oriented management skills;
at level of institutions
• change in the management process with regard to capacity of analysing needs identifying priorities and
objectives, formulating strategy, implementing actions.
• improvement in performance (i.e. financial performance for private enterprises and quality of service
delivered in case of Chambers of Commerce)
The improvement in the quality of services delivered will be assessed through interviews to customers.
In the case of the Europartenariat the impact will be also evaluate in terms of joint venture/commercial
agreement signed and enhanced trade relations.
Furthermore, possible multiplier effects such as an increasing demand and recognition for the need for
market oriented management skills or services.
Finally, it will be of particular importance the comparison of NIS partenariat and Europartenariat
performances.
&RQFOXVLRQVDQG5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV
The consultant will draw his conclusions in relation to overall relevance and appropriateness of the
concerned facilities and will make specific recommendations aimed at enhancing their impact with regard
to:
• budget allocation
• approach and selection criteria
• implementation strategy
• the programmes management and implementation procedures.
/HVVRQVOHDUQHG
The objective is to contribute to a reflection on the future evolution (2000 onwards) of EC cooperation in
management training and in developing business link between NIS and EU enterprises.
% $QDO\VLVRIWKHVSHFLILFDFWLRQV
A number of case studies will be analysed in depth for each of the facilities. The case studies may concern
components of the programme (seminars, training activities, meetings) to allow for an analysis of
effectiveness of implementing strategies or single beneficiaries to allow for an analysis of relevance and
impact of the programmes.
9 &29(5$*(2)7+((9$/8$7,21
Programme
The evaluation will focus on the Productivity Initiative Programme, the European Senior Service Network
Programme, the Eurochambers Programme and the Europartenariat. It will also take into consideration, for
the analysis of complementarity, other Tacis activities within the private sector development and
management training programmes.
Period
The evaluation will focus on 1995 to 1998 programmes.
Country coverage
Two countries within the four proposed here will be chosen for the second phase field visit: Russia,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan or Georgia.
9 25*$1,6$7,212)7+((9$/8$7,21
The evaluation will be organised in 4 phases.
)LUVWSKDVH
During the first phase, which will last 1 month, the consultant will have to:
• collect and analyse all the available documentation on NIS reform process, programme management
and selection criteria, Tacis sectoral programmes;
• make interview to Commission services, Western Europe technical assistance offices
• identify participants EU/NIS institutions - enterprises - individuals to be interviewed/evaluated in depth
in the second phase
• identify actions/events for each of the four programmes (eg seminars, training workshop, ‘on the job
training’ etc.) to take part in and evaluate during the second phase;
• develop indicators to measure effectiveness of implementing strategies and impact
• elaborate the preliminary analysis on relevance, complementarity, appropriateness and efficiency of the
management system.
At the end of the first phase the consultant will prepare a report which includes: i) preliminary analysis of
the four Programme ii) a presentation of proposed indicators iii) a detailed plan of work for the second
phase with mention of events and participants selected.
6HFRQGSKDVH
The second phase will last 2.5 months and will focus on visits to the NIS and the EU countriesThe
consultant will take part in seminars, training, fairs, senior experts visit to NIS company.   Indeed, for each
programme the consultant will attempt to participate/follow the different steps of the programme. It will
also visit and interview EU/NIS institutions, companies, individuals involved in the implementation of the
programme.
Furthermore the consultant will meet:
• Technical Assistance office located in Moscow
• the Tacis coordination Units
• the Tacis monitoring teams
• the Commission Delegations in the partner countries
The output of the second phase will be a short evaluation report for each of the action analysed an
accordance with the criteria defined in III B and preliminary synthesis of the main conclusions.
7KLUGSKDVH
During the third phase (1 month) the results of phases 1 and 2, after appropriate discussion with the
concerned services of the Commission, will be elaborated accordingly to the structures presented below:
• Executive summary (max. six pages)
The executive summary will present a synthesis of main findings, conclusions, lessons learned
and recommendations.
• Short description of the evaluation (max. 2 pages)
The short description must provide relevant information on issues such as: coverage of the
evaluation, methodological approach, main conclusions and recommendations.
• Background
• Methodological note (3 pages)
 Presentation of evaluation method with regard to evaluation criteria and indicators and organisation
of the evaluation process
• Programmes description and context
Presentation of the programmes objectives, actions, funding and their evolution overtime in the
framework of Multi-annual and annual programming exercises. Analysis of the reform process in
the sector concerned outlining main achievement in terms of policy and regulatory framework as
well as trends in economic performance.
Part two - Evaluation findings and conclusions
Part two will be organised in accordance with the chapter III part A and B":
• Analysis of the Facility Programmes
• approach and selection procedure
• implementation strategies
• Programme Management and Implementation procedures
• analysis of specific actions
Each chapter will report findings and conclusions
Part three - Impact and Sustainability
Part three will present impact and sustainability findings in relation to the four programmes.
Part four - Overall conclusions, recommendations and lesson learned
• Synthesis of main conclusions
 The synthesis of main conclusions will be drawn from the conclusions of each analytical chapter.
• Recommendations
• Lessons learned
)RXUWKSKDVH
This is the phase devoted to the dissemination of evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.
At the end of the study two seminars will be organised, one in Brussels and one in the NIS.  The consultant
will collaborate to the promotion and the organisation of the initiatives and will prepare adequate
presentations.
9, '2&80(17672%($1$/<6('
The following documentation will have to be analysed:
• Action Programmes
• All Monitoring Reports available
• Terms of Reference, technical proposal progress reports and for each selected project.
9,, 5(325735(6(17$7,21
The consultant will have to submit the following reports:
• a report of the first phase within 1 month from the beginning of the work (English/5 copies);
• a report of the second phase within 2.5 months from the beginning of the work (English/5 copies);
• a provisional synthesis reports within 20 days from the beginning of the third phase, (English/5 copies);
• a final synthesis report 15 days after having received comments of the Commission concerned services
(English, Russian, 100 copies).
All the reports have to be delivered on floppy disk and by electronic mail.
9,,, (;3(5765(48,5('
The evaluation will be carried out by a multi-disciplinary team, the experts of which should have NIS
experience.
• man/month
First phase (30 man/day)
Second phase (100 man/day)
Third phase (30 man/day - including final seminars)
• Team composition
The team leader should have the following background:
• senior evaluator with at least 15-20 years of experience, policy analyst and background in macro
economic policy.
The team has to include the following expertise:
• SME policy specialist
• management policy and training specialist
• private sector senior manager
 (/(0(1772%(7$.(1,172&216,'(5$7,21)257+(35(3$5$7,212)
7(&+1,&$/$1'),1$1&,$/352326$/
The consultant, during the preparation of the technical and financial proposals, will have to take into
account the following issues:
• kick off and debriefing meetings will be organised in Brussels for the presentation of inception,
intermediate and final reports
• cost for the evaluation presentation at workshop will be beard by the consultant
• interpretation and travel cost in Russian Federation will be beard by the consultant
• translation cost will be beard by the consultant
The consultant has to detailed the number of person/day for each of the expert in Russian Federation and in
EU.
The evaluation unit will co-ordinate the evaluation study and will provide the consultant with the following
support:
• letter of presentation to concerned Commission services, Delegation, Monitoring unit and Co-
ordinating Unit
• facilities for the organisation of workshop (meeting room, secretarial services, interpretation whenever
needed
Tender evaluation criteria
a. evaluation study team
The team will be evaluated in accordance with:
• previous common experience in the implementation of sectoral studies and/or evaluation studies
• experience in the concerned fields
• experience in the NIS
• knowledge of Tacis management process
Previous involvement in the design or implementation of ESG will not be eligible
b. methodological proposal
The methodological proposal should follow and complement the methodological approach proposed by the
ToR.
c. company experience
The consulting company should have direct experience in the implementation of policy studies and
evaluation.
d. Financial proposal
The total number of person/day in EU and in NIS countries will be taken into consideration.
$QQH[
(YDOXDWLRQ7HDP0HPEHUV
Johan de Leede Teamleader
Dr. Manfred Gaulhofer SME Expert
Dr. Rodney Baldwin Management Training Expert
Douglas McLure Short term Consultant
Danil Samoilenko Short term Consultant
Vitaly Bondarenko Short term Consultant
Galina Volostnykh Short term Consultant
Collean Evans de Souza Editor
$QQH[
/LVWRI3HRSOH,QWHUYLHZHG
%UXVVHOV
Sven Kjellstrom Head Tacis SCR/A3
Giovanni Morsiani Task Manager
Gwendolene Vamos Task Manager
Hans Sprokkreef Task Manager PIP
Achille Orzali Task Manager
Maria Smulders Former Task Manager PIP and WAP
Torben Lovenhoj ESSN Project Manager
(8PHPEHUVWDWHV
O.P Hansen Kampsax
Heinz Nordsieck SES
Uwe Vieth SES
Willem Zuidhoff NMCP
Van der Ende NMCP
Tony Daponte Senior Expert
Dr Heinz Pammer Senior Expert
5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ
Mary Hall Delegation of EC in Moscow
Juliet Schofield Delegation of the EC in Moscow
Igor A. Markov Tacis Coordinating Unit
Mikhail Korvyakov Tacis Coordinating Unit
Vasily Malakha Tacis Coordinating Unit
Monica Zabel Tacis Monitoring Team
Geraldine Gibbons Tacis Monitoring Team
David Oldfield Tacis Monitoring Team
Victor Ermakov President, Russian Agency for Small Business
Support
Ivan Mishin Vice-President, Russian Agency for Small
Business Support
Ms Balyuk Director, Moscow Agency for the Development of
Entrepeneurship
Vladimir Rostislavin Director, Voronezh SME Development Agency
Lydia Galkhova Regional Administration of Tomsk, SME
Department
Mr. Gavrilenko Managing Director, Delkont
Ms. Tishina Representative of NMCP
Nikolay Vassiliev CCI of the RF
Evgeny P Majanov CCI of the RF
Alexei Perepelkin CCI of the RF
Andreas Reisch Koordinierungsstelle für wirtschaftliche Beratung
an der Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Nikolai Gruzdev Asor Co. Ltd.
Irina Shitkina Elinar  Closed Joint Stock Co.
Irina Razumnova Guildia Co. Ltd.
Anatoly Pikalov College for Ecology and Humanities
Borsi Ivanov College for Ecology and Humanities
Andrei Souiazov Visavis, small enterprise
Andrei Sharmolaikin Shihovo-2 Co. Ltd.
Victor Farshtendiker ZIS-EKRAN Co. Ltd.
A. Slobodkin Rosmediograph Co. Ltd.
Victor Mohov Qua Dialysis Co. Ltd.
A. Nedvetski Armadillo-Freight Forwarding Co
8]EHNLVWDQ
Bakhtair Saddridinov CU
Nosir Asadullakhodjaev CU
Peter Reddish CU
Marc Jessel CU
Shuhkrat Akhundjanov Director General BCC
Fatima Mukmova Deputy Director BCC
Peter Skytte LTE Tacis Support to Tashkent BCC Project
Farida Yuldasehva SME DA Samarkand
Ms. Kartashovka SME DA Gulistan
Antonio Kerido ESSN Expert
Abdurakhman Azimov President, BEK, private company
Gennady Odinokov JSC Tashor
Mouradkhan s. Usmanovb JSC Tashor
Anatoly Primov Director, ERTA Co. Ltd.
Dmitry M. Kasatkin Guide, ERTA Co. Ltd.
Akhbor A. Khodjaev General Director, Silver Ariadne’s Clew
Dmitry A. Giller Deputy Director, Silver Ariadne’s Clew
Alexey Mikhailov BRIZ Co.
Sakhid S. Talibshanov ISTAL Co.
Yuri S. Volkov Director, GRIFON-V.R. Ltd.
Vadim Lisenko Chief of Technical Department,
BVV Newspaper
Bakhtair Ibragimov Company Director, Charvador Co.
Agzam K. Usmanov Managing Director, ALOKA A.K
Magomed S. Iskandarov President, ABUBAKAR International Ltd.
Botyrion Niyosov Chairman, Vtorma Cooperative
Ravil S. Savirjanov Market Skills Development Centre
Enrico Romito LTE Tacis Project Market Skills Development
Centre
$QQH[
/LVWRI'RFXPHQWV5HFHLYHG
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$QQH[
6DPSOH4XHVWLRQQDLUHV
4XHVWLRQQDLUHWR60('$VDQG%&&VLQ5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ
4XHVWLRQQDLUHDWWDFKHGWR60('$¶VDQG%&&VUHJDUGLQJ
&RPSDQLHVWKDWSDUWLFLSDWHGLQ(661
4XHVWLRQQDLUHWR7DFLV&RRUGLQDWLQJ8QLWV
4XHVWLRQQDLUHVHQWWR60('$VDQG%&&VLQWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQWR
LQYHVWLJDWHWKHLUDVVHVVPHQWRIWKH(661SURJUDPPH
7R7KH'LUHFWRUVRI
60('HYHORSPHQW$JHQFLHV
8QGHUWKH5XVVLDQ$JHQF\IRU6PDOO%XVLQHVV6XSSRUW
0RVFRZ0D\
Dear Mrs/Mr. Director
On behalf of Tacis, the British Company IPS is carrying out an evaluation of the so-called
Tacis Enterprise Support Facilities at the moment. These Facilities comprise the following
four programmes:
7KH3URGXFWLYLW\,QLWLDWLYH3URJUDPPH
7KH(661±(XURSHDQ6HQLRU6HUYLFH1HWZRUN3URJUDPPH
7KH(XURSDUWHQDULDWDQG&,63DUWHQDULDWSURJUDPPH
7KH&KDPEHU3DUWQHUVKLS0HUFXUH3URJUDPPH
Most of you have certainly already heard about these programmes and some of you probably
have been participating in their implementation. As you may know, the programmes are
relying to a certain extent on the SME development Agencies concerning the identification of
participants in the first three of the above programmes. In the case of ESSN, SME DAs are
even paid a success fee for the identification of companies interested in participation.
We know that some of you are actively involving yourselves in these activities in order to
further promote their image as a valuable service provider for the local business community.
This makes it interesting for the Evaluation Team to hear more about your experience with
these programmes. As one of the main objectives of the evaluation is to make
recommendations to Tacis for the further improvement of the Facilities, we are also very
much interested in your recommendations.
The Evaluation Team would therefore like to ask you, dear Ms. or Mr. Director to assist us in
our task by feeding back to us your experience and your comments. By doing so, you will
make an important contribution to the improvement of the Tacis Facilities for the sake of
small and medium size enterprises in the Russian Federation.
We are joining two questionnaires per programme (except for the Chambers programme) to
this mail. One questionnaire is aimed at getting your personal assessment and
recommendations. We ask all of you to fill out these short questionnaires.
Those among you who have been actively involved in the implementation of the Facilities are
requested to have a talk with one company per programme who have participated in it. This
talk should give the enterprise to feed back its experience to the evaluation team. In order to
help you in structuring this discussion, we add the second questionnaire.
We would be very grateful to you for sending back the questionnaire as soon as possible to
the e-mail address of the Russian Agency for Small Business Support.
48(67,211$,5(21<2853(5621$/(9$/8$7,212)7+((661
352*5$00((please fill in your answers in EROGand LWDOLFVor write your remarks.
1. In my opinion the ESSN programme is:
very useful to some extent useful not useful
2. I know companies that participated in the ESSN programme:
 yes no
 2UJDQLVDWLRQDODQGILQDQFLDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKH(661SURJUDPPHDUHH[SODLQHG
WRFRPSDQLHVLQWHUHVWHGLQDVVLVWDQFHIURPWKH(661SURJUDPPH
YHU\FOHDUO\ PRUHRUOHVVXQGHUVWDQGDEOH XQFOHDUO\
 7KHPDLQDFKLHYHPHQWRIWKHSURJUDPPHLV
7KHPDLQGUDZEDFNRIWKH(661SURJUDPPHLV
   7KH IROORZLQJDVSHFWVVKRXOGEHDPHOLRUDWHGZLWK WKHDLPRI UDLVLQJ WKH(661
SURJUDPPHHIILFLHQF\
 I recommend Tacis to attach to the ESSN programme:
more importance than before same importance as before no attention at all
2. Questionnaire which was also attached to the SME DAs and BCCs in Russia
should they know companies which had participated in ESSN to whom they were
asked to hand over the present questionnaire.
4XHVWLRQQDLUHIRUWKRVHFRPSDQLHVWKDWKDGDOUHDG\SDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKH(661
SURJUDPPHSDJHV
This questionnaire is the basis for an interview/discussion.
Please write down the answers given by the interviewed company and send them to :
Either in writing to the fax of the Russian Agency 095 247 6252.
Or by e mail to the Russian Agency (harlamov@ra.siora.ru)
(6614XHVWLRQQDLUH
7KH(XURSHDQ6HQLRU6HUYLFH1HWZRUN
What do you know about ESSN ( functions, addresses, telephone numbers, services
provision, conditions, sources of information).
1. Please describe the main purpose and usefulness of ESSN experts.
2. Did you get a substantial positive result from usage of the ESSN expert?
(a) if the answer is positive could you describe it specifically;
(b) if you have not achieved the anticipated result, why did it happen?
       3.    What was your source of the information on the ESSN programme?
(a) What was the route through which the official information on the ESSN
programme come to you.
(b) In the case of the absence of the official information, where and how did
you obtain details about ESSN?
       4.     Did you have personal contacts with ESSN representatives  (telephone, fax, e
mail?)
(a) If not please explain specifically through which mediators you have
addressed ESSN or its department:
       5.    What are the sources from which you learned about the payment terms for ESSN
              services and what do you know about this issue?
(a) What kind of costs related to ESSN services are paid by the European
party?
(b) What costs are borne by the Russian party?
(c) Where, when and who informed you of the opportunity to avail yourself of the
FRQVXOWDQF\RIWKH(661H[SHUWV"
(d)  Did you get several CVs of experts and have the opportunity to chose the most
suitable?
      (e) How much time was needed to call the ESSN expert?
(f) How much time did the expert spend in your company?
6.   Were you asked to pay for the expert’s services  (who, how much and for what)?
:KHQDQGZKHUHGLG\RXILQGRXWWKH(661ZDVD7DFLV¶SURJUDPPH"
:DVWKHH[SHUWZKRZRUNHGZLWK\RXZHOOSUHSDUHGIRUVROYLQJWKHJLYHQWDVN"
(a) was the expert informed well enough about you specific problems?
(b) If not was the lack of specificity of your application responsible for that?
(c) Is it possible that insufficient information was caused by the fact that the
translation of the application for the expert was not adequate?
9.  Are you satisfied with the results of the expert’s work?
10. If you are not satisfied, what are you not satisfied with and what anticipations
were not fulfilled. 
11. Do you believe as a result of the expert’s assistance you managed to solve all the
      given tasks?
12. In the event your company faces new problems, would you address ESSN again or
      would you look for other consultants.
(a) If so would you follow the same way through ESSN.
(b) Or would you use other channels (describe please)
       13. What problems did the expert experience while working at your firm?
(a) problems with getting information?
(b) Difficulties in relations with people (translation, lack of communication,
skills etc.
(c) Lack of knowledge of the situation in Russia, including the conditions
related to the enterprise?
(d) Were there problems with application of the previous experience or was it
       impossible to apply it at all and why?
       14. Do you comprehend now whether you were right in formulation of the
objectives and tasks for the expert?
       15. Was the written activity plan elabourated by the ESSN expert according to the
             results of his work at your firm?
(a) Did you follow the activity plan or make your amendments?
(b) Are you satisfied with the results and terms of the activity plan
implementation?
(c) If the activity plan has not been implemented completely or partially, what
is the reason for that?
           16. General remarks on raising the efficiency of the Tacis and ESSN programmes.
 48(67,211$,5(6(17727$&,6&225',1$7,1*81,76
Dear Mr. Team Leader
On behalf of Tacis, IPS is currently carrying out an evaluation of the former Tacis
Enterprise Support Facilities Group which is now called the Small Projects
Programme.
Two countries have been selected for the evaluation: the Russian Federation and
Uzbekistan. However, the evaluation will cover all NIS countries. Thus, we
would like to ask you, Mr Team Leader, to assist us in the preparation of sensible
conclusions by providing us with some information and your view on some of the
Facilities.
More specifically, we would like to ask you for information concerning the
implementation of the (661 ± The European Senior Service Network and
3DUWHQDULDWthe participation of NIS managers in Europartenariat events and the
CIS Partenariat.
From our findings in Russia and Uzbekistan, it would appear that the need for and the
usefulness of both programmes is varying from country to country. Thus, we
would be very thankful to you if you would give your view in the country which
you represent Tacis by answering the questions listed below.
Your contribution should help us in better identifying the specifics of the programmes
in the different countries and to better assess the usefulness of the continuation of
the programme or its replacement by other initiatives.
We would be grateful if you would respond within the next two weeks either by e-
mail to IPS@telecall.co.uk (the IPS head office in Bristol attn. Mr Danil
Samoilenko) or to gp@gp-graz.telecom.at ( the e-mail address of Mr. Manfred
Gaulhofer, the SME expert in the evaluation team).  Or by fax to IPS Bristol, +44
1179 7324170r to G & P – Dr. Gaulhofer & Partner, 43 316 373837.
Thanking you very much for your co-operation for the sake of improvement of the
Tacis programme.
With Best Regards
Johan de Leede Team Leader of the Evaluation Team
Manfred Gaulhofer SME Expert
48(67,216&21&(51,1*(661
(In case of multiple choice questions: please give your answer by highlighting your
answer in bold if you answer by e-mail or by ticking your answer if you respond by
fax).
1. Do you basically see ESSN as a useful programme for SMEs in your country?
YES NO
2. What volume does the ESSN programme have in your country?
A big one A medium one A small one
3. Should the volume of ESSN in your country be;
Enlarged maintained as it is Reduced
4. Would you say that ESSN assignments in your country – on average – produce
concrete results in the companies receiving assistance from and ESSN expert?
YES No
(a) if yes, which ones;
(b) If no, do companies just get general advice on how best to manage
a company etc? Which other reasons are there for the companies
not getting the desired results?
       How/by whom are SMEs in your country made acquainted with the existence of the
ESSN Programme
By the CU by intermediaries by representatives of ESSN
(BCCs & SME DAs) or a national senior service organisation
5. Do SMEs in your country contact ESSN directly, through ans intermediary or are
they mainly contacted by ESSN?
directly through intermediaries they are contacted by ESSN or
(CU, BCCs, SME DAs) a national senior service institution
6. Are the experts normally well prepared for the assignment ?
YES NO
(a) Do they know enough about the country they are assisting and the
country in advance?
YES NO
(b) If not, to which factors was this due?
8.    Do the experts and their work normally meet the expectations of the companies?
YES NO
(a) In case of no: what does not comply?
9.    Do ESSN assignments actually help SMEs overcome (some of) the problems of
the companies?
YES NO Partly
10.  Do you have any recommendations for the improvement of the ESSN
programme?
11. Do you have any further comments?
48(67,216&21&(51,1*3$57(1$5,$7
1. Do you basically see the participation of NIS managers in Europartenariats as
a sensible initiative?
YES NO
2. Some people say that the participation of NIS managers in Europartenariat
under the Tacis programme is mainly an EU funding for leisure trips for the
managers. Do you agree with this opinion?
YES, fully To a certain extent No, not at all
3. Do you think that the participation of NIS managers in Europartenariat is a
good means to expose managers from your country to EU business practice?
YES NO
4. Some say that it would be better to provide NIS managers with the
opportunity to visit specialised (industry sector related) trade fairs instead of
sending them to Europartenariats? Do you share this view?
YES NO
5. Do you know about cases in which the visit to a Europartenariat did not only
produce letters of intent but real contracts?
YES NO
If yes, could you name some
6. Some say it would be good to continue to invite SMEs from your country to
             Europartenariats, but they should pay for it themselves. Do you agree with that?
YES NO
In case of yes, should the EU (Tacis or DGXXIII) continue to finance
national counsellors?
7. Is the CIS Partenariat an initiative which should be repeated in the future?
YES NO 
In case of yes, in Russia or in other countries too, based on a rotational principle?
8. Would you say that a CIC Partenariat fits better the current needs of SMEs in
your country than participation in Europartenariats?
YES NO
If yes, why?
       9.   Any other comments, recommendations or remarks?
